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**Existence of Pro-Perestroyka Group
Acknowledged**

46050010 Beirut ARARAT in Armenian 11 Nov 88 p 2

[Third installment of interview with Soviet Armenian poetess Silva Kaputikyan by unidentified correspondent; date and place not given]

[Excerpt] [Correspondent] Comrade Kaputikyan, we learn from the press that Armenia also has a popular front called "Haykashen" to support perestroyka. Could you tell us briefly about that front?

[Kaputikyan] Yes, but only briefly because this is not the time or the place to elaborate on it. I believe that it will be possible to discuss this program in greater detail in the future through popular means, such as "round tables" or other means. Let me just say that the front has committees which must deal primarily with Karabakh and then with issues related to socioeconomics, ecology, history, culture, language, the diaspora, Armenians living in the

Soviet Union and interethnic relations on the basis of only the people's general interests and rejecting any programs and coercions which come from an imperious system, which are imposed from the top and which are often detrimental to the country. The front must be a body which puts the general principle of democracy into practice and which implements and realizes it. To make myself clearer, let me state the following: Had such a body been in operation many years ago—which was banned in the pre-perestroyka period under the arbitrary government system—nationally destructive programs such as draining the Sevan Lake, saturating the small republic with "big chemicals" and building a nuclear power plant near Yerevan would not have taken place in an unstoppable manner.

As you realize, the "Haykashen" front has assumed a very broad area of activity and has a plan of continual action. However, the Karabakh movement has engulfed us so intensely in these recent months that it is impossible to sit still and to formulate plans. [passage omitted]

REGIONAL

Joint Communique Issued by Libyan, Jordanian Labor Unions

45040121 Tripoli AL-MUNTIJUN in Arabic
8 Oct 88 p 3

["Joint Libyan-Jordanian Arab Labor Union Communique"]

[Text] On 28 September 1988, in response to an invitation from the General Confederation of Labor Unions in Jordan, a delegation from the Union of Producers in the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya visited Jordan. The delegation consisted of two comrades, Shutaywi al-Fituri, and 'Ali al-Qabisi. The visit lasted 5 days, during which the delegation met with leaders of the General Confederation and heads of labor unions. The delegation also visited a number of factories, workers' social service centers, and a number of tourist, historical, and archeological sites. At a closing joint meeting, the following joint communique was issued on the visit of the delegation.

1. The two fraternal confederations give their blessing to all Arab efforts aimed at restoring the spirit of Arab solidarity as a step on the path of unifying positions to confront common imminent dangers to the Arab nation. The two confederations affirm the importance of Arab unity as the way to build autonomous Arab strength, recover the position that befits the Arab nation, and achieve victory over all enemies of the nation.

2. The two fraternal confederations give their blessing and esteem to the Intifadah of the heroic Palestinian Arab people in occupied Palestine against the hateful Zionist occupation. They implore the Arab nation to support the Intifadah until it achieves its goals—ending the Zionist occupation, and enabling the Palestinian Arab people to exercise their right to self-determination and establishment of their independent state on the soil of their homeland, Palestine.

3. The two fraternal confederations condemn America's unjust attack against fraternal Iraq, its attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign, independent country, and its assumption of the role of international guardian and policeman at a time when the United States is supporting violations of the rights of peoples, racist movements, and the use of organized state terrorism. The greatest proof of this is America's support of the Zionist entity and the racist regime in South Africa and its open aggression against the territory of the Libyan Jamahiriya.

4. The two fraternal confederations ask the Arab states to work to create a just and appropriate solution to the Lebanese problem, one that will end the tragic situation,

preserve the unity and independence of Lebanon as a land and people, end foreign interference in Lebanese affairs, and end Zionist occupation of the insurgent Lebanese South.

5. The two fraternal confederations welcome the steps of the great Arab Maghrib [the countries of North Africa] and hope that these steps will succeed in achieving a unity that will be the nucleus for comprehensive Arab unity, the hope of all free Arabs. They greatly esteem the resolutions that serve these steps toward unity in all areas—political, economic, and social.

6. The two fraternal confederations call for the building of Arab economic integration and freedom of movement for Arab workers between countries of the greater Arab homeland as a pioneering step to the achievement of comprehensive economic and social development in the Arab homeland and because of the effect this will have—the unification of national interests and goals, which can be considered the primary pillar in the edifice of Arab unity.

7. The two fraternal confederations call on fraternal Arab states that import foreign workers to concentrate on replacing foreign workers with Arab workers, as part of a contribution to solving the problem of unemployment in some parts of the Arab homeland and to avoiding negative social and economic effects from the employment of foreign workers and the danger that their continued presence poses to our values and traditions. The numbers of such foreign workers are estimated to be in the millions, and in some parts of our great Arab homeland they constitute a population majority that in the future will have its rights and political demands.

8. The two fraternal confederations affirm their constant and firm commitment to the unity of Arab workers and to joint action to support the course of the Arab labor movement so that it regains its glories, its position, and its ability to exert influence as a mass pressure force to build Arab unity and defend the destiny-related causes of the Arab nation.

[They affirm their] support of rights and freedoms in the great Arab homeland, especially the rights and freedoms of trade unions.

9. The two fraternal confederations affirm their unconditional support for the struggle of peoples fighting for freedom, independence, and national sovereignty in all parts of the world and solidarity with their legitimate struggle to achieve their national and human goals.

10. The two fraternal confederations affirm the importance of supporting the front struggling to oppose the ambitions of imperialism, Zionism, and all colonial and racist movements in order to strengthen world peace based on truth and justice.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PLO Publishes Official Reports on Intifadah

Accomplishments, Goals Described

44040181 Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH* in Arabic
11 Dec 88 pp 63-66

[Text] The PLO's Occupied Homeland Affairs Department submitted a report to the PNC's [Palestine National Council] latest session entitled: "The Palestinian Intifadah: Its Accomplishments, Goals and Tasks." The report formed the background for the discussions of the Intifadah Committee emanating from the PNC and for the recommendations made by the committee in this regard. Here is the first part of the report, entitled: "The Intifadah: Its Accomplishments and Goals."

The blazing popular Intifadah in the occupied Palestinian territories is entering its 12th month with greater intensity, escalation, comprehensiveness, and organization, thus reaffirming our Palestinian people's determination to struggle and to reject the occupation, to sweep it away and to never coexist with it. We will underline here briefly the most significant points concerning the Intifadah:

First: The Most Important Causes of the Intifadah:

1. Determination to eliminate occupation:

One of the most significant consequences of the hard, but heroic, modern Palestinian struggle, especially since the PLO emerged in the 1960's and assumed command of the Palestinian struggle factions, is that the Palestinian struggle awareness has taken root and has interacted with the world's rising liberation movement, especially in the developing countries. The people now have their struggling leadership and they have accumulated in the past 21 years of occupation broad struggle experience and the ability to organize and shape the masses and to benefit from the past popular flareups and uprisings. The revolutionary situation has reached the point where the broad masses have realized that the occupation cannot last any longer and that there can be no coexistence with the occupation which must be eliminated so that the independent national state may rise in its place.

2. The racist, colonialist and settlement-oriented nature of occupation:

The Israeli occupation is characterized by being founded on an exploitative racist basis. It refuses to recognize the Palestinian people, it acts arrogantly and barbarically and it implements a comprehensive colonialist policy of plundering the land and the human and natural resources and capabilities, thus inflicting grave losses on all the social classes and groups of our people who well realize that their main conflict is with the occupation. Consequently, they yearn to eliminate the occupation. This is why they have begun to act in order to defeat the occupation and to establish the independent state.

3. The growing importance of the special (Palestinian) factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict issue:

The Palestinian factor has gained special importance since the rise of the Palestinian resistance movement in 1967, through the glorious Intifadah and as a result of retreat in the official Arab position, especially at Camp David, of the 1982 war in Lebanon, of the Iraq-Iran war, of the camps war in Lebanon, of the declining role of the petrodollars, of the (1987) Amman summit's neglect of the Palestinian issue, and so forth. The Palestinian masses have realized, through the [Arab] regimes' failure and retreat and through the regimes' words which have not been matched by deeds, especially the regimes' words that are intended for domestic consumption and that talk of liberation, of the strategic balance and so forth—the masses have realized the importance of their special role in achieving a just solution to our issue. Consequently, the masses have relied on their own struggle experience accumulated over the years. Palestinian national unity has inspired the ideal to rise to defend their cause which can be settled only by their own struggles and by relying on the support of the sisterly Arab masses and progressive world public opinion. This Intifadah has come to liberate Palestinian decision-making from some of the shackles that had impeded it and with this has arrived at a level of independence never attained before, especially since the battle is taking place mainly on Palestine's soil.

4. International liberation accomplishments

Our masses have realized through their prolonged struggle battle that their cause is tied to the international accomplishments made by the world liberation movement, to international detente and to the tendency to settle regional conflicts justly. This realization has given our masses the confidence that their movement will make numerous accomplishments in the current phase.

Second, The Intifadah's Characteristics:

1. Comprehensiveness:

The current Palestinian Intifadah is characterized by being geographically comprehensive, considering that all towns, villages, camps, and quarters of our Palestinian people in the occupied territories are participating in this Intifadah. It is also socially comprehensive, considering that all classes and groups of the Palestinian society, including workers, farmers, landlords, merchants, capitalists, professionals, intellectuals, college students, women, school students, and even children are participating in the Intifadah.

2. National unity:

The Intifadah is one of the most sublime reflections of the unity of the Palestinian people, wherever they exist, and of their support for the PLO, their sole legitimate representative and their struggle leader. This unity has been made evident in the [West] Bank and the [Gaza]

Strip by the kinship of all the Palestinian people's classes and groups, by their participation in the Intifadah and by their support for the Unified National Command which embodies the unity of the main Palestinian national forces through its coordination with all the tendencies, forces, and notables. The Intifadah and the interaction with this Intifadah reflect the unity and indivisibility of the Palestinian people wherever they exist, be they in their homeland or in the diaspora.

3. Immense organizational capability:

The past months have proven how great are the Palestinian masses' creative organizational capabilities that have paralyzed the occupier's hand. This capability has been made evident by creation of the national authority's nuclei, namely the popular committees that have spread throughout every quarter, alley, village, camp, and town. These committees have been diversified to include educational, health, supply, agricultural, women's, information, and price control affairs. They also include professional committees, committees concerned with social conditions and other committees.

These committees are founded on unionist struggle bases and are closely tied to the Unified National Command which drafts the general plans and goals which the committees then develop, crystallize and implement.

Through its appeals and with implementation by the popular committees, the Unified National Command has

been able to organize the Intifadah's progression and has created an indestructible national authority parallel to the occupation authority. This is how partial strikes have been organized and imposed and how general strike days are organized, how the boycott of Israeli products is achieved, how family solidarity is insured, how local industrial and agricultural production is protected, how health care is provided, how blockaded areas are aided, and how other activities are performed.

4. Immense capability for sacrifice:

The people's spirit of sacrifice has risen high, the strike forces have advanced, the masked men have embraced the Palestinian flag, and the masses have advanced to confront the neo-Nazi army's bullets, gas, blockades, bone-breaking, and house searches. They have foiled Israel's oppression machine which is getting more ferocious with time. The masses have paid dearly for the Intifadah. More than 500 people have been martyred, 30,000 people have been wounded, and 35,000 people have been imprisoned in the ugliest detention camps (Ansar-3, al-Zahiriyyah and others), orders have been issued for the deportation of 57 strugglers, and more than 366 homes have been demolished.

Despite these costly and honorable sacrifices and despite the intensifying Zionist means of oppression, the Palestinian national will is higher and stronger and the resolve to struggle is firmer.

List of Martyrs According to Date, Cause, and Sex*

Month	Cause of Martyrdom					Total	Sex	
	Shot	Tortured	Gassed	Run Over	Unknown		Male	Female
December	32	-	2	4	12	48	41	7
January	24	-	17	-	9	50	39	11
February	27	5	2	2	24	60	48	12
March	49	3	13	4	23	93	82	11
April	48	3	16	-	14	78	63	15
May	16	1	1	-	11	31	26	5
June	17	2	5	-	4	28	26	2
July	20	4	1	2	2	29	26	3
August	17	6	2	-	7	32	30	2
September	19	2	3	2	4	30	29	1
October	31	2	3	5	1	42	37	5
Total	300	28	65	19	111	523	449	74

*Statistical Report by PLO's Occupied Homeland Affairs Department

5. Clear vision and self-confidence:

The Palestinian masses in the occupied territories and their Unified National Command have known what they want since the Intifadah's beginning. They talk with absolute clarity about their phased strategic goals. In this, they proceed on the basis of strong self-confidence. With clarity and without any ambiguity, the Palestinian masses have defined their position on the PLO's sole representation of the Palestinian people and their

resolve to remove the occupation, to establish the independent state on Palestine's soil and to reject all self-rule, sharing of functions, and civil administration plans. They have demanded an end to the annihilation measures and have stressed the need for measures to be taken to prepare for a total Israeli withdrawal.

6. Continuity:

The Palestinian people's sons in the occupied territories possess the resistive elements that confirm that they are

resolved to continue the Intifadah and that it is impossible to put an end to this Intifadah, thanks to the Intifadah's comprehensive geographic and social character, to its careful organization, and to the bravery, the sacrifices made and the martyrs offered generously under the canopy of great self-confidence, of clear vision, and of a definite political objective.

Even though the Israeli suppression machine has become more ferocious and has been employing murder, bone-breaking, deportation, detention, economic blockades, inspection campaigns, house searches, and blockades against entire towns and villages on Saturdays and on general strike days, has been using live, rubber and plastic bullets and has been destroying property and crops to prevent the inhabitants from harvesting their crops with the aim of starving them and of striking the national economy, despite the harsh successive threats and statements made by the prominent Israeli officials and despite their repeated allegations that the conditions are tending toward tranquility, the Intifadah's flame continues to burn and will continue to burn until our people get their freedom and independence.

Third, The Intifadah's Objectives

The Intifadah has defined its phased and long-range objectives clearly, keeping in mind that achieving these objectives is influenced by local, Arab, Israeli, and international factors. In defining these objectives, the Unified National Command has proceeded on the basis of the Palestinian struggle constants which are reflected most clearly in the political program of the PNC's 18th session. These objectives have also been defined through direct interaction with the PLO leadership, taking into consideration the new circumstances developing at the local, Arab, and international levels and proceeding on the basis of the need to move from the general to the more specific and explicit.

1. Phased objectives:

- Secure international protection for our people's masses for a period of no more than a few months while preparing to establish the independent state.
- Abolish all the mandatory and occupation charters and laws currently in force.
- Release all of the Intifadah's and revolution's detainees and prisoners and shut down all the military detention camps.
- End the policy of expulsion, deportation, administrative detention, collective punishment, and house demolition and permit the repatriation of deportees.
- Stop land confiscation and settlement activity.
- End the violation of sanctities and of educational institutions and reopen these institutions.
- Withdraw the occupation forces from the Palestinian population concentration areas and end the torture activities practiced by the occupation authorities.
- Hold democratic municipal and village council elections, eliminate the restrictions on the Palestinian

national economy and put an end to the illegal tax-collection policy.

2. Long-range goals:

The Intifadah has spelled out its long-range objectives with absolute clarity. They are the objectives for which the national liberation movement, represented by the PLO, is struggling, namely: The inevitable attainment of the established rights to repatriation and self-determination and to establishing the independent Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative.

In this, the Intifadah proceeds from the position of revolutionary realism which requires the PNC to adopt a clear and complete political program capable of mobilizing the broadest international support for our people's national rights. The Intifadah expresses its confidence that the PNC will take the right steps to fill the vacuum created by the Jordanian [disengagement] decisions and will embrace programs and methods of action capable of crystallizing the Intifadah's freedom and independence slogans and of gaining greater support for our established rights. The Intifadah underlines the need for convening a fully-empowered international conference in which the PLO participates with an independent delegation and on equal footing with the other parties concerned.

Fourth, The Intifadah's Accomplishments

The Intifadah has come as a new, continuous, blazing and explosive form of struggle that has made numerous accomplishments at Palestinian, Arab, international, and Israeli levels.

1. At the Palestinian level:

The Intifadah has crowned a new phase of the continuous Palestinian struggle in all its forms and throughout its numerous historical phases, especially the modern PLO-led phase. Thus, the Intifadah has contributed a great qualitative addition to the Palestinian struggle's accomplishments and to strengthening and crystallizing the previous accomplishments. The Intifadah's most significant accomplishments are:

A. It has restored to the Palestinian masses their confidence in themselves and in their glorious contribution to their national liberation march and has given rise to the democratic popular struggle as a new qualitative element added to the other forms of struggle that contribute to reaffirming and bolstering independent Palestinian decision-making. It has underlined the importance of the Palestinian factor in defending Palestinian rights and the ability of this factor to play an influential role side by side with the other factors affecting the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

B. It has united all social groups and national forces of the Palestinian people, regardless of whether they are in the occupied homeland or in the diaspora.

C. It has broken the barrier of fear of the occupation army, has elevated the spirit of sacrifice and has enabled the masses to discover their latent and mighty capabilities that have strengthened confidence in achieving the national goals and that have left the occupation authorities and their protectors groping about and acting hysterically. But their groping and hysteria will not rescue them from the inevitable removal of the occupation.

2. At the Arab level:

The Arab official and popular interactions with the Intifadah continue, thus achieving numerous accomplishments, some of which have already materialized while others are not yet manifest await the moment of birth. These accomplishments include:

A. A growing circle of popular solidarity, support and aid movements backing the Intifadah, its people and its organization. These movements are reflected in numerous forms of financial and political support committees, in family solidarity committees and in popular movements that [are emerging] despite all the impediments and obstacles put in their way.

B. Conclusion of the Intifadah summit with resolutions that have decisively settled issues on which past attempts tried to cast doubts, such as the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to the creation of an independent state, the PLO's representation of the Palestinian people, its right to participate in the international conference as an equal to the other partners and recognition of the Palestinian identity of the occupied homeland.

C. Disengagement of the Jordanian Government's legal and administrative ties to the Palestinian [West] Bank as an inevitable outcome and a great accomplishment of the Intifadah.

D. Discarding all partial options and solutions and all maneuvers hostile to our people and retaining the sole option of Palestinian struggle.

E. Opening new horizons for the Arab liberation movement to confront the defeatism of the deteriorating Arab official position. The Intifadah is serving as a mighty model of how to confront imperialist means of oppression, domination, and subjugation, and is restoring confidence in the possibility of overcoming the setbacks, the retreats and the violations of the national sovereignty, and is offering the Arab world the possibility of marching forth anew now that indications of the failure of the Zionist expansionist rule and of terminating the Israeli forces' contentiousness and recklessness have surfaced.

3. At the international level

At this level, the Intifadah has made enormous accomplishments that surpass the accomplishments made in this area over more than 40 years. The following are some of the most significant of these accomplishments:

A. The Intifadah has entered nearly every home in the world and our people have gained the respect and sympathy of the overwhelming majority of the world's peoples. Our people's image is in the eyes of all peoples yearning for freedom and liberation. The Intifadah has eliminated the accusations and depictions of "terrorism" which our people's enemies have tried to attach to our struggle.

B. International recognition of our people's just cause and of the need to settle our issue in a manner compatible with the established Palestinian rights has broadened. This recognition has been reflected in the European position, in the U.S.-Soviet summit meetings, in numerous bilateral international meetings and in various international circles.

C. Numerous international liberal circles and broad social circles, including Jewish circles, have joined our friends in the world to demand that a just settlement be achieved for our people's issue. This has strengthened our friends' position and has put Israel's friends in a defensive, rather than offensive, position.

D. The PLO has gained a very high international status it had previously never enjoyed. It has also gained further influence and recognition as the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative. The strongest evidence of this is brother Abu 'Ammar's visit to Strasbourg and the wide international response given to his address to the European Parliament.

E. Increased international conviction of the need to hold an effective international conference to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute and of the need for the PLO to participate in this conference as an equal partner.

F. The United Nations has devoted maximum attention to the Palestinian issue and has adopted a number of positive resolutions serving the interest of the Palestinian people's struggle, such as Resolutions 605, 607, and 608 which have been adopted by the Security Council and which refer to the occupied Palestinian territories and to the Palestinian people explicitly and clearly. UN Assistant Secretary General Golding has also been dispatched to inspect and to familiarize himself with the Palestinian people's conditions on the spot and to reveal the true nature of the barbaric practices taking place in the occupied territories.

G. Israel's false allegations have been exposed and Israel has been put in the dock before the entire world. The false premises on which Israel founded its world propaganda through which it depicted itself as a small democratic country engulfed by a sea of Arab hostility and tried to justify the crimes it commits against the Palestinian people—these false premises have been destroyed. The Intifadah has reversed the picture and has exposed Israel's true character as an aggressive, racist, and occupying entity practicing the ugliest forms of violence and terrorism against unarmed people demanding their right to liberation and national independence.

4. At the Israeli level:

The Intifadah has, as a result of the Israeli war machine's failure to curb it, left its deep impact on the Israeli society, creating economic, political and social crises within it.

A. The economic aspect:

The Palestinian territories have turned from a source of net profit yielding to Israel a minimum annual income of \$1.8 billion to an economic burden costing the Israeli treasury more than \$5 million daily. We will discuss this aspect in greater detail when we tackle the issue of the economy's role in the Intifadah.

B. The political aspect:

1. There has been a turn toward rightist and fascist radicalism with the open emergence of the "transfer" theories and of the calls for concerted killing, deportation and detention campaigns, and for the use of more violent and harsher means by the army. This in turn has intensified the social crisis in Jewish society, subsequently reflecting a tendency and an inclination toward violence within this very society.

2. The democratic current within Israel demanding a just solution to the Palestinian issue has gained greater strength and has been tied to new liberal forces that have organized themselves in numerous movements, exceeding 30 in number, which call for ending the acts of killing, demolition and deportation and for searching for solutions to the Palestinian problem based on the impossibility of perpetuating the occupation of a people who reject this occupation strongly.

3. A qualitative change has developed in the position of the Israeli army's reserve generals and of Israeli writers, artists, lawyers, journalists and university professors who now oppose the occupation's practices in the occupied Palestinian territories. This change ranges from recognizing the Palestinian people's right to self-determination to demanding an end to the current practice of torture in these territories. The Israeli writers and intellectuals, along with their Palestinian colleagues in the Bank and the Strip, have signed a "peace document" which recognizes the Palestinian people's right to set up an independent state in the Bank and the Strip under the leadership of the PLO

which must participate in the international peace conference. A total of 235 prominent reserve officers with ranks of brigadier general and above have formed the Peace and Security Council which has categorically refuted the contention of the importance of the Bank and the Strip to Israel's security and has demanded an end to the idea of perpetuating the occupation of these territories. Furthermore, more than 2,000 officers have signed a document to this effect which has been delivered to Shamir. More than 200 lecturers in Israeli universities have done the same. Numerous Israeli lawyers have also staged sit-ins in their unions to protest the legal violations committed in the Israeli military courts.

4. The phenomenon of rejecting military service in the occupied Palestinian territories has spread, especially among Israeli high school seniors, as an expression of their protest against and rejection of the ugly methods employed in these territories. Thirty four soldiers have decided to go to jail rather than serve. The phenomenon of deserting the military service by submitting false medical reports has also spread.

5. The position toward the PLO has changed. Whereas all the Zionist parties used to refuse to meet with the PLO, we have found that some of these parties, such as RATZ and the MAPAM, as well as some prominent party and Israeli administration officials, such as (Avraham) Tamir, (Professor and Retired General Yehoshafat) Harkabi and Peres, in his recent statements in Paris, have begun to talk of the need to deal with the PLO. Even though their statements are coupled with conditions, this change reflects a new position imposed by the Intifadah.

6. The Intifadah has compelled the Zionist movement to reconsider many of its theories, such as the "greater Israel, the pure Jewish state, the settlement and security, the message of the Jewish state and of Jewish ethics" theories. The Intifadah has deeply shaken whoever believes that the occupation has entrenched its foundations and that the expansionist Zionist dream is at the peak of its implementation. This conviction has been replaced by voices warning of the fascism of the State of Israel, of transforming this state into something similar to South Africa's government, and of leading Israel to the wilderness of international isolation.

7. Proliferation within Israeli society of behavioral patterns similar to those displayed by U.S. troops during and after the Vietnam war. The manifestations of violence and suicide have increased and psychiatrists are more extensively involved in working with the [Israeli] soldiers.

Economic Accomplishments, Strategies

44040197 Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic*
18 Dec 88 pp 25-27

[Text] The PLO's Occupied Homeland Affairs Department submitted to the PNC's latest session a report entitled: "The Palestinian Intifadah's Accomplishments,

Objectives, and Tasks." The report formed the background for the discussions held by the PNC's Intifadah Committee and for the recommendations made by the committee in this regard. In edition No 728, dated Sunday, 11 December 1988, we published the first part of the report, entitled: "The Intifadah's Accomplishments and Objectives."

We publish here the second part of the report, entitled: "Economics in the Intifadah's Battle."

An objective review of the occupied Palestinian territories' economic importance and of the economy's role in deciding the ongoing struggle in the West Bank and Gaza Strip demonstrates the significance of this factor and of the inevitability of our focusing on it in an effort to influence strongly the course of events.

Through its appeals, the Unified National Command has focused on the economic factor's role in dealing painful blows to the Israeli occupation.

On the other hand, the Israeli occupation authorities are trying to exploit the economic factor to pressure the Intifadah and its people by imposing blockades and by destroying the material base of the new economy developing in the Palestinian territories.

Thus, the economic factor, which is closely tied to the social factor, and the political factor are now at the heart of the ongoing struggle. The PLO-Unified National Command is working to strengthen and utilize these factors to accelerate the achievement of victory, whereas the Israeli occupation authorities are trying to curtail the influence of these factors and to obstruct their interaction in the interest of the Intifadah people.

First, Economic Benefits Reaped by Israel From Occupation and the Intifadah's Confrontation of Israel:

The security, political, racial, or military factors were not the only factors which motivated Israel to occupy the Palestinian territories. The economic profit factor has also been a factor motivating Israel to cling to other people's lands, meaning that the exploitative colonialist factor has its role in this regard.

Field studies show that the Israeli economy's net income from the occupation throughout the 1968-87 period exceeded \$35 billion at least, i.e., it amounted on the average to \$1.8 billion annually, keeping in mind that this net annual income had been growing steadily when the Intifadah erupted.

It is worth noting that this net income account does not include all aspects of the colonialist economic exploitation of the occupied territories. It only includes those aspects for which official or semiofficial data and figures are somewhat available, namely, the differences in labor wages, taxes, customs, fees, water, tourism, the trade balance surplus, and the cash remittances from abroad.

This net income does not touch on the revenues generated by exploitation of confiscated lands, real estate, and properties; by the travel tax; by the free labor of prisoners; and so forth.

A comparison between this net income in the 1968-87 period and the financial and military loans and aid Israel received from the United States [in the same period], totaling \$37.8 billion, shows what the West Bank and Gaza Strip mean to Israel at this level. This comparison also demonstrates how strong is the Zionist tendency to exploit these territories which are as important economically as the U.S. aid as a fundamental mainstay decisively supporting Israel's survival.

The Unified National Command acted on the basis of this fact when it focused its successive appeals on economically boycotting Israel's products, on refusing to pay taxes and to work in the settlements, on boycotting work within the green line on all-out strike days, and on other economic countermeasures.

Regarding the boycott of Israeli and foreign goods, most of the Unified National Command's appeals focused on this aspect, urged refusal to sell or advertise such goods in local newspapers, and called for strengthening the boycott so as to strike the Israeli disposal market and to force Israel to look for new markets.

This is because the annual surplus in the trade exchange between the occupied Palestinian territories and Israel exceeds \$500 million [annually]. Thus, the total surplus from 1968 to 1987 amounted to more than \$5.5 billion.

In the past year, the Intifadah made effective and influential accomplishments on the boycott path. The volume of consumer goods, such as foodstuffs, textiles, and especially products for which a local alternative is available, decreased considerably. Moreover, alternative products were encouraged. When no such products were available, the command urged development of the means to enhance home economics. This also affected Israeli agricultural products, keeping in mind that 84 percent of the Palestinian territories' imports from Israel are industrial imports and 16 percent are agricultural imports.

Consequently, Israeli sectoral production establishments, especially establishments designed to produce and sell to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, were gravely affected by this boycott and went bankrupt. The Israeli Central Bank data show that as a direct result of the Intifadah, Israeli industrial production has dropped by three percent. With the Intifadah's progress, with the people's development of alternative production means, or when people become accustomed to abandoning the consumption habits prevalent prior to the Intifadah, the boycott will be even more strongly effective.

The initial estimates show that commodity sales dropped by nearly 25 percent (or by the equivalent of \$300 million) in the first half year of the Intifadah. The textiles sector was the one damaged the most severely, with the drop in its sales estimated at 50 percent.

Regarding employment in the Israeli labor market: For numerous reasons, the most important being people's search for a source of livelihood that would keep them in the motherland, increasing numbers of our Palestinian workers turned to employment within the green line market, with this number growing from 20,000 in the initial years of this market's emergence to nearly 150,000 workers [at present], according to the latest unofficial Israeli estimates. Initially, our workers found employment in the areas of hard labor in which Israeli manpower was fundamentally disinclined to work. With the passage of time, Israel has come to rely to a large degree on Palestinian labor in certain areas, considering that 48 percent of our workers are employed in the construction sector, 17 percent in the industrial sector, 16 percent in the agricultural sector and 19 percent in the services sector.

If we move from the general to the specific, we find that in addition to the construction sector in which Palestinians constitute 40 percent of the labor employed, there are areas of agricultural production that rely totally on Palestinian labor, especially the harvesting and packaging activities.

Employment in the Israeli market constitutes a source of extra profit for businessmen and for the Israeli Treasury by virtue of the difference in the Palestinian worker's and Israeli worker's wages, a difference ranging from 33-46 percent. As a result of the deductions taken out of the workers' wages (national insurance, social security, health services, organization fee and income tax) and as a result of the exploitation of workers to do unlicensed work, this profit is estimated at a minimum of \$500 million annually, a sum equalling the surplus generated in the trade exchange with the occupied territories.

The total profit reaped by Israel from this item in the 1968-87 period is estimated at \$5.9 billion.

As for the other economic consequences inside Israel, the Intifadah has had its impact on other aspects which influence the economic factors and spending inside Israel. The most important of these are:

1. Army and police expenditures: In the face of the comprehensive and constant revolutionary uprising, the occupation authorities have been forced to send more regular and reserve troops and police forces to the bank and the strip. By Rabin's admission, the number of these forces has amounted to more than half the number of troops who invaded Lebanon in 1982, i.e., to 50,000 men. This is why the Israeli Ministry of Defense has been demanding the allocation of additional budgets. In this

regard, the Israeli treasury has, according to facts gathered from the Israeli press, spent a total of nearly \$500 million on the Israeli troops deployed in the bank and the strip.

2. Tourism sector's loss: The glorious Intifadah has had a major impact on exposing the ugly occupation-oriented and oppressive character of Israel, thus encouraging thousands of tourists to cancel their trips to the holy lands in protest. This is in addition to the lack of the tranquillity the tourist desires. As a result, tourist numbers have decreased by more than 30 percent when compared with their numbers in the pre-Intifadah year. This decline continues despite the ceaseless endeavors made by the Israeli and Zionist circles to encourage tourism. The Israeli losses in this area have been estimated at nearly \$200 million.

Thus, it can be said that the Intifadah has, through mobilizing the boycott of Israeli products, refusal to work in the Israeli settlements, refusal to pay taxes, and partial strikes against work within the green line; through the impact of these strikes on the construction, industrial, agricultural and service sectors; and through the additional military expenditures—it can be said that the Intifadah has turned the occupied territories into an economic burden whose costs are initially estimated at \$5 million daily.

Second, the Intifadah and the Effort to Organize the Economic Situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip:

The Unified National Command has devoted great attention to mobilizing local economic capabilities to confront the Israeli oppression and to enhance the Intifadah's procession and to insure its continuity because of the importance of this aspect in deciding the ongoing struggle. This procession has followed the following directions:

1. Encouraging economic rebellion: This direction was crystallized in proclamation of the commercial strike which continued initially for a number of consecutive days and then turned to the partial opening of businesses for 4 hours daily during which the citizens could get essential goods and commodities. We thus combined the principle of defying the occupation authority and imposing this reality on it with securing the conditions for the Intifadah's continuation. This rebellion has also been crystallized in the refusal to pay taxes; in confronting the occupation authority's oppressive methods in this area; in urging the nonpayment of fines levied by the authorities; in breaking up the occupation institutions by encouraging resignations from the police, tax, and customs agencies; and in boycotting the occupation institutions by withdrawing savings accounts from Israeli banks and banking institutions.

2. Protecting and developing national production institutions and service sectors: In this regard, the emphasis has been put on encouraging and enhancing local production so it may replace the Israeli product and serve as a base contributing to the Intifadah's continuation.

The industrial production sector has been encouraged to double and develop its production, to absorb the largest number of workers possible, to organize and form committees to protect the local production and insure its marketing, and to boycott Israeli products for which a national alternative is available.

In view of the importance of land in creating the food self-sufficiency that is very essential to the Intifadah's continuation, the emphasis in the agricultural area has been put on returning to the land, exerting efforts to utilize it most extensively, forming agricultural cooperatives, helping to market the production internally, and reclaiming and developing lands. Emphasis has also been put on the food aspects of agricultural production. The popular agricultural aid committees have played a major role in educating farmers and supplying them with seed and seedlings; in spreading the methods of small-scale poultry and livestock farming to most homes, especially rural homes; and in forming guard committees to protect crops from the settlers' and military forces' endeavors to destroy them.

In the area of developing a new pattern of socioeconomic life, the Intifadah has achieved most of its accomplishments in this area through innovating and creating various and numerous types of popular committees that supervise organizing all aspects of the population's life, through strengthening the various concepts and forms of social cooperation and solidarity, and through rationalizing consumption by excluding all that is not essential, by being content with what is essential, and by constantly storing essentials in preparation for the long struggle. This storing includes not only food but also water, fuel, and other essential supplies. In this area, the Intifadah has created among the people new methods of dealing and cooperation founded on a profound understanding of the existing circumstances. A new relationship has developed between landlord and tenant, worker and employer, the poor and the well-to-do, and the buyer and the seller. Through these methods, pricing is observed and exploitation is avoided between one quarter and another, and between blockaded areas and areas that are not blockaded.

In the health services area, the voluntary health committees have been strengthened and boosted. These committees are founded on voluntarism and on the active efforts of doctors and nurses who provide essential medical services needed as a result of the confrontation between unarmed people and occupation troops heavily armed with various weapons. These committees treat the Intifadah victims who are prevented by the occupation conditions from getting to medical institutions. By virtue of their presence in every quarter, village, and population center, these committees offer their inhabitants treatment in private clinics where they conduct blood tests, provide first aid, hold seminars, and conduct tests to prevent the spread of diseases and epidemics, and collect blood donations.

In area of popular education: In view of the occupation authorities' determination to punish the Intifadah people by making their children ignorant through the closure of their schools and universities, popular schools have been established and each quarter's students have been distributed into the quarter's popular schools. The Israeli authorities are trying to obstruct this phenomenon with all oppressive means by closing these substitute institutions, storming homes, and arresting teachers and students. The Intifadah has responded to these methods by intensifying education in every home and quarter without any fear of the enemy, by trying to renew the basis of certification for students and promotion for teachers teaching in these popular schools, and by eradicating illiteracy among adults to crystallize the slogan of "education for resistance."

3. Home economy: Under the Intifadah's circumstances and to insure the Intifadah's continuation, the Unified National Command decided to raise the slogan of home economy as an important weapon in achieving minimal self-sufficiency in food, in making the boycott of Israeli goods and products successful, in absorbing local manpower in local production, and in turning the occupation into an economic burden for the occupation authorities.

Coupling the struggle objectives with economic feasibility is at the heart of this tendency of encouraging and developing the home economy.

In the agricultural sector, the emphasis is on rural development and giving the substitute its main role in providing the minimum in foodstuffs essential for society by returning to the land; by intensifying agricultural and livestock production; by diversifying crops, especially the main crops needed to secure food, such as grains; by aiding family farms; and by intensifying irrigated and dryland agriculture.

In the industrial sector, the emphasis is on small-scale industrial production, such as the traditional industries, crafts, and family industries, especially food industries. This is because this form of production employs large numbers of workers, exploits local raw materials, does not require big amounts of capital, and is less vulnerable to the occupation's oppression. Moreover, most of these forms of production are already in place. But there is a need to develop and support all facets of this type of production, including clothing, leather products, canning, and dairy production.

4. Labor: The working class is a main artery of the occupied Palestinian territories' national economy. This class has grown in size and now incorporates 175,000 workers, 150,000 of whom work within the green line and 25,000 in the bank's and strip's local industry. This labor is one of the profitable mainstays which the Israeli capitalist businessman tries to obtain and exploit in all ways. Therefore, tackling the working class' role properly will transform this class into a more effective instrument supporting the Intifadah.

Refusal to work within the "green line" will be one of the most important conditions that must exist for comprehensive civil disobedience to be declared. To get to this point, careful and well-studied preparation is needed to make it possible to stage such disobedience in a way that this disobedience may not lead to negative consequences. To reach this point, it is necessary:

1. To create alternative work opportunities by encouraging small-scale industrial production and small agricultural investments, by returning to the land, by intensifying the home economy, and by achieving food self-sufficiency.
2. To take into consideration Gaza's circumstances because although it is possible to ensure a return to work in the West Bank's land, the lack of adequate arable land in the Gaza Strip makes it necessary to intensify small-scale industrial production and small investments in the strip. It also makes it necessary to try to establish firmer integration between the economic projects in each the bank and the strip.
3. To secure direct aid for broader segments of workers employed within the green line through the labor unions in each the bank and the strip.

EGYPT

President's Office Orders 'One Voice' on Uprising
45000090 *London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic*
4 Jan 89 p 8

[Text] President Husni Mubarak's office of political affairs has issued instructions to the editors in chief of Egyptian newspapers for the Egyptian position on the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories to be "of one voice."

These instructions came after an article in Anis Mansur's daily column in AL-AHRAM caused a commotion. In the article, he stressed the necessity of ending the uprising on the West Bank, which he called "acts of violence exchanged between the Palestinians and the Israelis."

These instructions included the nonpublication of opinions such as these in AL-AHRAM or any other Egyptian newspaper.

Foreign Affairs Minister Outlines Policy
45040138a *Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic*
7 Dec 88 pp 12, 13, 57

[Article by Usamah 'Ajjaj]

[Text] Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, asserted that Egyptian foreign policy's most important goals are embodied in the attainment of national security, the support of our economic interests, and the consolidation of comprehensive development efforts, and that the basic components of Egyptian foreign activity, especially in the Arab region,

have brought about a high degree of strength and mutual trust. During a lecture at Cairo University, he said that our relations with the superpowers are based on a foundation of respect for Egypt's sovereignty. What were the features of Egyptian foreign policy set out in the lecture?

The lecture by Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, to the colloquium held by the Center of Political Research and Studies at Cairo University was an opportunity not just for an interpretation of the course of Egyptian foreign policy from the dean of Egyptian diplomats, and the person supervising its execution, but also for the ascertainment of Egypt's positions on many issues that have arisen. The discussion following the colloquium was an opportunity for enriching the dialogue and disclosing further secrets behind the Tabah struggle, prompting Dr 'Abd-al-Majid to hold a full symposium on what had gone on in this struggle, since it was an Egyptian diplomatic success in the system of crisis management of a totally distinctive style, as Dr 'Abd-al-Majid described it. In addition there were the secrets of the Egyptian position on the latest Palestinian movements, which arose from the resolutions that emerged from the Palestine National Council; these Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid described as "a new Palestinian idea which we had not been accustomed to." The rich discussions were not confined to these points. It was necessary to address oneself to positions regarding the issue of the peace agreement, relations with Washington and other important issues.

To begin with the contents of Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid's lecture, he concentrated, at the start, on the phenomenon of society's increasing attention, in spite of their various interests and affiliations, to foreign policy affairs. That may be attributed to an increasing awareness of the influence of foreign trends on their living conditions, in the context of the increased mutual economic dependence among various countries of the world and the interconnection of international interests. On the other hand, the requirements of our democratic system necessitate an understanding of domestic public opinion which supports our foreign orientations and positions, and this makes us concerned to be close at all times to the pulse and aspirations of the Egyptian man in the street. Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid mentioned four features of the international changes in the coming period and defined them as follows:

1. The coming period will witness a diminution of ideological struggle and the appearance of a new stage of balance and conciliation of economic interests between the East and West, such as the continuation of the policy of international detente which has marked the past years.
2. The international system's orientation toward the proliferation of axes and the appearance of new economic axes with a basic role in the international system, which will accordingly have its effect on the redistribution of zones of influence and interests.

3. The increased role of international financing institutions, expansion in the scope of multinational corporations, an increase in mutual economic dependence (highlighting the difficulty of confining the economic cycle within the framework of national boundaries, remote from international economic influences), and an increase in the weight of the economic dimension in the formation of foreign policy in various countries.

4. The world's entry into a deep stage of technological development which will impart its effects on international equilibrium. It is not an exaggeration to say that the strength of countries in the coming period will be determined in accordance with their position on the map of scientific industrial wealth.

National Security and Development

Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid defined two basic goals of Egyptian foreign policy during the coming period:

1. Supporting Egypt's national security.
2. Strengthening development efforts and protecting the economic interests which in their turn support our national security and our regional and international status.

Because of this, Egypt, through its foreign orientations, is trying to obtain regional and international support for its strategy, which is based on establishing the pillars of security and stability in our region. These rely on the following five considerations:

1. The platform of comprehensive peace compatible with the thinking of the age and responsive to the pressing demands of development in our nation.
2. We have been able to regain our occupied territory, and this was recently crowned by the issuance of the ruling of the international arbitration board supporting the Egyptian character of Tabah. That is to be considered a political gain which it has been possible to realize in the context of the peace platform.
3. The adoption of a platform for peace without a deterrent force to protect it will turn into a policy for capitulation as long as the conviction of all parties in the region in the peace approach does not assume a firm basis. In addition, preserving an advanced level for our armed forces will strengthen the features of Egypt's Arab, African and regional role.
4. Peace, if it is to endure, must be comprehensive and just, and that requires the elimination of the roots of the struggle and acceptance by the parties to it of the platform of peace. The recent resolutions of the Palestine National Congress in Algiers have reflected moderation, realism and an acceptance of Resolutions 338 and 242. This is a position which calls for encouragement, backing and support from all peace-loving forces in the world.

5. The Israeli party, sooner or later, will in its turn face the need to develop its position in a positive manner because of the difficulty of remaining in the current situation on occupied Arab territories, in the light of the brave Palestinian uprising which rejects this situation.

Entering the Technological Age

Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid asserted that it is no longer possible to separate foreign policy from its domestic base, and this means talking about the second goal of Egyptian foreign policy, which is to support our economic interests to strengthen the efforts of comprehensive development in our nation and its current and future requirements. He said that Egypt's population will double in the next 22 years and will reach 100 million in 2020. A comparison of this figure with the natural resources available shows the extent of the effort which must be exerted to respond to our people's basic requirements and their right to an honorable life, with basic reliance on our intrinsic efforts.

Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid added that the demographic weight of countries of an average magnitude, such as Egypt, can strengthen the potentialities of their foreign role, their international situation and their regional weight, but that continues to be conditional on the attainment of tangible development to convert the population "quantity" into "quality." Otherwise, the population density will turn into a negative element which will exert pressure on the course of foreign policy in these countries. This requires:

1. The attainment of a technological revolution which is consistent with our domestic requirements, so that the population element will become a true added value.
2. An increase in economic and political investment in the capital of Egypt's strategic geographic location.
3. A continuation of plans related to the agricultural field, in horizontal and vertical terms.
4. If export potential depends on the quality and cost of production, the situation may demand the preparation of a suitable policy vis-a-vis certain countries and international blocs, for the conclusion of detailed agreements for our commodities.
5. The consideration that some vanguard sectors of economic growth are still reliant on or partially linked to foreign sources, such as tourist activity, the Suez Canal and oil. This explains one aspect of our foreign activities, which we are mobilizing to support the elements of stability in the region which is of close or distant geographical proximity to us.
6. The continued attention during the stage of transition to increased opportunities for the emigration of surplus Egyptian labor.

7. The direction of further attention to the cultural dimension in foreign policy by making use of Egypt's cultural weight.

8. Attraction of further international support for our economic projects and modernization of the means of production, as embodied in grants, aid and credit facilities and increased foreign investments in these.

Priority to the Arabs

Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid referred to the bases and priorities of Egyptian foreign activity in various areas, especially in the Arab region, which has realized a high degree of strength and mutual trust. Egypt, by virtue of its strategic location, its demographic weight, its innovativeness in culture and civilization, its military weight and its accumulated technical expertise, is qualified to perform an influential, effective role in the area of international affiliation in which an important portion of our vital interests is concentrated. The most important goals and dimensions of this role are:

1. Egypt, by virtue of its regional weight, as a party which is an interlocutor acceptable to all parties, is qualified to carry out a conciliatory role for forming Arab agreement on building Arab solidarity. Let me remind you of the al-'Aqabah summit.
2. Our position on Egypt's security is that it is "part of the whole," which is Arab national security, and this shows our position on the Gulf war, just as our position on the security of the Nile Valley shows it.
3. Considering that our Arab region is the meeting place of cultures and the place where all religions were revealed, which requires the pursuit of a policy of good neighborliness and constructive cooperation with all non-Arab peoples and countries bordering us in the context of a conception alienated from racism, racial discrimination and factionalism and the rejection of appeals for regional expansion, hegemony and dominance.
4. Support for the efforts of common Arab action at various levels to confront the challenges of development and the requirements of increased effectiveness in Arab powers.
5. With respect to trends toward the establishment of peripheral regional Arab groupings, our position with respect to these groupings is that we do not object to them as long as the goal is the attainment of a more developed stage than the stages which have been reached in the context of the League of Arab States. Otherwise, such peripheral groupings will lead to the fragmentation of Arab resources. This calls for the need to establish channels of cooperation and contact between the efforts of peripheral regional groupings and the efforts of the comprehensive national grouping. Otherwise these groupings will be directed against an Arab country or group of Arab countries.

In the discussion, Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid began concentrating on the circles of concern in Egyptian foreign policy. Africa represents an important strategic heartland for Egypt and the Arab nation. It is the world's future breadbasket and great future market, in spite of all the economic and financial problems the African continent is suffering from now. The African continent contains important sources of a number of primary materials essential to the establishment of a number of basic and strategic industries, not to speak of tremendous agricultural resources.

Relations between the Two Superpowers

Concerning relations with America, we consider that the relationship of friendship with it, which is founded on respect for our sovereignty, represents a vital course with which we are concerned and which we are trying to develop. The relative importance of this relationship is apparent from these angles:

If the goal of the United States is to achieve regional stability in the Middle East, on grounds that that is the most appropriate means for ensuring its interests in the region, we do not object to this goal as long as it is founded on justice and international legitimacy, with attention to the rights of the various parties.

The importance of this relationship is apparent through the magnitude of aid, which occupies first place relative to the total aid Egypt receives and accounts for a contribution which has weight with respect to the requirements of development and the progress of our armed forces, while not entailing a diminution of our sovereignty or our capitulation to political positions which conflict with our basic principles. In addition, strong relations with the United States have not amounted to a restriction on Egypt's desire to establish balanced relations between it and the Soviet Union and different countries of the world.

Concerning relations with the Soviets, the period of dispute has benefited the two parties in creating a sound new conception and atmosphere for the interrelationship and has paved the way for the establishment of more balanced relations and attention to the interests of the two parties and respect for Egyptian will. In addition, the orientations of the new Soviet leadership, its realistic view of international relations and its increased receptivity toward the outer world, in the presence of a Soviet conviction in the principle of increasing open dealings with Egypt—all these and other factors are strengthening the potential for supporting relations between the two countries in various areas. In my meeting last May with President Gorbachev in Moscow, when I handed him a letter from President Husni Mubarak, I personally sensed support for these orientations, and relations with the Eastern Bloc have experienced great improvement.

The European group, which comprises 320 million people, is working, from now to 1992, to establish a joint internal market by eliminating the barriers that hinder the movement of goods, services, capital and individuals; it will thus become one of the important economic axes in the coming stage. We must draw up our conception regarding future relations with this group, use the opportunities which the establishment of this joint market will provide for our products and increase the magnitude of European economic support for our projects.

Attention to the Asian Region

Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid pointed out that attention in the coming period will be given to the Asian region and the region of Latin America in particular, and that Asia will witness areas of increasing economic expansion and technological development and an increase in its role and share in the world economy. He stressed that Egypt is trying to develop its relations within regional groupings and organizations and international organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity, the Islamic Conference and the nonaligned movement, and toward the United Nations organization. Dr 'Ismat pointed out that our watchword in the coming stage is for "everything that is international and foreign to serve everything that is national and domestic."

After that, the discussions and requests for explanations began. Some professors on the left pointed to reservations about discussing the end of the stage of ideological struggle. Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid replied, "It is certain that ideologies are no longer as they were in the sixties and fifties, as the Soviets have pointed out. In an hour and a half of conversation with Gorbachev during the recent visit to Moscow, he stressed that there are changes occurring in Moscow and China and asserted that the economic dimension has become important, there is concern for the investment of Western capital in the Eastern countries, and ideologies are no longer the main characteristic."

Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid talked about the Tabah case and regarding that said "It is a model crisis-management method. We confronted the Tabah crisis from early 1985 to September 1988. There was coordination and a collective spirit through the national committee which embraced various areas of specialization in the form of history, geography, military experts and scholars of the law. They were prepared for the alternatives the Israelis might present. We prepared maps and sources from Jordan, the Sudan, Turkey, England and America." One item of information disclosed by Dr 'Abd-al-Majid mentioned what had been reached 14 December, when the agreement was concluded, with the provision that it be carried out in 45 days. As to the pending issues, they will be discussed in the course of a meeting of the two parties. In general, there will be no giving up when it comes to the hotel and the regulations for entering and exiting Tabah.

Concerning the Palestinian situation, he asserted that "the Algiers resolutions which came out of the Palestine National Congress meeting are to be considered an obvious advance not just in substance but also in their contents, in the form of new political positions; in their significance we are faced with a new Palestinian conception which the Palestinians had been afraid to approach. They have passed beyond this, now that the uprising has given them ammunition and strength, and have accepted Resolutions 242 and 338, the condemnation of terrorism and the formation of a confederation with Jordan. Our view regarding Resolution 242 is that it contains positive features, including the principle of withdrawal, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of land by force, the right of countries to live in security within their boundaries and the settlement of problems in peaceful ways. Although the mention of refugees occurred in a haphazard way in the resolution, the Palestinians in the latest national congress demonstrated proficiency and skill in endorsing Resolution 181, on whose basis Israel was established. Thirty-three countries voted in favor of the resolution and seven Arab countries were opposed. The Palestinians have accepted it after 41 years. The Israelis consider that Resolution 181 is no longer valid, because the Israeli boundaries are less than they were and this entails a diminution of Israel. The Palestinians proceeded to point out that they are content with the 1967 boundaries."

The Realistic Nature of Egyptian Decisionmaking

Concerning relations with America, he said, "We face things realistically. We consider that Washington is anxious for stability in the region and Egypt can affect the course of things. The important matter is that planning in our interest be good and proper. That is what imposes itself at the end. Yes, we realize that American Israeli interests are immense and that we cannot ignore them. However, that must be part of our calculations. Sometimes we differ with Washington regarding views and trends, and Egypt has its own view on many issues.

Some of the people present raised the issue of Camp David and Egypt's position on it in the light of our recognition of the Palestinian state. He said "Camp David was an attempt to resolve the Palestine issue. It was a stage. From the beginning I made a distinction, concerning autonomy, between the Israeli conception and the Egyptian orientation. They believed that it was a beginning and we believed that it was a beginning in order to arrive at the right of self-determination. The stage now is totally different from the premise behind Camp David. What has been set forth now is an international conference, the right of self-determination, the declaration of the nation of Palestine and Resolution 181, and it is illogical for us to talk about the context of autonomy as stated in Camp David following the uprising, which has changed the equation in the region, similar to the effect of the October 1973 war. The meaning of the uprising is that 21 years of occupation of the bank and the strip have not broken the back of the

resistance." Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid denied that there had been an Israeli warning to Egypt on discontinuation of the recognition of Camp David.

Relations With America and Israel

Concerning the effect of the Arab rapprochement on relations with America and Israel, Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid said, "It must be clear that relations with the Arabs are organic ones. Egypt is part of the Arab world and this does not have any connection to relations with Washington and Tel Aviv. There is no contradiction between these relations. We are a member of the Arab body and our Arab orientations have not changed and will not change. This is understood in Egyptian foreign policy. It works to support the Arab position and solidarity. Our position on the Palestine cause is the criterion. We do not want to look back. The present and future are before us, and we act in the light of Arab interests."

Concerning relations with Syria he said, "There is no animosity between us and Syria. There is just a difference in views which on the Syrian side amounted to the expression of animosity and defamation in the United Nations. If a readiness exists for a rapprochement to take place, it will be welcome. All attempts made in this context are an attempt along the right road. We have our position and our view, and we will not stop ourselves from shaking hands with the Syrians."

Parliamentarian Hammad Dismissed From Labor Party

45000083 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 13 Dec 88 p 7

[Text] Based on the recommendation of the parliamentary committee, the Labor Party's Supreme Committee decided in its meeting last Saturday to dismiss Khalid Hammad, People's Assembly member and member of the party's parliamentary committee, for straying from party discipline in his practices within the People's Assembly. Most recently, he participated in the assembly deputy election oversight committee, despite the issuance of organizational directives for him to withdraw from this committee.

Accused Discuss 'Egypt's Revolution' Case

45050079 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
18 Nov 88 pp 37,38

[Interview with Hamdi al-Shuqanqayri, Ahmad 'Isam-al-Din, Husayn al-Shaf'i, and Mahmud Nur-al-Din by Usamah 'Ajjaj; date and place not given]

[Text] From now and until early next year, the case of Egypt's Revolution will be one of the most significant Egyptian events. The Extraordinary Higher State Security Court held two sessions over two days. It was everybody's understanding that these were to be "procedural sessions", but still they were unusually sensational, which confirms the fact that entering the "objective

part" of the case through the prosecution arguments, the defense pleas, and the prosecution and defense witnesses it will be the case of next year. Even before the procedural sessions started, the court faced a crisis that threatened its meeting when the lawyers, headed by Ahmad al-Khawajah, protested against the security and police attitude toward them. In a first display of strength, they threatened to withdraw in protest against banning them from entering the court room and went to the Bar Association while waiting for the crisis to pass. The fate of the court was undecided. Its session having been announced; it was inappropriate to cancel it. Holding it without lawyers was also absurd because in this case the court would have to assign new lawyers to this task. This is done in coordination with the Bar Association which nominates lawyers for this purpose. Quick contacts were held with Counselor 'Abd-al-Ghaffar Muhammad, president of Cairo Appellate Court and a compromise solution for the crisis was reached. This was to send a group of lawyers to attend the session provided that the withdrawal is noted in the court's record and that the court should meet all the lawyers' demands. This was what actually happened and thus the "first crisis" was over.

The excitement reached a high point when the lawyers realized that they are going to face a real crisis which would put an end to their role in the case or, at least, make it marginal. Prolonged negotiations were held between Mahmud Nur-al-Din, leader of Egypt's Revolution and his defense lawyers during which he insisted that his defense should include three principal bases: First, that he will not deny the charges against him that he killed Israelis and Americans which, as he told AL-HAWADITH, "was an undeniable honor and indeed is worthy of pride." The second is that the lawyers should concentrate their efforts on ensuring the acquittal of Khalid Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir because he has no role in the organization. There is an old friendship, he said, that goes back to the days when Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir was preparing for his doctorate at the Royal College in London. Third, that he wishes to assume all the charges alone on behalf of all his colleagues on the grounds that he is the organization's leader. According to one of the lawyers who took part in the negotiations, he said: "Even if I were to be sentenced to death I should be quite satisfied provided that the others are acquitted."

Mahmud Nur-al-Din's insistence on acknowledging to all what is imputed to him narrows the defense lawyers' maneuvering space, makes their task difficult, and confines their role to justifying what Mahmud Nur-al-Din has done. And in fact when counselor 'Imad al-Din Mahmud Isma'il, president of the court, began to ask Mahmud Nur-al-Din his traditional question "guilty or not guilty", he replied: I would say what Joseph [son of Jacob] said: "O my Lord! The prison is more to my liking than that to which they invite me" [Surah 12:33] and what Jacob said: "Our Lord Most Gracious is the One Whose assistance should be sought against the blasphemies ye utter." [Surah 21:112]. Lawyer Safiy-al-Din Salim asked to confer privately with his defendant before

completing the answer. Other lawyers objected to the form of the court president's question because it means drawing the defendant into admitting to events and actions. After that Mahmud Nur-al-Din said; "I did not commit a crime and I am not guilty," adding: "I am not confessing." All the lawyers sighed with relief when this round ended in their favor. The response of the rest of the organization members was: "I reject this accusation and I am not guilty." This was with the exception of the third accused Ahmad 'Isam-al-Din whose confessions led to uncovering the organization. He said: "I admit my confessions to the prosecution...But I am not guilty."

The third crises which the court sidestepped by "ignoring" it was the request by lawyer Safiy-al-Din Salim on behalf of Mahmud Nur-al-Din for a public confrontation in court between him and his brother Ahmad 'Isam al-Din. Everybody waited for this confrontation which would have revealed ambiguities in the case or, at least, Ahmad 'Isam-al-Din's role. However the Egyptian judiciary requires Ahmad 'Isam-al-Din's defense lawyers to agree to a confrontation. Although Ahmad 'Isam-al-Din had told AL-HAWADITH from the dock "I am prepared for confrontation for I have not falsely accused anybody," yet his lawyer Hamdi al-Shuqanqayri said: "As far as I am concerned, I absolutely reject the confrontation because he is the only accused who is absolutely not certain of acquittal, something that others involved in the case might win, because he is the only one to admit that he took part in the activities and to everything."

[AL-HAWADITH] But he might win acquittal on the grounds that he is a state witness in the case.

[al-Shuqanqayri] In order to be a state witness he should have informed before the crimes took place.

[AL-HAWADITH] But his report prevented other crimes from taking place...

[al-Shuqanqayri] This is a reason for commutation and not for acquittal.

AL-HAWADITH asked the accused: Are you repentant for what you have done?

['Isam-al-Din] I am not repentant. What we have done against the Jews they deserve a thousand times more. But the confrontation should not be in Cairo. Maybe not everybody knows that during the invasion of Beirut in 1982 I volunteered to join the resistance ranks.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you have any political connections or ideological beliefs?

['Isam-al-Din] I have no political connections or ideological beliefs.

[AL-HAWADITH] Does this mean that your elder brother Mahmud got you involved with the organization?

['Isam-al-Din] Mahmud did not get me involved. I volunteered for action.

[AL-HAWADITH] Why then, did you report the organization?

['Isam-al-Din] Because I refused that our operations should be extended to include the Americans because this harms Egypt's interests with a friendly state and is harmful to the Egyptians.

[AL-HAWADITH] What is the truth about the incident of reporting to the U.S. Embassy, your travel to the United States, the promise of large sums of money, and your detention in the engineers' quarter by the U.S. intelligence?

['Isam-al-Din] Perhaps you have heard that I surrendered to the prosecution when I heard these rumor in order to stress in a new statement of mine that this is a falsehood and did not happen. so that in a new statement I would stress that this is a falsehood and did not happen.

[AL-HAWADITH] How?

['Isam-al-Din] If I had informed the U.S. Embassy as is being unjustly publicized, why am I now facing trial?

[AL-HAWADITH] Once again we would ask you: Do you feel any remorse?

['Isam al-Din] I am happy about my role. I have saved Egypt from a sea of blood, terror, and assassinations.

The perplexing question is Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir's role which has been the subject of conflicting reports. During the investigation and in a statement to AL-HAWADITH Mahmud Nur-al-Din asserted that Khalid had no role in the case; he did not know about the organization nor did he finance it. Financing the organization has cost 50,000 pounds which came from Mahmud Nur-al-Din's pocket. But the prosecution submitted to the court notes exchanged between two organization members in jail, which deal with their fate after Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir had abandoned them and fled abroad. Ahmad 'Isam-al-Din told AL-HAWADITH: "I am surprised by his stand; he was the first to flee. He used to say that he is a nationalist and the organization is nationalist." The truth about Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir's role will come to light only when he returns to Egypt. According to his lawyer Ahmad al-Khawajah, Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir will return in early January, when the court sessions begin so that in the meantime he is not in prison, something which he does not deserve. Everybody is awaiting this return because, under Egyptian law, he will otherwise be deprived of the right to defense before the court. Nevertheless, it has been reiterated that health reasons have prevented Jamal

Shawqi 'Abd-al-Nasir from appearing at the procedural sessions as scheduled. Husayn al-Shaf'i, a former deputy prime minister, was right in saying during the court meeting that "this is a difficult case and creates a difficult situation for any responsible official." When asked by AL-HAWADITH what would he have done had he been an official, he replied with a smile: "Thank God I am not an official." He then added: The difficulty in the case lies in the difficulty of controlling the reaction of the masses to what is happening to the Palestinians in the occupied territories, to Israeli terrorism, to the assassination of Abu Jihad, to the bombing the PLO headquarters, and to the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor. Regardless of what the others may wish, the Arab and Islamic world is one single body no matter how they try to dismember it. What harms one part of it affects the other parts.

[AL-HAWADITH] Are you concerned about your son Sharif?

[Husayn al-Shaf'i] My concern for my son Sharif is the same as my concern for the rest; there is no difference between Sharif and anyone else, regardless of his position with regard to the case before the law.

[AL-HAWADITH] What exactly is the charge against him?

[Husayn al-Shaf'i] Only his friendship with 'Abd-al-Nasir's sons...

[AL-HAWADITH] Is friendship with 'Abd-al-Nasir's sons these days [a reason for] an accusation?

[Husayn al-Shaf'i] Unfortunately, yes.

[AL-HAWADITH] What are your expectations regarding the case and the sentences?

[Husayn al-Shaf'i] How can you ask me about my expectations when the case is before the court? Generally, we have confidence in the justice and integrity of the Egyptian judiciary.

The dialogue with Mahmud Nur-al-Din was fraught with risks. Security officials had prevented journalists from having contact with him at the beginning of the first court session. They approached him for a short while but were immediately removed. AL-HAWADITH had no choice but to agree that his lawyer Safiy al-Din Salim deliver written questions to him and obtain the answers.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you believe that assassination was the ideal method for resisting the Israelis' influence and presence in Egypt?

[Mahmud Nur-al-Din] Methods and conditions of action vary in every phase. Some people resisted Israeli presence with words and through organized and open political parties. But as this presence increased and opposition to it had limited effect, the only method left to use was this one. Let the world know, particularly our American and Zionist enemies, that there are men in Egypt who are ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of this homeland.

[AL-HAWADITH] What is your opinion of the bill of indictment which did not include the usual charges in such cases, like [attempting to] overthrow the regime, acting as an agent for a foreign power, and obtaining foreign financing?

[Mahmud Nur-al-Din] I would like to say that the so-called bill of indictment has been labelled the bill of assault. Thank God we are pleased with our role. As we said in our first statement, what we did was in defense of Egypt. It would suffice to say that we have dealt blows to the enemies of Egypt and its people and have avoided any Egyptian being hit by a single bullet, even if this meant a loss for us. When the Egyptian escort exchanged fire with us as we carried out the Tzvi Kedar operation I shouted at my colleagues not to open fire at the escort. The result of that was that we could not kill Tzvi Kedar, although it would have been easy to kill him. I was almost killed in this operation because of being careful not to hit any Egyptian.

[AL-HAWADITH] But Egypt's Revolution operations were not confined to the Israelis. Indeed, the Americans entered as a new party. Was the reason for your disagreement with your brother Ahmad 'Isam?

[Mahmud Nur-al-Din] We aimed our fire against anybody we suspected of being a U.S. intelligence agent. This was an act of revenge for kidnapping the Egyptian plane carrying the four Palestinians after the Achille Lauro operation.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you believe that the Israelis still pose a danger to Egyptian society?

[Mahmud Nur-al-Din] Let it be known that the Israelis, throughout long wars and numerous attempts, have been unable to sway the will of the Egyptian people. But now, by virtue of the Camp David accord and normalization of relations they are resorting to new methods, including spreading AIDS, smuggling drugs, and counterfeiting currency. Those who carry out such operations are recruited by the Mossad in an attempt to influence the Egyptian people. Their present danger stems from this.

[AL-HAWADITH] Why did you attempt suicide?

[Mahmud Nur-al-Din] The reason was that I realized that certain quarters were trying to pressure me in order to involve certain persons in the case, especially some of

President Mubarak's aides and some of leader 'Abd-al-Nasir's children, although they had nothing to do with it. The attempt to assassinate Tzvi Kedar, who, together with Weizman, was on his way back from a secret meeting with President Mubarak, happened by sheer coincidence. We knew nothing about this meeting, its time, or the character or the function of the person who was meeting him. In fact he was put under surveillance after we discovered the presence of Israelis in al-Ma'adi neighborhood.

[AL-HAWADITH] What about Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir's role?

[Mahmud Nur-al-Din] Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir is an old friend of mine since he was in London preparing for his doctorate. He has nothing to do with the organization's operations and knew nothing about it. He had no knowledge of it. In view of this pressure I had no other choice but to try to commit suicide for fear that some innocent people be involved in the case.

[AL-HAWADITH] Are you optimistic now?

[Mahmud Nur-al-Din] Very optimistic. I trust in the justice and integrity of the Egyptian judiciary. Even if I were to be hanged, I know that I have done my duty and I am happy because of that.

Office of Foreign Real Estate Ownership Formed
45000079 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 18 Dec 88 p 6

[Text] The minister of justice has issued a decision to form an office of non-Egyptian ownership of real estate and land affairs under the leadership of Husayn Ahmad Mustafa, undersecretary in the Ministry of Justice and assistant secretary for financial and administrative affairs in the land registry administration. Members of the office include two representatives from the national security organization; the Interior Ministry; the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and New Communities; the survey organization; and the currency directorate in the Ministry of Economy; in addition to two engineers in the land registry administration.

Government Assumes Farm Improvement Costs
45000085 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 13 Dec 88 p 1

[Text] It has been decided to exempt farmers from agricultural land maintenance and improvement costs, which total 3 million pounds annually. This was announced yesterday by Dr Yusuf Wali, deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture. He said he had done this under directions from President Husni Mubarak to lighten the burden on the peasants. This concerns an area of 5.5 million feddans in the governorates.

Dr Ibrahim 'Antar, head of the land improvement projects office, said exemption priority will go to farmers who answered the call to plant strategic crops on their land. These are cotton, rice, wheat, sorghum, and sugar, considered mainstays of the national economy. He said

land maintenance and improvement are part of the processes of the renewal and replacement of the basic environment of older lands. A committee has been formed to study exemption requests on this basis.

Joint Company Tax Revenues Up From Last Year
45000086 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 13 Dec 88 p 1

[Text] Tax revenue from the joint-stock company commission totaled nearly 855 million pounds over the period from the beginning of July to the end of November, an increase of 138 million pounds over the same period last year. The commission succeeded in accomplishing this after its employees exerted great effort to bring in delinquent taxes.

At the same time, the commission continued examining the files of the investment companies, which the commission numbered at 32. It is expected that the examinations will be finished by the end of December.

Official Gives Capital Statistics for Private Companies

45000084 Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 17 Dec 88 p 8

[Text] The number of companies founded under the rules of Law 159 of 1981 has increased to 1,343, among which are 796 joint-stock companies working in the fields of agriculture, industry, and trade. They have a total registered capital of 4,954,700,000 pounds and an issued capital calculated at 933,622,000 pounds.

This was announced by Dr 'Atif 'Ajwah, head of the companies administration, who explained that, among these companies, the total capital of 547 limited companies amounted to 609,130,000 pounds.

Roads, Bridges Authority Lists Completed Projects

45000089 [Editorial Report] The 30 December issue of the Cairo Arabic-language daily AL-AKHBAR published a half-page notice by the General Authority for Roads and Bridges on page 13. The notice announced the results from the 19 December budget meeting of the authority's four dependent companies: the Nile Public Roads and Bridges Company, the Nile Public Desert Roads Company, the Nile Public Road Construction Company, and the Nile Public Construction and Paving Company.

Work completed during the 1987-88 fiscal year cost 262,861,000 pounds, up 63,861,000 pounds, or 33 percent, over the previous fiscal year. The notice also listed "some of the most important accomplishments of the 1987-88 fiscal year" in roads, bridges, railroads, ports and airports.

Road projects consisted of doubling the width of the Samannud/Talkha-Shirbin road; doubling the width of the Shirbin-Dumyat road; widening the double-width Cairo-Alexandria agricultural road by adding a third lane from Shubra to Banha; doubling the width of the

Hikestop-Bilbays road; doubling the width of the Ismailia-Port Said road; building the double-width al-Mahallah al-Kubra traffic circle; building the Za'faranah-Ra's Gharib road; building the al-Adabiyah-Za'faranah road; building the Bani Suwayf-al-Shaykh Fadl road to al-Minya east of the Nile; modernizing and strengthening the Bani Suwayf-al-Fayyum road; building the Aswan-Wadi Halfa road; modernizing and strengthening the Qina-Naj' Hammadi road; modernizing and strengthening the Mit Ghamr-Aja road; and modernizing and strengthening the al-'Ayyat-Bani Suwayf road to al-Milatiyah/Abu Qurqas.

Bridge projects consisted of the al-Minya overpass on the Nile; the Disuq overpass on the Nile; the al-Nubariyah bridge; and the Naj' Hammadi railroad bridge. Work is continuing on the Banha bridge on the Nile; the Margham overpass; the Bani Suwayf railroad overpass; the Banha bridge on the al-Tawfiqi main canal; and the Dirut overpass.

Railroad projects consisted of double-tracking the Sawhaj-Naj' Hammadi line; building the Qina-Safaja line; building the Ismailia-Port Said line and stations; and improving and upgrading the 'Ayn Shams-Suez line. Work is continuing on double-tracking the distance from Naj' Hammadi to Al-Uqsar.

Port and airport projects consisted of building the al-Adabiyah port, the Safaja port and the Qabus seaport in Nuwaybi'; upgrading the Cairo airport; building the airport west of Alexandria; upgrading the al-Uqsar airport; and upgrading the Aswan and al-Wadi al-Jadid airports.

Experiments To Increase Production of Al-Amal Field

45000081 Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
13 Dec 88 p 5

[Text] Experiments have begun to operate the al-Amal oil field in the Gulf of Suez at a production capacity of 4,000 bpd increasing to 7,000 bpd over 2 months. 'Abd-al-Hadi Qandil, minister of petroleum and mineral resources, requested a study of new expansions to the field within the framework of a plan to develop it with Kuwaiti-French investments estimated at approximately \$40 million, in cooperation with the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation, the Kuwaiti company KUFPEC and the French company Totale.

Police Seize Dynamite, Fuses in Contractor's Truck in Hilwan

45000080 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 18 Dec 88 p 6

[Article by Iman Rashid]

[Text] The 15 May Investigations Division has seized 100 kg of dynamite and 300 explosive fuses in a truck owned by a building contractor that he was driving by himself. Jamal Fathi, director of the Hilwan prosecutor's office,

ordered his arrest for 15 days pending investigation and appointed an explosives expert to examine the seizure.

Colonel 'Ali Jad, commander of the 15 May Division, was informed of a cache of dynamite owned by the building contractor in the al-Jabal area of the city, and of a large amount of explosives on its way to the cache. Col 'Abdallah al-Watidi ordered Lieutenant Colonel Muhsin 'Abd-al-Rahman, chief of the investigations division, Captain Kamal Mustafa and Captain Muhammad Rif'at to form an investigative unit. The truck, Cairo truck license 73756, driven by the building contractor, was seized, and found in it were 100 kg of dynamite and 300 explosive fuses packed in two crates covered by an oilcloth.

The prosecutor's office took over the investigation, arrested the contractor for 15 days, and assigned the investigations division to find the source of the explosives. The accused denied any ties to the truck and the seized goods, and refused to make any statement before the prosecutor despite the presence of three lawyers with him.

Columnist Calls for Elimination of Port Said Free Zone

45000072 Cairo EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English
17 Dec 88 p 3

[Article by Columnist Ahmad Zayn]

[Text] Columnist Ahmad Zayn of AL-AKHBAR said that the free trade zone in Port Said has contributed no valuable service whatsoever to the country's economy. It has neither become a centre for attracting foreign currency, nor has helped to promote national industries and exports. On the contrary, it has done a disservice to the country's economy through encouraging attempts to smuggle foreign currency out of the country.

If this is the case, why should authorities insist on maintaining the present status of the city? Why shouldn't the government take serious moves to develop Port Said and amend the system of free trade zones? For instance, being storehouses for transit trade should be established in the city so that the commodities produced by industrialized countries can be stored there prior to their sale in African and Asian markets. This could be [a] remarkable source for foreign currency. Besides, the city could be made a vortex for certain industries suitable for free trade zones. If such improvements are introduced the whole status of the city can be radically changed to the better, Mr Zayn said.

ISRAEL

Teddy Kollek Seeking Arab Vote in Coming Elections

44230034 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
21 Nov 88 p 11

[Article by Nadav Shargay]

[Text] Quietly, and with almost no publicity, the elections campaign staff of Teddy Kollek is currently carrying out fundamental and deep plowing among the Arab

population in East Jerusalem. Against the background of the Intifadah, the continuing commercial strike, arrests, demonstrations, and the declaration of Palestinian independence, Kollek is asking his staff to do the apparently unbelievable and bring as many Arab voters as possible to the polling places on election day.

A high voter turnout, Teddy repeatedly tells his people, will give Israel an excellent propaganda card and will strengthen the trend toward recognizing the unity of Jerusalem before the entire world. However, behind these nice words, the mayor of Jerusalem is not innocent of having political motivations.

Year	Eligible To Vote	No of Actual Voters	Percentage of Vote	Total Council Seats For Kollek
1969	35,000	7,150	20.4	16
1973	45,274	39,000	8.6	14
1978	55,000	8,000	15.0	16
1983	65,565	10,812	18.0	17
1989	78,000	?	?	?

The highest turnout of Arab voters in Jerusalem municipal elections was recorded in 1969, with votes cast by 7,500 of the 35,000 Arabs then eligible to vote. The Arab vote has since been well organized by the mayor's advisor on East Jerusalem affairs, Meron Benvenisti. "On elections day, a great stream of Arab residents began; they were transported on buses and in taxis according to a pre-arranged program," describes Benvenisti in his book. "Within several hours, long lines were created outside the polls...."

On 28 October 1969, the polling places of Arab voters were set up in West Jerusalem, and not in the area of their residences, which explains the high Arab voter turnout despite the threats made by terrorist organizations. Twenty years have since passed. In recent weeks, municipal elements have gone to the Ministry of Interior to inquire about the possibility of the polling places for East Jerusalem residents again being set up in western Jerusalem for the 29 February 1989 elections. It emerged that this is no longer possible, even though it once was. The people at the Ministry of Interior made it clear to the interested parties that the law in this regard is unequivocal: Polling places must be established in the area of residence of the voter. Kollek's elections staff is therefore pessimistic in its appraisal. In the best of cases, they expect that only a few thousand Arab voters will reach the polling places—mostly Arab workers employed by the municipality of Jerusalem or employed by factories in the capital, who can be "organized" more easily.

'The City of Peace' Expects 7 Mandates

Against this background, and against the background of the expected strengthening of the Haredi [ultra-Orthodox] parties in at least two additional mandates, a new list, "City of Peace," was organized in Jerusalem. The person who conceived the idea of the party is Moshe

The 140,000 Arabs of the East Jerusalem constitute a third of the city's population and are theoretically equal to 8-10 seats on the city council. This has great significance in a city council of 31 members. In the best of cases, only 15-20 percent of those Arabs eligible to vote actually do so. However, in three out of the four election campaigns in which they have taken part, they have decisively tipped the balance by granting Teddy two additional mandates and an absolute majority in the city council (see 1969, 1978 and 1983 in table). In the only election year in which the percentage of Arab voters in the city declined significantly (1973), Kollek lost his absolute majority in the council and required coalition partners.

'Amirav, a former member of the Likud Party and a current member of the Shinuy Party. 'Amirav is seeking to create an electoral alternative for East Jerusalem residents.

His initiative is based on the assumption that if Kollek does not obtain an absolute majority, he would be liable to resign with the result that the governing of the city would then fall into the hands of a rightist-Haredi coalition. The Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, say the initiators, will not vote this time for Kollek's list, but would vote for an Arab-Jewish list which would assure their national unity and which would join a coalition headed by Kollek.

Participants in the new initiative include, among others, members of the Citizens' Rights Movement, Shinuy, and MAPAM parties in Jerusalem, personalities from the Reform movement, and from the East to Peace movement, as well as neighborhood activists in the city. Hanna Sanyurah, the editor of AL-FAJR, is also helping to establish the new list, but he does not intend to be on it. He also expresses doubt as to whether other Arab public figures will agree to be on the list, and states that the matter is currently being discussed among his friends in Israel and abroad.

The memory is still fresh in Sanyurah's mind of his two cars going up in flames in June 1987, immediately after he announced that he was considering heading an independent Arab list which would have competed in elections for the Jerusalem City Council.

Aware of the almost nonexistent chance of attracting Arab personalities to their list, the members of "City of Peace" decided at the end of the week that they would

participate in the elections in any case. 'Amirav and his friends also assume that they can succeed in attracting Arab voters with the unofficial encouragement of the Palestinian leadership. In this context, they point out that in the last Knesset elections, a large segment of the Arab public transferred their votes from the Labor Alignment to the Citizens' Rights Movement, and they are hoping for another round of this process in the municipal elections. The reserve of potential seats in "City of Peace" is estimated at approximately six: Three among the Jews (the left in Jerusalem obtained approximately 14,000 votes in the last elections for the Knesset) and three among the Arabs.

The platform of the new movement is already formulated, and it was made to conform to the presumed expectations of the Arab voting public. The word sovereignty does not appear in it, and this question is actually left open. This is a new development engendered by activists from Zionist parties, such as the Citizens' Rights Movement, MAPAM, and Shinuy. The platform also states that: "It is necessary to begin developing the Arab sector...to renovate distressed Arab neighborhoods, to establish Arabic as a required language and as the second language in Jerusalem, and to assure a special status for East Jerusalem and the possibility of an autonomous administration in the framework of a dual municipality. Administrative autonomy in East Jerusalem would include the possibility of political representation, separate taxation, separate police forces, and more...."

Finance Minister's Performance Review
44000203 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in
English 16 Dec 88 p 20

[Article by Avi Temkin]

[Text] The decision of Vice-Premier Shim'on Peres to accept the Treasury portfolio apparently heralds the end of Moshe Nisim's era as finance minister. While this can still change, given the volatility of the negotiations between Likud and Labor, the end of the present government provides an excellent opportunity to review Nisim's performance at the Treasury.

He will be leaving the ministry in a very different way from almost all his predecessors. His two-and-a-half years' tenure of the post contributed greatly to his status within his party and in the political system. But also within the Treasury itself, he has gained in stature.

Ministry officials trust him and find it very easy to work with him.

Maybe one of the reasons for that rapport between them is that they share the same basic ideological outlook. Throughout his 30 months at the Treasury, Nisim has remained faithful to a credo of conservative liberalism. He has made a point of praising the virtues of what he calls "private efforts and initiatives."

From his own point of view, Nisim has accomplished a great deal in a relatively short time. First of all, he can boast that he has been able to sustain economic stability, the task he set himself when he came to the Treasury. Secondly, he leaves behind an economy that is much closer to his ideas than to those of the Labor Party.

Beyond the daily management of the economy, Nisim's period at the Finance Ministry was characterized by the attempt to implement three "structural" reforms. These were the privatization drive he initiated; the changes in the tax system; and the so-called deregulation of the capital market.

A second characteristic was his constant effort to make companies and public bodies aware that they could no longer could rely on the government budget. This sometimes assumed the nature of shock treatment.

Nisim's quest for efficiency put him on a collision course not only with some of his cabinet colleagues, but also with the country's industrialists.

He used the fixed exchange rate of the shekel as a weapon for pushing manufacturers into adopting cost-cutting programmes. The result has been an ongoing clash between the finance minister and the Manufacturers' Association, which has blamed him and his policies for the current slowdown in exports and production.

There can be no doubt that industrialists accustomed over the years to milking the State budget resented the change in policy. Many of them had learned to live only too well with inflation, which gave them ample scope to benefit from eroded tax payments and financial speculation. They knew they could always rely on the policies of devaluation of the shekel to offset rises in domestic costs. Now all that is gone. The industrialists must relearn the hard way that profits come from production, not from lobbying in the Treasury corridors.

This does not mean that Nisim can claim that the current hardships being faced by industry are only an adjustment to new conditions.

The fact is that he allowed the Bank of Israel to manage monetary policy as it saw fit. This meant nothing less than approving the very high interest rates that the central bank established and has sustained since 1984. The bank, so it seems, was so afraid of being held responsible for any increase in inflation that it preferred to engage in an exercise of over-shooting.

Nisim's shortcomings are underscored by the fact that the high interest rates compounded the debts of the various bodies that were unable to adjust to the new conditions. The Bank of Israel's policy put unnecessary pressure on firms, and eroded whatever room for maneuver there was. True, this was the doing of the central bank, but it was done with the tacit approval of Nisim and his officials.

Moshe Nisim's tenure of the finance portfolio will not be one which the leaders of the Histadrut enterprises and other connected labor enterprises will remember with pleasure.

The once-powerful economic establishment of the labor federation, the moshavim and the kibbutzim, has been forced to beg for his goodwill in order to survive the worst crisis in its history.

For the Histadrut managerial bureaucracy, there would be nothing easier than to blame Nisim's economic policy for their hardships. The truth is, however, that the minister was presented by the Histadrut managers themselves with an unprecedented opportunity to shake their power basis.

Like any other bureaucracy, the labor federation's managerial elite displayed a strong tendency to over-centralization. They were not accountable to anybody that could put a check on their grandiose dreams. The result was a bloated and speculative collection of firms and institutions based on a very flimsy financial basis.

The bureaucratic management of the Histadrut enterprises succeeded over the years in alienating the workforce of those firms. This, coupled with the lack of accountability of the managers, had a lethal effect on efficiency. Employment in these enterprises increased, but productivity lagged behind.

It was this background that enabled Nisim to appear in the public eye as the defender of the taxpayer's money against the establishment of the Histadrut enterprises and the kibbutzim.

His insistence on recovery programmes, his stress on efficiency measures, his emphasis on cost-cutting schemes, were all welcomed by the vast majority of the public. It was as if St George Nisim was finally delivering a fatal blow to the Histadrut's dragon.

Behind the scenes, however, Nisim has used the weakness of the Histadrut establishment for his own purposes. This weakness has enabled him to get the collaboration of the labor federation in more than one instance. The Histadrut knows that saving Koor, Solel Bone and Kupat Holim Clalit had, and will continue have, a price, as proved by its willingness to waive part of the latest Cost-of-Living allowance to which workers were entitled.

But Nisim has clashed not only with the Histadrut and the industrialists. His insistence on budgetary and fiscal discipline has more than once aroused the animosity of his fellow ministers.

The latest instance occurred just this week, when he refused to sign the accord between the Likud and the

religious parties. His integrity did not allow him to take such step. Unlike some of predecessors, such as Yitzhaq Moda'i or Yoram Aridor, Nisim speaks softly, but means what he says.

On one occasion, when the fate of the Lavi jet fighter was being decided, Nisim's determination to defend the budget almost cost him his job. The Likud ministers were willing to sacrifice him and not the project. Prime Minister Shamir joined his opponents, and once again showed complete indifference to economic issues. Paradoxically, it was only thanks to the support of the Labour Party, and especially of Shim'on Peres, that the Lavi was scrapped and Nisim was able to remain in his job.

There is little doubt that, if asked, Nisim would cite the 1987 tax reform as one of his main achievements. The reform suited his ideological inclinations: it reduced the top income tax rate from 60 to 48 per cent. The reform was heralded by him as the beginning of a new era in Israel: it would encourage effort and investment, he said.

Given the slowdown in economic activity during most of 1988, it is difficult to say whether the reform has made a contribution to economic growth. Nisim can quote income tax revenue figures as proof that far from reducing tax receipts, the reform has increased them. But the rise could be also attributed to the increase in real wages during recent months, and not to any greater incentive to pay taxes.

It should be remembered that almost all of the benefits of the April 1987 reform went to the highest income earners in the economy. This, to say the least, was a very questionable way of encouraging productivity and effort.

If Nisim were less inclined to implement conservative dogma, he would have directed his reform to the lowest and middle rungs of the income ladder. It is there that the vast majority of Israeli wage-earners are located. It is there that one can find young workers at the beginning of their careers.

Instead of encouraging this class of worker, Nisim preferred to benefit the very few—a selected number of top executives, lawyers, accountants and other members of the liberal professions.

He would like to believe that his reform contributed to economic growth. But there is little doubt that the reaction, in terms of effort and initiative, by those at the middle and the bottom of the income scale would had been much greater.

Nisim promised the public that the benefits of the reform would be extended to the rest of the population by the implementation of the Sheshinski Commission recommendations. But when he received those recommendations, early in 1988, it became apparent that they were politically loaded from his point of view.

The committee proposed, inter alia, to tax capital gains in the stock market, something which neither he nor his officials found reasonable. The result has been that workers and other low- and middle-income earners are still waiting for the benefits of the reform to reach them.

The second reform initiated during Nisim's tenure was the capital market reform. The was heralded by the minister, and by liberal ideologists inside and outside the government, as one of the keys to economic growth. By reducing the deficit, they said, and by reducing the government's role in the capital market, more resources would be freed which private initiative could raise and invest.

Nisim took practical steps in this direction in 1987. He liberalized the capital and credit markets. He reduced the deficit. More money from saving schemes, provident funds and private investors was available, looking for private investors.

Reality, however, has been different from what the minister and his friends anticipated. Most of the money available due to the reform went not to finance new investment, but to finance bail-out schemes, debt-rescheduling programmes and recovery plans.

Once again it was Nisim's inability to control the steps of the Bank of Israel that was a direct cause of this reality. Faced with the huge short-term interest rates established by the central bank, many firms almost went under. Short-term interest pushed up long-term rates. Firms therefore were able to raise money at yields of 8-9 per cent. Given their prospects of profits, such rates were, and are, prohibitive.

One final aspect of Nisim's period as finance minister must be stressed: the privatization plans.

There is little doubt that without the kind of support that Nisim gave the idea, little or nothing would have been done in this direction. It was Nisim who encouraged the sale of Paz to Australian businessman Jack Lieberman. It was Nisim who invited First Boston to draft a study of privatization potentialities.

Once again, the minister's conservative ideas have to be measured by their actual effects.

The sale of Paz left many question marks. There was resentment in the Knesset Finance Committee that the minister used a legal loophole to escape from parliamentary scrutiny of this step. Some MKs said the price asked by the Treasury, \$95 million, was too low.

Beyond that, there are questions of principle regarding any privatization programme. It is not clear whether what is to be privatized will be only the profits, while the costs of turning a corporation into a profitable one are to be borne by the taxpayer. It is also not clear whether the implementation of the programme would not create more private monopolies.

These are only two of the questions that can be asked about privatization. The process is still only just beginning, and it is therefore difficult to pass judgement on it. But there can be little doubt that without Moshe Nisim, even the small steps we have already witnessed would not have been taken.

JORDAN

More Canadian Aid for Hydrocarbon Exploration

44000247 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English
4 Dec 88 p 1

[Text] Amman (J.T.)—The Natural Resources Authority (NRA) and the Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation (PCIAC) Saturday signed an agreement to extend an existing accord on hydrocarbon exploration in Jordan.

The extension, involves additional PCIAC funding in the amount of Canadian dollars 13 million. The agreement was signed by Peter M. Towe, chairman of PCIAC, and NRA Director-General Kamal Juraysat. This amount brings PCIAC's contribution to NRA's efforts to evaluate the hydrocarbon potential of Jordan to Canadian dollars 32.1 million.

This extension will permit PCIAC to continue the seismic acquisition and processing programme in the al-Sarhan and Northern Highlands areas. This programme started in January 1988 in the Rishah area. The new agreement also provides for further Canadian technical assistance to NRA and for continuing training activities until March 1990.

PCIAC will finance the foreign costs of the project, which will utilise contracted goods and services from Canada's oil and gas industry. The NRA will provide for all local costs.

PCIAC was established in 1981 by the Canadian government to provide technical and exploration-related assistance to help developing countries exploit their hydrocarbon potential. To date, PCIAC has mounted over 35 projects in over 20 developing countries in the Western Hemisphere, Africa and Asia. Wherever possible, these projects are executed by contracted Canadian private-sector companies, thus showcasing Canadian equipment and expertise overseas.

Three New AIDS Cases Reported

54004512 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English
13 Dec 88 p 3

[Article by Najwa Najjar: "Number of AIDS Cases Rises to 20." "Ministry Reports 3 More AIDS Patients"]

[Text] Amman—The number of AIDS patients in Jordan has risen to 20, with the discovery of three additional patients with the incurable disease last week,

according to the director of the Anti-AIDS Campaign Project, Dr. Hani 'al-Shammut.

Speaking to reporters Monday, Shammut, who is also head of the Communicable Diseases Department at the Ministry of Health, said that the three cases, although discovered last week, were not new cases.

Of the three patients, two had contracted Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) through blood transfusion and blood products, while one had contracted the disease through sexual contact—all prior to 1986.

Of the three patients, two were outside of Jordan, while one patient received blood in Jordan in 1984.

Shammut expects more cases to be discovered in Jordan. However, he stresses that they would be the result of previous contact with the disease.

Shammut said 73 percent of the patients were males and 27 percent were females. The reason that the percentage of females were higher than the worldwide figure of 10 percent, "is that females here have a higher rate of blood exchange during pregnancy," he said.

However, males have a considerably higher ration than females in Jordan, mainly due to a large number of hemophiliacs—al-Na'ur in Arabic—which, Shammut explained affects only male children who begin to bleed profusely and unabated at the slightest cut on the body. 129 children with the disease were checked, nine are AIDS patients.

Blood and blood products are the main causes of AIDS in Jordan. To combat the spread of the disease and any further import of the disease into the Kingdom, Jordan has taken several measures since late 1986 to ensure that the quality of blood imported into the Kingdom would be AIDS-free. The measures include:

- Requiring the person donating blood in the respective country be checked for AIDS.
- Refusing to import any blood or blood product which does not include a certificate insuring the blood to be AIDS-free.
- Forbidding any blood or blood product to be brought into the country if the company or the people in charge refuse to be held responsible for the contact of AIDS.
- Preparing blood and blood products at a temperature of 60 degrees.
- Upon arrival of the blood and blood products, Jordan will conduct additional tests.

Since Jordan's AIDS problem is mainly due to blood and blood products, Shammut noted that these measures have been able to control 80 percent of the cases. The remaining 20 percent are mainly due to sexual contacts.

"There is no country in the world without AIDS," Shammut said, pointing out that the worldwide figure of AIDS patients is 125,000 and of AIDS carriers is between five to 10 million.

Since many Jordanian families and students live or study in over 120 countries abroad, "we can do nothing, but spread awareness."

LEBANON

Former Foreign Minister Outlines Political Solution

44040194 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic
7 Jan 89 pp 26-30

[Article by Lucien Dahdah, Lebanese ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs; "New Year's Plan: Inter-Lebanese Peace Conference at Sea Under International Auspices"]

[Text] In Lebanon, Lucien Dahdah is a well-known political, journalistic and financial figure. He is one of the figures who have played a significant role in the Syrian-Lebanese relations. Lucien Dahdah held the position of minister of foreign affairs in ex-President Sulayman Franjiyah's administration. He later headed Intra Bank's Board of Directors. He entered the information area and was one of the publishers of MED magazine and is one of the publishers of AL-MUKHTAR. Currently, Lucien Dahdah works as a financial, economic and press adviser but without divorcing politics. Because Dahdah has not divorced politics, because as a Lebanese, a politician, a journalist and an economist, he is concerned with Lebanon and its future and because he believes that despite the tragic condition under which Lebanon is living, it has not exhausted all the possibilities of reconciling the two factions confronting each other in the arena—because of all of this, Dahdah has drafted a detailed study on his view and his proposals on how to steer Lebanon to the shore of safety and how to live confidently and with reassurance for a 100 years to come. Dahdah has done this, relying on his being the "son of a family whose roots date back to the pre-Islamic era and because no Maronite is more Maronite than he is." AL-MUSTAQBAL has summed up the most important points of the lengthy study forming the new year's plan. AL-MUSTAQBAL publishes this "plan" for "whose contents" Lucien Dahdah "is responsible" because the moment of truth has come and because Lebanon needs to debate its future with an open heart and a cool mind.

Before I embark on what I am going to present, I must admit that what may distort my review of the Syrian motives is this right which our neighbor uses as a pretext to put this kind of "security conditions" in our way.

We, as Lebanese, are under nobody's custodianship and we are not an occupied territory. Consequently, it is a foregone conclusion that we have the right to act as we wish.

I was previously given two answers to this question [question not cited]. This happened on a day in November 1975 when I was an invited guest in Damascus. I posed my question frankly to the prominent interlocutors who had invited me.

The first answer was that Syria is affected by whatever happens in Lebanon and that Syria does not wish in any shape or manner to bear the consequences of the schemes hatched in Lebanon. Syria was then offering the principle of the legitimate right to self-defense in response to my question.

The second answer, which was the one that convinced me, was that the Lebanese themselves are the ones who request Syrian intervention whenever they feel they are threatened by another Lebanese faction.

This request began with the repeated appeals addressed by the mufti of the Republic of Lebanon to President al-Asad to "stop the invasion of West Beirut" on the morrow of the fall of al-Karantina (at the end of 1975).

In accordance with [prior] agreements, the Palestinians requested at the same time that the PLA [Palestine Liberation Army] come from Syria to rescue the blockaded inhabitants of Tall al-Za'tar, and it did so. On 21 January 1976, the PLA moved and confronted the Maronite villages of Dayr al-Ahmar, Zahlah, Zgharta and al-Sa'diyat. On the same day, A syrian delegation was visiting B'abda Palace.

At the time, the Maronites themselves, unable to find people in the Lebanese Muslim ranks to negotiate with because those ranks were dominated by the Palestinians, accepted the Syrian mediation which claimed to be able to convince and guarantee the Muslims and the Palestinians. Thus, the "constitutional charter" came into existence and Syrian observers entered al-Ashrafiyah to the cheers of its inhabitants.

Nobody can deny today that this option was not a free Christian option. At worst, it can be said that the Christians had to choose between two evils, especially since the other sects (the Shi'ites and the Druze) had taken the path to Damascus which has always welcomed its guests warmly.

Some Maronites who requested the Syrian mediation at a certain stage now fear a kind of domination that is difficult to imagine within the framework of a unified Lebanon. This is why they have turned to other alliances. This is how these Maronites visualize the situation:

Matters reached the point where we, relying on Washington, threatened Damascus with our guns. But Washington abandoned us promptly.

By relying on Tel Aviv, we alone were defeated in Bhamdun and al-Shuf.

We returned the Palestinians to Lebanon!

Now, we await the salvation coming from Baghdad!

It is wrong to believe that Syria alone holds today or held in the past the cards to the game in Lebanon. This is because other more capable interests (Israel, the Palestinians, international terrorism, Iran and so forth) have been impeding Syria's work. A quick review of the Lebanese developments is sure to confirm this.

I find this prelude necessary to clarify matters before I embark on analyzing the positions of the forces existing in the Lebanese arena, especially the positions of the Syrians and the Maronites.

The question that opens the door to the analysis is: What does Syria want of the Lebanese presidential candidate?

It wants:

1. The candidate to be Maronite so as to reassure the Lebanese Christians about their future on the basis of the principle of: "Reassurance for the Christians and greater justice for the Muslims."

2. The Lebanese president is required to have deep conviction of Lebanon's Arabism, especially the Arabism of the Christian faction whose Arabism predates Islam and that has made a major contribution to the Arab world's cultural and political renaissance.

3. The Arab Maronite president is required to have a clear position vis-a-vis Israel as long as the territories occupied by Israel, including our territories, have not been liberated directly or within the framework of a collective peaceful agreement. The Palestinian cause is the Arabs' main cause and Syria believes that it has contributed to this cause more than any other Arab country because it has shouldered the drain caused to it by its defense position at the expense of its people's prosperity. Moreover, he is required to avoid any independent rapprochement or peace and any secret contacts with Israel.

4. The Maronite president, the president of all the Lebanese, is especially required to have a great understanding of and openness to all the factions that form Lebanon. He is also required to have an intellect capable of bringing all the Lebanese together in a broad movement for a national reconciliation that guarantees that all rancors will be dissipated and that peace and security will be restored to all.

5. Finally, the future Lebanon is required to establish with its closest neighbor the relations of a "single people in two different countries." Syria does not accept having the Lebanese territories extending from the Horse Shoe

to the Dolce Vita turned into a center for those who plot against it in plain view of the Lebanese authorities. Finally, Syria will not be able to defend its southern territories if the Lebanese gaps continue to pose a danger to it. Therefore, Lebanon and Syria must coordinate their major Arab and international options.

What do the Maronites demand in return?

1. That the next president should not be Syria's man and should not agree to important concessions to insure his election.
2. That Lebanon should entrench finally the distinguished position of its Christians because these Christians have unstintingly aided the various Arab minorities that came looking for a place for themselves [in Lebanon] and that always lived without any discrimination in an atmosphere of plurality that has led to mutual religious retrogressions.
3. That the future Lebanon must not disavow its children. The expatriates who have enabled their motherland to survive are an indivisible part of Lebanon.
4. That the new national charter, which will be achieved at the expense of the Christian gains as a result of a fairer distribution among the sects, must lead to greater loyalty to Lebanon and to putting Lebanon's interest above all other considerations.
5. As of now, secret bargains are no longer acceptable. Thus, abolishing political sectarianism "only," which is what some people are demanding, will not be acceptable. It is either that all forms of sectarianism must be abolished and replaced by total secularism or that sectarianism must be entrenched, provided that it develops in harmony, thus enabling Lebanon to benefit from its spiritual plurality.
6. That the liberal economic system which has enabled the Lebanese capabilities to grow and to surpass the limits of their natural resources must be maintained and that Lebanon's cultural openness to the world must be preserved.
7. That Lebanon's Arab solidarity versus Israel must be defined in a manner that allows Lebanon to contribute within the limits of its capability. As for military action stemming from Lebanon, such action is incompatible with Lebanon's liberal economy. In order that all the Lebanese may have the opportunity to contribute enthusiastically to the Palestinian people's restoration of their rights, the Palestinian organizations must maintain discipline under the canopy of the Lebanese Government and laws.
8. That Lebanon's Christians must not be given lessons by anybody insofar as their Arabism is concerned. First, the Arabs must fully recognize these Christians. Who can deny that the families of Abi al-Lama', 'Assaf, Shihab,

Dahdah, Hubaysh, Hashim, Harfush and others are from Arab and Islamic origins? Can we forget that 'Abdullah Zakhir, a monk, founded the first Arab printing press in Aleppo and then in al-Shuwayr? Can we say, for example, that Christians like Butrus al-Bustani, al-Yaziji, Jubran, Nu'aymah and others left behind a cultural legacy that departed from their [Arab] culture?

9. That the relations between Syria and Lebanon must be relations of brotherhood and trust between two peoples who are bound by family ties between tens of thousands of families. The relations between the two countries can be improved easily if frankness replaces suspicion and caution.

In view of this reality, it must be said that there is no possible solution for the Lebanese issue without the Maronites. But the Maronites themselves must also find a solution acceptable to the majority of the Lebanese. Therefore, there must be, before anything else, an inter-Maronite reconciliation movement as a prior condition for the comprehensive national concord. The Maronites must also forget the wave of madness that has swept the Maronite sect and that their oneupmanship must not always flow into the course of methodical opposition to Syria, keeping in mind that salvation has not come from any other circle. They must also realize that their sect is not the worthiest of managing the state affairs. This is because of the Maronites' frankness and enthusiasm, which make them unskilful politicians. This is also true when it comes to the Maronite's management of his private affairs. In the past 100 years, we have not seen a Maronite among the top 5 wealthiest Lebanese citizens. They must remember that the "least guaranteed" among them was the one who took the most Maronite position at the Lusanne conference (meaning ex-President Sulayman Franjiyah).

Under the current circumstances, we must realize that it is better to select two kinds of men: One kind to solve the crisis—a kind that is able, in a transitional phase, to achieve reconciliation among the Maronites themselves, to establish relations with Syria, without any concealed intentions and on the basis of safeguarding Lebanon's sovereignty, and to create the proper foundations for reconciliation between the other sectors—and another kind of men to insure the reconstruction and organization of Lebanon.

Maronites and Other Lebanese Sects

The Maronites must learn anew to read Lebanon's history so that they may not forget that the other sects have, as the Maronites do, their role in building the past and the future Lebanon. Neither Fakhr al-Din nor Riyad al-Sulh were Maronite.

First, the Druze are the ones who developed the Druze Mountain entity before Mount Lebanon became known. Thanks to the Druze' political awareness and their

stubborn determination, we experienced some sort of independence at a time when the Maronites themselves were divided into pro-Yazbik and pro-Junblatt factions.

It is unfortunate for Lebanon that this sect has lost the important place it held at the outset of our political life. Therefore, it is essential that the Maronite sect continue performing its role in building Lebanon and that it rid itself of the complex of the firstborn who has lost his right to the inheritance.

Second, there are the Shi'ites who disappeared from Kasrawan mountains, Byblos [Jubayl], al-Batrun and the north only after the Mamelukes (who were not Arabs) had persecuted them. Because of its feudal system and the collusion of the Lebanese ruling class, this sect is still seeking its private identity in Lebanon.

As for the Sunna, who are the mouthpiece of Lebanon's Islam, they have held a prominent position in the "two-winged Lebanon" from the time of independence to this day. Thanks to their recent fusion in the Lebanon of the minorities, they have been more open to the Arabist currents.

Finally, we must mention the small sects, such as the 'Alawites who took refuge in Lebanon and became Lebanese and who, however, have not been given any representation rights. It is necessary to say that before being prosecuted by the Mamelukes, the 'Alawites were present in North Lebanon and in the "Bisharah region" in the south.

As for the Christians, the Orthodox hold a distinguished position, whether at the Arab level, to which they declare they belong without any embarrassment or complex, or at the Lebanese level. This sect, called the "Sunna Orthodox," has provided evidence of its fusion in the urban structure of Lebanon and Syria. It is open to international exchange and capable of establishing harmonious ties with all the Islamic sects.

Even though the Roman Catholics share the Maronites' position, they have learned, under more than one circumstance, how to preserve the possibilities of dialogue and how to let reason rule when necessary.

Finally, the Lebanese Protestants are, like the Armenians, the Chaldeans and the Syriacs, new to Lebanon and each of these sects has its place in the future Lebanon.

The purpose of Lebanon's plurality is to allow every sect to bring its own color and and weave it with the other colors. Let us work with an open mind to tackle the problems frankly and without hypocrisy so that we may together develop a 100-year charter, emphasizing that "Lebanon, with both its Christians and its Muslims, is an Arab country."

Political System: Both Sectarian and Secular

The sectarian system has been the foundation of the existence of Lebanon, the minorities' refuge. This plurality can become in the future a source of richness and a model to be emulated. It is true that real democracy can be achieved only when all citizens are subject to the same laws, especially civil status laws. But it is dangerous to impose on the Lebanese a system that conflicts with their beliefs and their heritage.

We believe that it is better for the comprehensive secular solution to be achieved with the approval of all the Lebanese. Within this framework, we propose the following:

1. Entrench and preserve the sectarian system, provisionally, at both the political level and the civil status level.
2. Open the door for all willing Lebanese to choose to belong to a "secular faction" to be added to the two main factions existing in Lebanon currently.

A. All Lebanese who choose to belong to this "secular faction" shall be subject to the civil law.

B. This secular faction shall have the right to parliamentary and ministerial representation proportionate with its numbership numbers.

It can be said as of this moment that this faction represents 10 percent. Before the next parliamentary elections, a grace period shall be given to all the Lebanese to register themselves as members of this new faction. At the end of this grace period, the percentage of parliamentary seats to be given to this faction and the districts in which it is to be represented shall be determined. This percentage shall be modified continuously, depending on the number of Lebanese who join this faction. This percentage shall be deducted equally from the other factions. Thus, we may be able to solve the more complex problem in Lebanon while respecting Lebanon's creeds and observing human rights.

Lebanon and Syria: Twin Brothers

Even though Lebanon acts in solidarity with all the Arab countries, it has established special relations with its closest neighbor. Therefore, relations of friendship and trust must be established between the two countries as if they were between "twin brothers."

Syria should refrain from demanding any rights or territories whatsoever in Lebanon unless the Lebanese people approve such demands through a referendum conducted under the supervision of an international organization.

2. Through a proper deterrent force, Lebanon should prevent its territories from being turned into a playground where plots are hatched against Syria or into a passage for invaders.

3. To establish a legal formula for the special relations between Syria and Lebanon, a "ministry of state for Syrian-Lebanese affairs" should be constitutionally established in each of the two cabinets and the two ministers of state should be selected from among non-political figures in the two countries.

4. Regular meetings should be held between the two heads of state to coordinate the two countries' positions on the major Arab and international options.

5. As for the so-called "distinguished relations," only the two countries' parliaments should conclude agreements of the sort that has been proposed. There is no other way for such agreements.

National Parliamentary and Ministerial Representation

It is a given fact that Lebanon's two main factions have been sharing parliamentary representation and state jobs. Introduction of the "secular" faction will help bring the religious factions closer to each other.

1. The secular faction's percentage should be determined afterward and deducted from the percentage of the two other factions. Only Lebanese registered in the secular faction and holding identity cards showing that they have been members of this faction for at least 6 months may represent the faction. As for members who wish to abandon their "secular faction" later, they should be made to wait for a time. Special laws should be issued to define the status of this new "Lebanese faction."

2. Christian faction—50%-x/2 (one half the secular faction):

28 Maronites	56%
9 Greek Orthodox	18%
6 Roman Catholics	12%
3 Orthodox Armenians	6%
1 Protestant, 1 Caldean/Catholic, 1 Syriac,	8%
1 Catholic Armenian	
[Total] 50	100%

3. Muslim Faction—50percent-x/2:

19 Sunna	38%
19 Shi'ites	38%
9 Druze	18%
3 'Alawites	6%
[Total] 50	100%

To strengthen Lebanon's special status as a "homeland for the Arab minorities," the president of the republic should be elected from the Maronite minority throughout four presidential terms.

In the fifth presidential term, the presidency should be entrusted to a member of the secular faction, provided that this faction amounts to 20 percent of the total population and that the presidency does not continue to be confined to a Christian group.

As for the other two presidencies (the Chamber of Deputies speakership and the cabinet premiership), they should not be assigned to any particular faction and should be open to all factions without any discrimination.

The president of the republic should be elected by a broad electoral college that includes all current and retired deputies, all current and former ministers, all elected mayors, all acknowledged labor union chairmen and a representative of each recognized sect.

The rules of government should be derived from the rules of the Fifth French Republic: The president presides and the prime minister rules.

The executive authority should be practiced by the cabinet which is headed by the president of the republic and by the prime minister who should direct the state policy.

The prime minister should be appointed by the Chamber of Deputies after consultations conducted by the chamber speaker with the various parliamentary factions.

The prime minister-designate should form the cabinet after consultations with the president of the republic who may reject only 20 percent of the cabinet ministers proposed.

The prime minister should assume his position before the Chamber of Deputies after a vote of confidence and should take the oath before the president of the republic.

As for the election law, it should stress the principle of one citizen, one vote. It is preferable that (each Lebanese electoral district) be given at least one seat but no more than 3 seats. The voter may not, regardless of the number of seats in his district, vote for more than one candidate in the district. Candidates gaining a majority of the votes for the seats allocated for their group or their secular faction should win the election. Absentee or proxy voting should be allowed so that all Lebanese citizens may practice their right through the embassies and consulates. No argument should obstruct this rule which is now enacted in all countries of the world.

The Lebanese educational system must be reformulated at the roots so that Lebanon may be allowed to reap greater benefits from the advantages of its plurality and its openness to the world.

While preserving private education, education in state schools must be made the best education available in Lebanon.

1. Religious education should be compulsory and should certainly include the teaching of Christianity and Islam in all private and public schools. It should also constitute a part of the baccalaureate test materials.

2. The teaching of foreign languages, especially in universities, should also be compulsory.

3. Technical education should be expanded.

4. Scientific research in certain areas must be encouraged and it is essential that top university graduates be appointed [to research positions].

Through a proper national educational system, Lebanon should stop being a people and should become a nation.

As for social justice, its objective will be to provide equal opportunities to all. No matter what the price, some of the destitute factions must not be abandoned and must be provided with national solidarity [social security]. Efforts must also be made not to let some Lebanese provinces develop at a slower pace than others so that these provinces may exploit their best resources which may benefit the nation in its entirety.

Summary and Recommendations

These recommendations or proposals can form a basis for the "100-year charter." For the first time in our history which abounds with constant dangers and with arguments often generated by external causes, let us consider the distant future. Let us consider the Lebanese homes built more than a 100 years ago and let us all tell ourselves with the same enthusiasm that a "100-year charter" is possible.

In a 100 years and with all the Lebanese who are determined to maintain Lebanon, we may be able to get a Lebanon that is a model country, a unique Lebanon, thanks to its plurality which it will bequeath to its children, and a Lebanon turned into an oasis of peace after having been the scorched land that was rejected by all and that gave its children nothing.

Let us stretch our hands to each other across the fabricated borders. There are no insurmountable problems. Rather, there are men who don't know how to find the solutions. The solutions are there. So let us try together to find them.

The internal security situation prevents the Lebanese from meeting with each other to discuss the reconciliation problems. I am convinced that if the Lebanese are given the opportunity, they will ultimately find the proper and acceptable solutions.

The major powers concerned with Lebanon must take the initiative to get the following Lebanese groups together aboard a ship anchored at sea in Lebanese waters: all former presidents and Chamber of Deputy

speakers; all current and former cabinet ministers; all elected current and former deputies; two official representatives of each faction; two official representatives of each of the five main political forces (the Phalanges, the Lebanese Forces, the Socialist Progressive Party, the Syrian Nationalist Party, Amal Movement).

Aboard this peace ship, the Lebanese should hold a closed session that lasts as long as necessary to discuss and agree on the "100-year charter."

After the representatives of Lebanon, all of Lebanon, have expressed their opinions, we can expect aid and assistance from the friendly forces—which have been disabled so far by the lack of agreement—to which we turn [when in need] so that they may help us regain our domestic security and rebuild Lebanon.

Al-Musawi Expresses Views on Islamic Resistance

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[Interview with Hizbullah Mulla 'Abbas al-Musawi; "In Broad and Comprehensive Interview, 'Abbas al-Musawi to AL-'AHD: We Are Witnessing Most Criminal Endeavors to Close Islamic Resistance Dossier"]

[Text] Even though he has little time, we have interviewed him. He welcomed us. We asked him questions about Lebanon and the president and about reconciliation between Amal and Hizbullah. He reassured us of the Intifadah's future, despite what Yasir 'Arafat is doing. We talked about the Islamic resistance and he urged the nation to shoulder its responsibility so as to protect this resistance from its domestic and foreign enemies. For every question, al-Musawi has a convincing answer which emanates from the heart of the truth and honesty and from profound knowledge. AL-'AHD has met His Eminence the Most Erudite 'Abbas al-Musawi and conducted the following interview with him:

[AL-'AHD] Despite all the ongoing movements, the local conditions continue to be deadlocked. Do you expect any progress or any understanding to be achieved in the foreseeable future and to lead, at least, to holding the presidential election?

[Musawi] Lebanon's crisis generally has undergone numerous experiences. Upon examining these experiences, we understand the nature of the complexities of this crisis. We also realize that a major part of the complexities emanates from foreign intervention and from the dimensions of this intervention. We have recently seen large-scale intervention in Lebanon's affairs and in the Lebanese crisis. This level of intervention contributes in large part to the complexities of the crisis. Consequently, as long as the Lebanese society and the Lebanese citizens, especially the Muslims, play no serious role in tackling the conditions, we see no possibility of any loosening of the existing Lebanese crisis.

The proof of this is that all the past experiences, embodied in U.S., Arab, European and Vatican intervention, have further complicated the problem and have made it more difficult, thus leading the problem to what everybody calls a dead end. This issue is not separate from the presidency issue, especially if we view it from two angles. The first is that the presidency issue is a part, not to say the most significant part, of the crisis—a part in which the Maronites see their survival and the preservation of their state, their rights and their privileges. On the other hand, the presidency represents to the others an issue of injustice and unfairness. The presidency is the most significant aspect of the problem.

If we view the issue from another angle, we find that the presidency has, especially since the Zionist invasion of 1982, entered a dangerous circle. Previously, one of the prerequisites of the presidency was that the president be Maronite. But since 1982, the main prerequisite has become that the president be (pro-Israel). Israel stormed into the election circuit and imposed the now-buried Bashir al-Jumayyil with Israeli tanks. Because all the Islamic and Christian factions gave legitimacy and legality to the president produced by the Israeli intervention and Israeli tanks, it is now Israel's prerequisite that the president must be a pro-Israel president employed by Israel. Israel also intervened and appointed Amin al-Jumayyil and other people completely loyal to it, such as Ja'ja' and 'Awn who is employed by Israel. They all serve the Israeli interest, especially 'Awn who is a Zionist. To the Muslims, the presidential issue is no longer just an issue of injustice, of the impossibility of attaining it or of the Maronites' wish to preserve their privileges, even though all these elements complicate the matter. Since 1982, another factor has surfaced and further complications have developed.

We believe that the presidency issue is separate from the general situation no longer and that any election endeavor will lead to further complications in Lebanon's atmosphere. There is something obvious in everybody's movement. For example, when the election became due, everybody was demanding loudly and enthusiastically that the election be held. But now things have subsided and everybody is demanding that a plan be submitted by the president prior to the election. All this proves that the election is not separate from the crisis generally.

Regimes' Fear of Revolutionary Condition

[AL-'AHD] The Arab movements and contacts are connected with two fundamental issues: The first is whatever pertains to the Lebanese situation and to what is rumored about an Arab summit to deal with this situation and the second concerns the ongoing efforts to restore Egypt to the Arab League. It seems that a new tendency is developing to achieve a common Arab visualization on a settlement [of Arab-Israeli conflict]. What is the true nature and what are the dimensions of what is going on?

[Musawi] It is our firm belief in this regard that most of the Arab movements emanate from a fear complex created by the new revolutionary movement which has been generated by the successive revolutions, beginning with the Islamic revolution of Iran and ending with the blessed Intifadah which has erupted on Palestine's soil. To understand this issue, we must examine all the Islamic movements and the Arab position toward these movements. For example, if we take Egypt, the biggest Arab country, we find that its real crisis is with the fundamentalists. This is why Egypt's streets are witnessing pursuits of and confrontations with the fundamentalists. Jordan has also acknowledged its problems with the fundamentalists and it, too, stages large-scale raids against the homes of fundamentalists. What we see clearly in Egypt and Jordan is also seen in all the Arab countries. But the more important issue is the blessed Intifadah which has embarrassed everybody. While the Arabs were seeking a settlement with the Zionist enemy through Camp David and the Fez summit, they were surprised by the Intifadah which has embarrassed them. To understand this problem, we must cite some Arab statements. The shah [king] of Jordan was most frank when he noted that any procrastination or delay in settling the Palestinian issue will lead to greater radicalism.

The words of Jordan's ruler show us that the basic complex that has motivated the Arab leaders and kings to launch their new movements is their fear of the Islamic condition and of the revolutionary movements, especially the revolutionary movements that have embraced Islam as their basis. This is what has motivated these leaders to move most forcefully to deal with a number of issues in the area. For example, the Arab movements in this phase flow mainly in the direction of entrenching the Arab leaderships that can restore prominence to the U.S. role which is in harmony with the Israeli position and Israeli entity. It is evident from the Arab leaders' and kings' movements that they want to restore Egypt to the sphere of the Arab countries and Arab League and to give Egypt the stronger role throughout the entire Arab area. At the same time, the majority of the Arabs are unanimous that it is necessary to give Yasir 'Arafat the main influential role in the main problem, namely the Palestinian problem. All these movements, whether intended to restore Egypt's role in the Arab world or to give Yasir 'Arafat the fundamental and influential role in the main problem, namely the Palestinian issue, flow in the direction of ending the blessed Palestinian Intifadah and, by ending this Intifadah, of eliminating the most important revolutionary school in our modern age. If it continues, this school alone is capable of arousing our entire Islamic nation to confront the Israeli enemy. Therefore, the regimes' fear of the revolutionary condition which has begun to spread everywhere is what has motivated these regimes to move, whether at the level of restoring Egypt's role in the Arab homeland, of ending the Palestinian Intifadah or of the Lebanese situation.

Regarding the Lebanese issue in particular, I should note that the Arab kings' and leaders' interest in the Lebanese

issue is confined solely to that which is connected with their interests. The proof of this is that in the year when Israel invaded Lebanon and blockaded Beirut for more than 3 months, the Arabs did not move a finger and let the Muslim Palestinians and the Muslim Lebanese suffer alone in the face of the Israeli occupation and shoulder all the tragic consequences of the invasion. This means that the Arab kings and leaders are not closely or remotely concerned with the Lebanese issue or with the Lebanese people. Yes, when they saw a major revolutionary condition setting forth from Lebanon to confront the United States, Israel, France and all the imperialist powers and to threaten their interests and when they saw this condition giving rise to the blessed Palestinian Intifadah, they became concerned with the Lebanese situation, i.e. with putting an end to this revolutionary movement and with striking all its mainstays in Lebanon. This is the part of the Lebanese issue that concerns the Arab states and Arab leaders. As to the Arab leaders being really concerned with the Lebanese situation, I believe that the experiences have demonstrated that these leaders are not in the least concerned with Lebanon's condition.

'Major Plot'

[AL-'AHD] In the wake of the [southern] suburb's most recent incidents, of brother Bisharati's visit and of the meetings with the Syrian officials, what point has reconciliation between Amal and Hizbullah reached and where should we place Amal's ceaseless escalation of the situation, especially in light of the incidents in Burj al-Barajinah?

[Musawi] We have repeatedly said that the issue of Amal and of the battles it has initiated against Hizbullah, whether in Beirut or in the south, is not separate from the major plot which is intended to end the Islamic condition in Lebanon and outside Lebanon. Through the imperialist movement generally, we believe that there is an attempt to fold over a glorious and honorable page of our Islamic nation's history in this phase. In this regard, I will note obvious examples which even the ordinary citizen understands, such as the criminal attempt to close the dossier of the war between the Islamic Republic and Iraq, the imperialist U.S. and Soviet pressure and the pressure by all the Arab states to shut down the most important revolutionary school in our modern life.

We know that the jihad of the Muslim Iranians on the battlefronts with Iraq has graduated revolutionaries from all parts of the world. We saw Muslims from Lebanon, from Afghanistan and from most parts of the Islamic world go to the battlefronts to seek inspiration from the high revolutionary spirit of these major revolutionary schools. Imperialism worked day and night and plotted in all ways until it closed this great revolutionary school.

A major effort was then launched in Lebanon to shut down the second school that teaches jihad and the methods to confront world imperialism, namely the

Islamic resistance school. A most serious and criminal attempt has been made to fold over the dossier of the Islamic resistance in South Lebanon.

The same applies to the numerous major and obvious endeavors intended to strike the Intifadah and to shut down this great school that has arisen on Palestine's soil as a result of the Islamic resistance in Lebanon. All efforts are being made to shut down this Intifadah or this school which has sharpened the Muslims' resolve and has offered lessons and examples to Muslims in every part of the world.

To demonstrate the nature of the plot at this phase, whether against Hizbullah in Lebanon or against the blessed Intifadah in Palestine, I will pause at the following: Having despaired of striking the Islamic condition the jihad condition in Lebanon in Palestine, it was natural for world imperialism to think of means that would enable it to deal the two revolutions in Lebanon and Palestine a severe blow.

To put it more precisely, Israel has tried to weaken the Islamic resistance in South Lebanon with all the means but failed. It has tried through numerous invasions and through all kinds of shelling but failed to accomplish anything. All of Israel's serious and criminal endeavors to weaken the resistance movement in Palestine have also failed.

'Local Instruments'

This is why imperialism has selected some local instruments (opposed) to the revolution leaders to use them to strike the liberation and revolutionary movements. It has selected Yasir 'Arafat and the PLO to strike the Intifadah and Nabih Birri and Amal Movement to strike Hizbullah.

This is why 'Arafat's and the PLO's main effort is currently aimed at ending the Intifadah. This has been embodied clearly since Yasir 'Arafat declared his condemnation of all forms of terror. His statement has been interpreted in part to mean that even throwing stones at Israeli tanks and at the Israeli war machine is a form of violence which he, the Arab kings and leaders, the Palestinian organizations and others who support this capitulationist line condemn. As I have already said, people who consider themselves Shi'ite followers of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib and who consider their slogan an Islamic slogan have been chosen to strike the Islamic resistance and the jihad condition in Lebanon. Through these people, the imperialists have sought to strike the Islamic tendency and Islamic condition. If this is the case, then it means an imperialist scheme to strike the Islamic condition in Lebanon. This is why the issue is not a local or ordinary issue that concerns disagreements between brothers and that is easy to deal with and settle. It is a big and serious issue that falls within the framework of the conspiracy against the proponents of the Islamic, jihad and revolutionary condition in Lebanon. This is why I expect the solution to be difficult and complicated in this climate.

Obstruction Is Proof

What confirms this is the course of the efforts made by more than one circle to reconcile Amal and Hizbullah. Iran has tried repeatedly and frequently. Our brother ulema in Lebanon, whether from Beirut, the south or al-Biqa', have also made several endeavours and played several roles in this regard. Other people have played their role. We in Hizbullah have tried with all the means to end the feuds between Hizbullah and Amal. However, we have constantly collided with Amal's and Nabih Birri's insistence on conditions that complicate the issues and that preclude any possibility of an understanding or a truce. This is especially true of the latest, and still ongoing, endeavor made by the Islamic Republic through brother Bisharati. Despite brother Bisharati's strong intervention and his contacts with all the parties concerned, we see more preconditions and complications added to the preconditions made in the past for a reconciliation. This means that there is determination and insistence on persisting in the plot against the Islamic condition.

Understanding Is Necessary

While reminding of these issues, we also stress our constant starting point, namely the need for an understanding among the Muslims in their entirety, not to mention an understanding among the Shi'ites themselves, because of numerous necessities, especially in this critical phase in which the entire Lebanese arena, rather the entire area, is experiencing real and major crises, particularly in the wake of the most recent Israeli attacks and of the positions displayed by East Beirut which fully reflects Israel's role and the obvious Israeli intervention in Lebanon's affairs.

In these conditions when the ranks must be united and when all the people must act in solidarity, we find Nabih Birri complicating the issues and trying to move the Lebanese arena in the direction of disagreements and of further complication of the feuds between the brothers so that this arena may not stabilize and calm down and, consequently, may not engage in a real and firm confrontation against the world imperialist forces.

Shi'ite History Is History of Jihad, Nazi Is Murderer of Ulema

[AL-'AHD] What is your response to those who have described Hizbullah's procession as a neo-Nazi procession that has distorted the Shi'ite history?

[Musawi] Our clear response in this regard is to offer a quick review of the Shi'ite history which is known for nothing other than honorable confrontations and for jihad positions. The history of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib is a continuation of the history of God's messenger, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, and of Islam's history which abounds with jihad for God and for elevating the word of God, and there is no God but Him.

Throughout the oppressive Ommiad, Marawanite and 'Abbaside eras, our imams constantly opposed the tyrants. It is well known that those of our imams, the Shi'ite imams, who were not killed with the sword were murdered with poison because of their opposition to tyranny in their times. We also know that God, may He be praised, hastened the noble birth of our Imam al-Mahdi because the 'Abbaside tyrant and the other tyrants were aware that an infant would be born to Imam Hasan al-'Askari and that this infant would march forth to fill the world with justice after it had been filled with injustice and oppression. We also find that the home of Imam Hasan al-'Askari was besieged and that the plan was to kill the newborn. But God, with his mercy and compassion, concealed the infant from the eyes of the tyrants. In the absence of Imam al-Mahdi, his deputies have been the epitome of confrontation against the world imperialist forces.

How many Shi'ite authorities, who are al-Mahdi's deputies, have been murdered, beginning with the first martyr, who was one of the Muslims' prominent authorities, and the second martyr and ending with martyr Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who was murdered in our modern age, and with all the righteous ulema and authorities? How many were murdered until Ayatollah Khomeyni, Imam al-Mahdi's deputy, came? Ayatollah Khomeini, this great imam, may God keep him, has been able with his prominent and honorable jihad to remind us of 'Ali's jihad, of al-Husayn's jihad and of the jihad of our prominent imams and authorities. This is the Shi'ite history which abounds with confrontations against the forces of oppression.

Lebanon's Hizbullah has marched within this procession and has acted in full harmony with the procession of the imams of the [prophet's] house which is the procession of the Shi'ite imams and of the Shi'ite history.

Who other than Hizbullah has been able to defeat the U.S. enemy in Lebanon and has been able to score the greatest victories in the confrontation against the Israeli enemy and against all the anti-Islamic forces in Lebanon and in the entire area? Everybody, both enemy and friend, acknowledges that this confrontatin has been honorable, unique and distinguished. This is our history as Hizbullah and this is the Shi'ite history and we find full harmony between the two.

We, as Hizbullah, consider ourselves a continuation of the history of the prophet's kinsmen and of the Shi'ite history whereas the others have killed the ulema, murdered martyr Shaykh 'Ali Karim, staged the criminal attempt in al-Safari area and the most recent attempt at Shaykh Hammud Hammud's life in West Beirut and have attempted to kill the faithful and struggling youth. All these attempts show that the Nazis and those who do not wish right to be established in this country or to see the Shi'ite history renewed are Nabih Birri and his likes who have sold themselves to the devil and who have

fought the Shi'ite history and the history of the prophet's kinsmen through their main crime. We don't believe that there is a more heinous or bigger crime than the crime of eliminating South Lebanon's Islamic resistance which represents the honorable jihad condition for all Muslims in the world, not just for Lebanon's Muslims.

[AL-'AHD] A magazine has said that you went into seclusion because of alleged disagreements. What is your response to this allegation?

War of Rumors

[Musawi] In this regard, it is beneficial to note that one of the means used by world imperialism in this phase to create a climate of confusion and anxiety among the faithful Muslim ranks is to rumor the presence of disagreements within the Islamic leaderships. This issue started, as we have seen, when rumors were spread at a large scale by the media and the broadcasting stations about disagreements within the Islamic Republic's leaderships and about the presence of various conflicting currents with the aim of confusing the world's faithful who adhere to the Islamic revolution line because when the individual committed to the line, whether in Lebanon, in Iran or in any part of the world, hears the widespread rumors about such disagreements, he will become confused and unsettled and will feel anxious, especially insofar as these leaderships are concerned.

There are plans to use this method in Lebanon as a part of the war against the faithful in Lebanon. I consider the attempt to spread the rumor of the presence of disagreement in Hizbullah's leadership to be a part of the plot aimed at spreading confusion in the arena, of creating further anxiety and of weakening our kinsmen's and our youth's morale. We have not stopped working and have not shirked our work in Hizbullah for a single moment. We will stay under this banner which we consider the banner of Islam and the banner of the jurisprudent's rule, embodied in the leadership of Imam Khomeyni. We will do our utmost to elevate God's word, and there is no god but God, through the resistance.

Failed Assassination Attempt

[AL-'AHD] You have promised to reveal the circumstances of the crime of the assassination attempt made against you and against some brother ulema and leaders and you said that you would announce the perpetrating party and the names of the people involved in the attempt. What point has this case reached and what are the new developments in it?

[Musawi] The crime aimed at Hizbullah's leadership is not, of course, an ordinary crime but a major crime which sought to break the back of the Islamic condition in Lebanon, especially through the battle which was reimposed on the suburb in the wake of this crime. This battle was followed by another battle which sought to topple the southern suburb and to also topple the jihad

condition in West Beirut. In this complete plot, security action was integrated with military action. But with God's will and with the resolve of the struggling faithful, the plot failed. However, this crime must not go untasked by us and by all the people.

When we said that we had ample information on this crime and that we would present it to our kinsmen and our people in Lebanon, we wanted, on the one hand, people to shoulder their responsibility toward crimes perpetrated daily against the jihad and Islamic condition and wanted, at the same time, the people to know the truth of what goes on and of the means fabricated constantly to spread confusion in the arena and to keep the wound open between those who should stand united in one rank in order to complete the march of confronting the Israeli enemy and the Maronites who, in the name of the United States, of Europe and of Israel, seek to tighten their control of the Muslims and of the strugglers in Lebanon. Therefore, we are waiting for the right occasion and the right time to clarify these matters to our people and our kinsmen so that we, on the one hand, may shoulder our full responsibility in confronting these plots and so that the people, on the other hand, may shoulder their full responsibility toward these plots. This [clarification] may be done in the near future.

'Arafat: Endless Concessions

[AL-'AHD] Now that dialogue has been opened between Washington and Yasir 'Arafat and that 'Arafat is ready to end the so-called terrorism, what is the future of this movement and what are the future consequences to the Intifadah?

[Musawi] In this regard, we must separate two issues: The issue of the Intifadah's future and the issue of 'Arafat's dialogue and of the concessions he is making to the Zionist enemy, of course.

We know that the United States has been and continues to be the Zionist enemy's true supporter and that it has continued to employ and will continue to employ all its capabilities to keep the Israeli enemy in the area. It is my opinion that one need not cite evidence and proofs on this issue. I think that Washington, especially since it has seen that the Intifadah cannot be ended and that it has led the Israeli enemy to big security, military, economic and political crises and to political, security and economic labyrinths, is trying to rescue Israel, its foster daughter, from these crises. This is why Washington is using all means in this phase, especially the dialogue it has opened with Yasir 'Arafat, to end the Intifadah in Palestine.

What is interesting in this regard is that for Washington to agree to talk with the PLO and Yasir 'Arafat, it has taken everything away from 'Arafat. What is it that 'Arafat has not given away and what concessions has he not made to the enemy? Considering that Washington did not agree to talk to 'Arafat until it had taken

everything away from him, then what will it demand if it decides to do something for the Palestinian people? What pressures will it exert and what will it demand of Yasir 'Arafat and of the Muslim Palestinian people? The future dialogue between Washington and Yasir 'Arafat will, in my opinion, lead to further daily concessions by Yasir 'Arafat at a time when he has been able to do nothing for the Intifadah.

Intifadah Is Islamic

The reason for this—and here we should talk about the issue which I have said must be separated from the first issue, namely the Intifadah and its future. As it has become recently obvious, even to the Israeli officials, the Intifadah and the movement in Palestiine is Islamic. Others may have positions or a line in this Intifadah but the Islamic condition is the basis. This point, which has become obvious even to the Israeli officials, enables us to understand the nature of the struggle and of the future and to realize that they will not be tied to an open dialogue between 'Arafat and Washington or to direct or indirect negotiations with the Israeli enemy. There is a people moving with its Islam and its religion. Nothing will stop this people's movement. This is why Yasir 'Arafat and his position have not been able to curtail the people's Intifadah.

It Continues

Yes, 'Arafat may, through his position in Palestine, be able to cause some confusion. As to his being able to end this Intifadah and to introduce some fundamental changes and transformations into it, we believe, on the basis of a realistic view of the details of the Intifadah and of the nature and identity of this Intifadah and of the strugglers who oversee it, especially the Muslim ulama—both those who have been deported and those who continue to lead the Intifadah in Palestine—we believe, as a result of our knowledge of the Intifadah, of its figures and of its leadership, that this Intifadah will not be influenced by any climate of dialogue, whether between the Arab countries and Israel, between Yasir 'Arafat and Israel or between the United States and 'Arafat. All these dialogues, which will only lead to further verbal and practical concessions, will not influence the Intifadah's future. Our kinsmen's Intifadah in Palestiine will remain independent and will continue to escalate until it makes the Israeli position more and more critical and, consequently, until it achieves victory over the Israeli enemy.

Dialogue Is Maneuver to End Intifadah

[AL-'AHD] Now that the U.S.-'Arafat dialogue has been initiated, do you think that the doors to the international conference have become wide open?

[Musawi] The point that we should remember in this regard is that Yasir 'Arafat and the Arab countries which

may have some influence over the Palestinian issue were moving in the bandwagon of settlements and of defeat before the Israeli enemy prior to the Muslim Palestinian people's Intifadah.

We do, of course, remember Yasir 'Arafat's position and the position of the shah of Jordan vis-a-vis the Muslim-Israeli conflict prior to the Intifadah. We also remember the position of Egypt and of others toward this conflict. We especially remember that Yasir 'Arafat was very enthusiastic for the international conference prior to the Intifadah and that 'Arafat, the shah of Jordan and some other Arab leaders were able to proliferate this idea in most countries of the world.

But while the Arab countries and 'Arafat were moving in the direction of the international conference prior to the Intifadah, we saw world imperialism, especially the United States, disregard all those movements. All the developments that have occurred since then and that have compelled the United States to make some sort of superficial concessions to Yasir 'Arafat are a result of the Intifadah and an endeavor to outflank it.

This means that the United States is pondering how to outflank the Intifadah with all possible means because this Intifadah poses a threat to its interests and to the Israeli enemy's interests. This is all that is occurring at the level of the area and that distinguishes the U.S. enemy's opinions of the PLO and of Yasir 'Arafat. As to a real desire to truly solve the Palestinian issue, we don't at all expect the presence of such a desire. What is there is that the United States will exploit the situation. The United States has explicitly and openly declared that it will exploit the international conference as a canopy for the separate peace treaties which it has embraced as a policy—a policy which it initiated with Egypt. So the United States does not truly believe in the international conference but seeks to have the Arab countries capitulate individually through separate peace treaties with the Israeli enemy. This is what the United States is seeking. As to whether it will be achieved or not, we believe that it will not, especially in the wake of the Palestinian people's Intifadah inside Palestine and especially since observation has demonstrated that the Intifadah is escalating constantly. With its escalation, no conference can be held, whether within the framework of separate peace treaties or of a general peace treaty through which the Arabs want to collectively sell the Palestinians and the venerable Jerusalem.

Israel's Standing Has Fallen

[AL-'AHD] A British military magazine reported 2 days prior to the Israeli commando operation in al-Na'imah that Israel had mobilized an airborne brigade in the northern part of the occupied homeland to stage a qualitative operation against a number of Islamic Palestinian and Lebanese jihad positions. What is your assessment of al-Na'imah operation and will Israel repeat this

kind of operation now that its air force has failed to destroy the resistance positions?

[Musawi] To understand what means Israel will use to complete its struggle against the revolutionary condition in the area, be it Islamic or non-Islamic, we must review the history of development of the Israeli enemy's glory and standing. In its entire past history, Israel has adopted the method of attacking and invading Arab and other territories so as to strike fear in the hearts of all Arabs and Muslims through such repeated blows and invasions.

As a result of this constant Israeli conduct, especially of the qualitative operations Israel ceaselessly carried out in the past, whether the operations it carried out against a number of Palestinian officials and leaders in Beirut, the operation in Uganda or operations in other areas, Israel was actually able to build its glory and standing and to create fear throughout the entire area. Israel became a legend, its army became the invincible army and its entity turned into the entity that nobody could defeat. All this resulted from the adoption of a certain policy of military and security operations. But after Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the Islamic resistance wrenched the initiative from Israel and became the party which staged qualitative operations, whether the daring martyrdom operation staged by the resistance or the qualitative operations which were staged against Israel's and Lahd's positions and which harassed the Israeli enemy's policy and created an awe-inspiring climate around the Islamic condition and resistance. At the same time, these operations planted fear and horror in the ranks of Jews in all parts of the world.

We know that the qualitative operations through which the Islamic resistance scored major victories and the Muslim Palestinian people's Intifadah which followed those victories have created a new climate among the Israeli enemy's ranks—a climate of confusion and of major fears not only among the Jews in Palestine but also in all parts of the world.

This is why we imagine and expect that Israel will—in this climate under which there are ongoing efforts to reach settlements and in which the plan is to deal the Muslims a moral defeat and to strike the Islamic condition positions in all parts of the world—try to regain the initiative, especially since internal blows have been dealt the Islamic resistance. The qualitative operation through which Israel assassinated Khalil al-Wazir in Tunisia and the most recent qualitative operation in al-Na'imah are intended to restore the initiative in qualitative operations to Israel so that it may rebuild its standing that has fallen to the point where Palestinian children dare attack the Israeli war machine with stones.

'We Must Regain Initiative'

Israel wants to regain its lost standing. This is why we believe that the operation it carried out against al-Na'imah is the beginning of another phase of qualitative

operations. On the other hand, the Islamic and revolutionary condition in Lebanon and in the entire area must shoulder its responsibilities in regaining the initiative. Here is where we understand the serious nature of the crime committed against the Islamic resistance in South Lebanon. This crime has obliterated the most significant accomplishments of jihad and revolutionary action in this phase and has, consequently, allowed Israel to consider with utter ease the possibility of staging qualitative operations against the jihad condition in Lebanon and outside Lebanon.

Obstacles Are Very Big

[AL-'AHD] Martyr Haytham Dabbuq's operation, al-Hurr al-'Amili's heroic operation, and the epic operation staged by an Islamic resistance group against the Lahdist Amal broadcasting station, [bringing the downfall] of the Zionist enemy confirm that the resistance can penetrate all artificial barriers. So why aren't these qualitative operations intensified?

[Musawi] Martyr Haytham Dabbuq's operation and the following qualitative operations, especially al-Hurr al-'Amili operation, were part of the plan launched by the Islamic resistance since its inception—a plan to seize the initiative and to escalate the jihad and the qualitative operations until they are turned into lessons, rather schools, for Muslims in all parts of the world.

But in this phase, we must not disregard the difficulties, hardships and obstacles that have faced the Islamic resistance. In the wake of the challenges it has faced in South Lebanon and of the successive blows dealt the Islamic resistance, its strugglers and its weapons—blows which have turned Amal Movement into a guard protecting the Israeli enemy's borders, exactly like Antoine Lahd and the South Lebanon Army—and now that Amal has sunk to this level of lackeyhood and of confrontation against the Islamic resistance, it is natural to expect a weakening of the jihad operations, especially of the qualitative operations. But despite this, the Islamic resistance has, thanks to its strength and to its strugglers' resolve, been able to stage the most recent operations, especially the martyrdom operations.

The resistance is most eager to maintain this level of qualitative operations so that the jihad and resistance condition in Lebanon may continue to be the true support backing our kinsmen's Intifadah in Palestine and the main school teaching jihad daily, through its operations and through its continued jihad, to all Muslims and all revolutionaries in all parts of the world.

Determined To Continue

The resistance is resolved and determined to continue this kind of operations. But we must appreciate the major obstacles facing it in this phase. However, it is certain that the resistance will pursue its course and that neither Israel's force nor the force of all the agents, be

they Christians or others, will be able to weaken the strugglers' resolve or to undermine the Islamic resistance's jihad operations. As to the question of why military operations are monopolized by the Shi'ites to the exclusion of the Sunna, you are well aware of the Islamic resistance's tendency. From the outset, the Islamic resistance has adhered to Islam, and Islam solely, as its starting point. This is why throughout its past history, the resistance has included our Muslim Sunna brothers. Muslim Sunna strugglers have participated in more than one military operation. God willing, we will ceaselessly try in the future to restore momentum to these operations and to the participation of all Muslims in the operations so that the resistance may be able to assume its real role and dimension and may safeguard its real identity which is the identity of adherence to the beloved Islam.

Resistance Is Nation's Responsibility

[AL-'AHD] After all that has been said and all that is going on, how do you view the Islamic resistance's future?

[Musawi] As I have already noted, the resistance is the honorable face of this nation's jihad. Therefore, the entire nation is responsible before God, may He be praised and exalted, to move to safeguard this resistance, especially since this resistance does not belong to one circle and not another, one faction and not another or one people and not another. It belongs to the entire Islamic nation. This is why the entire nation must move with full force to safeguard the resistance. Only if the nation shoulders the responsibility will this resistance be guaranteed a real future. But if the resistance is left to face alone this onslaught by all the enemies and by the world imperialist forces, it will move weakly and slowly, even though the enemies will not be able to defeat it. If all shoulder their responsibility to escalate the resistance and if they all confront those who oppose the resistance, whether at home or abroad, and defend this resistance which has preserved the Muslims' dignity and defended the nation's honor, then things will be different and matters will move toward the better.

Within the limits of the modest resources at our disposal, we will try to enhance this resistance with all our might. We seek to be martyrs on its path in order to enable it to advance.

The Islamic resistance, its martyrs and its men reaffirm their resolve to liberate the venerable Jerusalem from the Zionist and U.S. enemy's control. We will continue our action and our jihad and we will not stop offering blood and efforts to escalate the resistance. But the thing is that the nation must shoulder its full responsibilities because our honor and dignity come through the resistance and through our religion. The Prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, said: God has honored my nation through its jihad and through its horsemen. Through jihad and through ceaseless work, we can guarantee the nation's safety and the resistance's continuity.

And may God, the Lord of the universe, be praised.

LIBYA

Spokesman Expresses Surprise at French UN Veto

PM1701132589 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 13 Jan 89 pp 1-2

[Unattributed report: " 'Abd al-'Ati al-'Ubaydi to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: U.S. Security Council Veto Did Not Surprise Us; Real Surprise Was French Veto"]

[Excerpt] New York, Tunis, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—Several Arab UN circles have expressed their amazement at the fact that France joined the United States and Britain in vetoing the Nonaligned Movement's draft resolution condemning the downing of two Libyan aircraft over the Mediterranean by U.S. aircraft. The circles, however, expressed joy at the victory won by the Palestinian UN Mission, which was able to get the Security Council members to agree to take part in discussing the U.S. aggression against Libya. This is because it is a full UN member that can speak directly without the mediation of another state, as in the past.

'Abd al-'Ati al-'Ubaydi, Libyan permanent representative to the Arab League, told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the U.S. veto did not surprise Libya, but that the French veto did.

Furthermore, Libyan UN Representative 'Ali al-Turayki expressed resentment at the veto on the draft resolution and said that the voting results did not surprise him. He expressed satisfaction that many states had intervened with the Security Council to express support for the Libyan position. [passage omitted]

'Source' Supports Moroccan-Polisario Front Talks

LD0701144389 Tripoli JANA in English
1435 GMT 7 Jan 89

[Text] Tripoli, 7 Ay al-Nar [January], Jamahiriya News Agency—A source at the People's Foreign Liaison Bureau made the following statement: The Great Socialist People's Foreign Liaison Bureau made the following statement:

The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya supports the meeting which took place between Morocco and the Polisario Front and considers it as a historic step and turning point in getting together brothers of the same people and same nation through which blood is spared and fighting is ceased and Arab efforts are fostered so as to unify ranks and mobilise energies to build up unity in order to direct all guns against the common enemy.

We in Great Jamahiriya congratulate our brothers in realising this meeting and congratulate ourselves for it was the result of efforts in which Great Jamahiriya played a

fundamental role. The unity of the Arab nation in the west of the Arab homeland and its east requires all sincere steps to close ranks and gather all energies for unity and liberation to counter the enemies of the Arab nation.

OMAN

Minister Signs Two Oil Exploration Agreements 44040178b Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 7 Dec 88 p 2

[Article by Muhammad Darwish]

[Text] His Highness Sa'id Ibn Ahmad al-Shanfari, the minister of oil and minerals, will sign two oil exploration agreements today. The first agreement will be signed with the Amoco Oman company, by virtue of which the company will be given an oil exploration concession in the 'Ufar region. The second agreement will be signed with the Wintershall company, and by virtue of this agreement the company will be given the right to drill for oil in the Saywan-al-Haqf area.

An official source in the Ministry of Oil and Minerals stated that in spite of the economic deterioration in the world and the lack of stability in oil markets, the signing of these two agreements proves the companies' desire to continue and expand oil exploration activities in the sultanate and also shows that the oil companies believe that the future of oil in the sultanate calls for optimism and bodes well. In another area, these companies have confidence in the soundness and competence of the Omani domestic economy in overcoming the crises, since it is founded on a strong firm basis and sound planning.

It is worth pointing out that activities in oil development in the sultanate this year have been extremely satisfactory.

This year the results of the exploratory activity by the Oman Petroleum Development Company, the largest of the oil-producing companies in the sultanate, have included the discovery of oil in 13 exploratory wells since the start of this year. Gas also was discovered in another well, and drilling is taking place now in the Masrur exploratory well; it is expected that it will reach a depth of 5,200 meters. Meanwhile, about eight other exploratory wells will be drilled in the company's drilling program by the end of this year.

The Japex company concentrated its efforts on evaluating the petroleum accumulation discovered in the Dalil field, and the ministry monitored all the studies which led to the drilling of the successful Dalil-6 well. It also monitored the seismic survey activities which covered 300 km in the Dalil area to determine the best sites for drilling the Dalil-7 well at the start of the coming year.

The Amoco company is still following up on its exploratory efforts, since it recently made a telluride magnetic survey to study the electric resistance of the geologic formations and is monitoring them physically in the

Jabal Sumayni area and linking the results of the study to the results of the drilling in a manner which, it is hoped, will give a clearer picture of the depths of the targeted formations from the petroleum standpoint in the region. The Occidental company is evaluating the results of the seismic survey of a complex 550 km in length in the concession area it owns with the goal of choosing a site for exploratory drilling next year. The company has also done a seismic survey of about 50 km in the area alongside the Dalil field.

The Elf Aquitaine company has evaluated all the geological and geophysical information of its concession area in Abu al-Tubul, and it has decided that it will drill an exploratory evaluation well next year.

The Development of 43 Fields

The Ministry of Oil and Minerals is monitoring development activities in 43 oilfields in the north, center, and south of Oman. The ministry is taking part in various decisions related to the drilling of development wells in the light of geological and geophysical studies and the petrophysical evaluation of development wells in various fields, as well as the productive performance of the wells. Technicians in schools have also studied the conditions of the fields and oil deposits and the volumes of the oil reserve in them and the possibilities of increasing reserves, dealing with all emergency problems and setting out bases which will guarantee attaining the best means of production and support for the reserves.

The ministry is studying the state of every field in isolation in a detailed manner to ascertain the real potential of each field and the number of development wells and necessary injection wells and to adopt the necessary measures for maintaining wells, installations, and pipelines.

Since the start of this year, 155 development wells have been drilled, carried out by a number of companies in their fields in addition to maintenance activities on 53 wells belonging to the Oman Petroleum Development Company.

SAUDI ARABIA

Al-Qurayyah Power Plant Starts Operation 44000243 Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English 14 Dec 88 p 2

[Text] Dammam, 13 Dec—The first unit of the SR3.8 billion al-Qurayyah electricity plant, considered the biggest in the Middle East and the developing countries, has started experimental operation, according to Sulayman al-Qadi, director general of the Saudi Consolidated Electricity Co. in the eastern province (SCECO-East).

The plant will have a total generating capacity of 2,400 megawatts, al-Qadi said adding that the second unit with a capacity of 600 megawatts will also begin operation

shortly. He said contract has been signed with a specialized company to construct two more units each with a capacity of 600 megawatts. A network of electricity lines links the plant with other plants in the region.

Addressing a news conference here today, al-Qadi said SCECO-East was able to operate the 350-kilowatt power line connecting Shadgam with Riyadh. This SR980 million line supplies 400 megawatts of electricity to the central province and this will be increased to 1,700 megawatts in future.

By the middle of last July the number of company's customers stood at 330,759 with a four percent increase over last year, the director general said. Its total generating capacity has increased to 5,043 megawatts. At present 62 percent of its employees are Saudis and 875 Saudi youths are being trained at the company's training center, he noted.

Al-Qadi said a project is under way to construct a 1,250-kilometer visual electricity line linking most of the power plants in the province. Linking of the region with the central province and Ha'il with Medina is also under plan, he added.

Power Generation Capacity Up 12 Times
44000242 Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English
18 Dec 88 p 9

[Article by Muhammad Ibrahim]

[Text] Jeddah—Power generation in the kingdom has increased by 1,248 percent in a period of 12 years going up from 1,173 megawatts in 1975 to 14,644 megawatts by the end of 1987. This enabled the country to supply electricity to more than two million subscribers and more than 2,000 factories around the kingdom in addition to thousands of farms, hospitals, schools and other establishments.

According to a statistical report for the year 1988 recently published by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the total production of electricity rose from 41,904 million kilowatt hours (MKwh) in 1985 to 45,866 Mkw in 1986 marking a production rise of 9.4 percent.

The report noted that the industrial power consumption rose from 11,656 MKwh to 12,029 MKwh during the same period registering an increase of 3.2 percent. This can be explained by the establishment of more factories and plants which now stood at 2,061, according to the latest industrial figures.

Electricity is generated by five regional power companies which are the Saudi Consolidated Electric Companies (SCECO's) of the central, western, eastern, southern and northern regions in addition to the Saline Water Conversion Corporation (SWCC) through its various plants which have been a good source of power generation.

The largest producer and industrial consumer remained to be the eastern province where the bulk of the kingdom's industrial plants are situated. There the production rose by 11.3 percent from 17,544 MKwh to 19,519 MKwh.

In the northern province the power generation rose by 19.9 percent from 853 MKwh in 1985 to 1,023 MKwh in 1986 while in the central province it went up by 8.3 percent and in the western province by 6 percent from 11,577 MKwh to 12,268 MKwh.

According to a report issued by the Ministry of Industry and Electricity (the ministry's agency for the affairs of electricity), the maximum load in 1975 was 848 megawatts which increased to more than 11,000 megawatts in a few years marking a rise of 1,297 percent.

The 110-KV distribution lines reached more than 14,000 kilometers while those less than 69 KV reached more than 55,600 kms by the end of 1986.

The report noted that the total number of subscribers in the services of the entire electricity companies was 351,531 in 1975. This number increased by 580 percent to reach 2,036,000 in 1987.

Last year alone, a total of 150,486 new subscribers joined the electricity companies in various parts of the kingdom. They were distributed as: eastern province 14,278; central province 42,072; southern province 37,592; western province 45,393 and northern province 11,151.

The total manpower in electricity companies stood at 8,363 until 1977 of whom Saudi nationals constituted about 51 percent. The number increased to 15,651 in 1980 of whom the Saudis made up 44.6 percent. In 1985 it reached a record number of 28,958 with Saudi employees marking 46 percent of the total manpower.

However, at the beginning of last year, the number of the total manpower came down to 27,987 of whom about 50 percent were Saudis. The drop in the number of employees was due to the Saudization of jobs and the policy of rationalizing expenditure followed by the electricity companies.

According to the report, the government subsidies constituted a strong supportive factor to the electricity companies enabling them to honor their commitments toward subscribers and to shoulder their responsibilities in the generation and distribution of electric power. It also enabled them to sell the energy to customers at a price which is less than the actual cost.

In the three years from 1973 to 1975, the government's subsidies to the electricity companies amounted to SR186.6 million which went up to SR5.4 billion in 1980. The subsidies witnessed a skyrocketing rise by the end of 1986 when they amounted to more than SR25 billion.

SUDAN

Movement Forms People's Committee To Support Libya

45000091 Khartoum AL-USBU' in Arabic

29 Dec 88 p 2

[Text] Mahmud 'Abidin, the assistant general coordinator of the Revolutionary Committees Movement in Sudan,

has stated that he has formed a people's committee to support the Libyan people and their resistance against imperialism. The committee is comprised of the parties, political activities, and unions that attended the meeting called by the Revolutionary Committees Movement in Sudan Thursday night, 28 December. They sent a telegram of support to brother Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi. The committee is calling for holding a people's conference to take practical steps against the American threats.

AFGHANISTAN

Soviet Diplomat on Dialogue With Afghan Opposition

46000064b Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
16 Dec 88 pp 1, 2

[Text] Moscow, 14 December, (TASS)—The settlement of the situation around Afghanistan through calm dialogue and mutual compromises such as the concrete manifestation of new thinking in tackling the Afghan problem. Therefore the main thing today is to prevent the dialogue from being halted, a Soviet foreign ministry spokesman said in an interview to the newspaper MOSCOW NEWS. Vladimir Avigdir was a member of the Soviet delegation at the meeting in At-Ta'if Saudi Arabia, with the representatives of the Afghan opposition which was held late last week.

He writes that both sides tried to find at the meeting the points of contact practically on all issues as regards the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan. All actions of the Soviet delegation, the diplomat stressed, were coordinated with Afghan President Najibullah.

According to him, the initiative of holding the Al-Ta'if meeting totally belonged to the Saudi Arabian government. However, the Soviet side readily responded to this proposal because the meeting opened new ways for political settlement. The Soviet Union is using any possibility now to stop bloodshed in Afghanistan and help create a broad-based government.

It is too early to speak about the results of the Al-Ta'if meeting because the dialogue has not been finished yet, the Soviet diplomat said. On mutual agreement the second meeting between Soviet and Afghan representatives will take place shortly. Representatives of the Afghan opposition must give the specific time when it will be held.

Leftist Alliance Reviews Politico-Military Situation

46000066b Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
14 Dec 88 p 2

[Text] Kabul, 12 December (BIA)—In the extraordinary session of the Coordinating Council of the leftist democratic parties alliance presided over by Hamidullah Gran First Secretary of the Toilers Organization of Afghanistan, the military-political situation of the country was reviewed at the outset and then members of the Coordinating Council evaluated the proceeding of the talks of Yuli Vorontsov, First Deputy USSR Foreign Minister, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Afghanistan, with some representatives of the seven party alliance.

The Coordinating Council of the leftist democratic parties alliance evaluated the talks, which is a continuation of direct and indirect contacts being held by the Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union separately with representatives of the opposition as a positive step.

The Coordinating Council emphasized once again that there exist wise and realistic ways leading to the settlement of Afghanistan problem through negotiations and creation of broad-based coalition government, as reflected in the resolution of the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly.

The council also assessed the constructive speech of Mikhail Sergievich Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU CC and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet delivered in the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly, and regarded the proposals tabled for the political settlement of Afghanistan problem as a realistic step.

The council expressed its deep sympathy over the tragic earthquake in Soviet Armenia.

Appointments in Supreme Court

46000066a Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
12 Dec 88 pp 1, 3

[Text] Kabul, 10 December (BIA)—Presidential Office reported that President Najibullah has in separate decrees approved as per the provision of article 110 of the Constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan and articles 20 and 25 of the law on organization and authorities of courts, the appointment of the following persons.

-Abdul Wali Hujat s/o Abdul Ali as Deputy Chief Justice and President of the board of Civil cases of the Supreme Court.

-Mir Azizul Haq Zayeeffi s/o Fazlul Haq as President of the General Penal Court of the Supreme Court.

-Abdul Halim Qayumi s/o Abdul Qayum as President of the Public Security Court of the Supreme Court.

-Bahawuddin Baha s/o Ghulam Nabi as President of commercial Court of the Supreme Court.

-Abdul Malik Jawhar Seddiqi s/o Abdul Khaliq as President of the civil and public rights court of the Supreme Court.

-Zamen Ali Behsudi s/o Barat Ali as President of the court of Trial of Judges and Disputes on Authorities of the Supreme Court.

-Mohammad Hanif Salim s/o Mohammad Salim as member of the Supreme Court.

- Bay Mohammad Deldar s/o Farhad as member of the Supreme Court.
- Abdul Hanan Saleh s/o Abdul Mohammad as member of the Supreme Court.
- Jandol s/o Alias as member of the Supreme Court.
- Mohammad Omar Momand s/o Haji Mohammad as member of the Supreme Court.
- Abdul Wadood Jawhari s/o Mula Mahmoud as member of the Supreme Court.
- Abdul Ghafoor Amiri s/o Amir Jan as member of the Supreme Court.
- Abdul Ahad Mojeeb s/o Abdul Wahid as member of the Supreme Court.
- Uliaqul Bakhtari s/o Safar Bay as member of the Supreme Court.
- Bahramuddin Moqbel s/o Achildi as member of the Supreme Court.
- Muhiburrahman s/o Habiburrahman as member of the Supreme Court.
- Abdul Qadir Rodwal s/o Amir Mohammad as member of the Supreme Court.
- Mohammad Nasir Hassan Zada s/o Mohammad Hassan as member of the Supreme Court.
- Ruhul Amin Ruhi s/o Abdul Manan as member of the Supreme Court.
- Mohammad Musa s/o Khuda Dost as member of the Supreme Court.
- Bahawuddin Rostayee s/o Ghulam Qadir as member of the Supreme Court.

Afghanistan and Human Rights

46000065a Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
11 Dec 88 pp 3, 4

[Article by R. Jurmi]

[Text] December 10, 1988 coincides with the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the day observed by all peaceloving, the progressive people of the world, the people of Afghanistan included, every year.

The adoption and proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on this day, 1948, was of particular importance to the world people and the United Nations, as an effective instrument in defending universal peace and security, understanding among

nations, international cooperation for mobilizing the essential forces for development and tranquility. By adopting the above declaration the UN can prepare the grounds for effective guarantees for strengthening the observance of human rights free from any discrimination and difference of colour, race, sex, religion, ethnics, tribes, and political and religious believes.

The developments and realities of the past four decades in the international arena indicate that the progressive and peaceloving forces of the world have made all efforts for the implementation of the objectives of the declaration. But the world imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism has always acted in different direction. Imperialism has always tried to undermine the letter and the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by its violations and by having military preferences access to nuclear weapons, space armaments, creation of regional conflicts and strengthening of colonialism and neo-colonialism, racism and Apartheid, kindle flames of war in parts of the world so as to deprive the people from the very rudimentary rights. Despite the enforcement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the consistent efforts of the United Nations and the peaceloving humanity it has resulted in millions of peoples' poverty, misery, disease and malnutrition.

At present, the difficult living conditions of displaced Palestinians caused by Israeli Zionism, cruelties practiced by Pretoria regime against the South African people, subversive activities of the U.S. imperialism against the peoples of Nicaragua, Angola, Kampuchea and etc. are living examples for nonobservance of the principles and norms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other conventions by the world imperialism.

In the Republic of Afghanistan, after the victory of April Revolution, particularly after the national reconciliation not only maximum attention has been paid to the principles of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but also all its norms have been strictly observed. The new constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan has been prepared and approved in the light of this declaration and in full consideration to the interests of the working people of our country, Afghanistan. The preamble of the new constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan indicates the fact that now UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are observed and guaranteed. The obligation of the government regarding the observance of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as other accepted principles and norms on human rights and freedoms in full conformity with the Universal Declaration of inter-state rights has been specified. Reliable guarantees for the observance and respect to human rights for Afghans are stipulated in this national document.

The new constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan enforced in the country has contributed to ensure all freedoms and rights for the suffering people of our country. It is very difficult to mention examples here.

Our people celebrate this historic day under conditions that with the signing of Geneva Accords, the war ended peace is ensured and real emigrant compatriots returned to their land.

Living realities reveal that in the light of the policy of national reconciliation and signing of Geneva accords, despite the intensification of subversive activities 1,750,000 compatriots returned to their homeland and assumed their peaceful life and activity.

Similarly, in this period democratic political, economic, social and cultural freedoms of the people have been ensured and got legal guarantees.

In conclusion it is to be mentioned that if the Pakistani government a signatory to the Geneva documents and the United States as a guarantor of the accords adhere honestly to their commitments and end interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan all the democratic freedoms of the people will be ensured and with the implementation of Geneva Accords the sun of peace has risen over our suffering homeland and welfare and tranquility of the people is totally ensured.

Crimes of Opposition Groups Against People
46000065b *Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English*
15 Dec 88 pp 1, 2

[Text] The armed extremist groups commit numberless crimes and loot people's belongings in the areas under their temporary rule. For instance when Kunar and Kunduz provinces, as well as the areas were declared as demilitarized zones by the State of the Republic of Afghanistan for facilitating the return home of refugees, the extremists looted all the people.

Commenting on this, a political commentator of the BIA writes: Under their rule of less than 24 hours over Maidan Shahr city, the extremist razed to the ground all public utility establishments, schools, mosques and people's houses, they either looted or set ablaze all the utensils available. Over the division of the looted utensils, the armed opposition groups fell on each other and tore apart each other in a beastly manner. As a result a number of their men were killed, while the local people also sustained heavy losses.

In the same way, the residents of Kunduz also shouldered once the evil burden of the so-called Jihad of the savage armed opponents and the extremist bands. They not only destroyed and set ablaze the beautiful city of Kunduz, but also demolished its moral assets. Included in public utility establishment which the enemy destroyed was the Spinzar Company, which produces edible oil needed by the toiling people and helped peasants of the eastern part of the country. The same fell to the lot of Kunar. When the city of Assadabad centre of Kunar became a demilitarized zone the extremists said that. "It is natural for every one to praise what he possesses." However, we have taken, like other groups, as booty the goods and kept them safe. His

statement and those of other ringleaders clearly certify that they admit, in one or another way, their crimes and do not hide their crimes from the people. Because in their mind what they have done during one decade in the country is under their programme of so-called Jihad. This means that setting fire to people's utensils and mosques, holy places, public institutions and looting is a part of their economic programme. On the other hand the armed clashes among the armed extremists and the opposition groups in the areas which became demilitarized, prove that they possess different programmes of Jihad for their own and that each one seeks to kill the other for keeping its monopoly on the areas declared as demilitarized zones.

Summing up, [o]ne can say that the opposition and the armed extremist groups lack any socio-economic programme for our people. And one should not expect them so. For during the 10-year long war imposed on our people, they have got accustomed to looting, creating panic, robbery and other crimes against our suffering people.

Our people have now well realized that the rule of the opposition and the extremist groups on the farmer's areas eliminate their moral and material wealth. That is why they abstain from any cooperation with them and see the prospects of their rule in the mirror of their beastly deeds in Kunduz, Kunar and Maidan Shahr, after these areas became demilitarized zones.

Swiss Analysis of Political Future, Reconstruction Needs

46200004 *Frauenfeld ALLGEMEINE SCHWEIZERISCHE MILITAERZEITSCHRIFT in German Dec 88 pp 1-24*

[Article by Paul Bucherer et al.: "Afghanistan 1988/89—Soviet Withdrawal, Political Future, Reconstruction"; first paragraph is ALLGEMEINE SCHWEIZERISCHE MILITAERZEITSCHRIFT introduction]

[Text] In lieu of a foreword we herewith reprint excerpts from an appeal by Sadruddin Agan Khan, the coordinator for UN Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programs Relating to Afghanistan:

Operation Salam—Operation Peace

Peace, Assistance, and Reconstruction

There is great hope today that peace can once more return to Afghanistan. After 10 years of war and 6 years of negotiations the Afghan people is at last able to begin reconstructing its devastated country.

The energy and initiative required for taking up this enormous task will come from the Afghans themselves. But the world community must also make an important contribution to this effort. If the necessary conditions for

survival are not rapidly created in Afghanistan, i.e., in strictly humanitarian terms, sprouting hope may be replaced by renewed despair and new suffering.

There is hardly an Afghan family or community that has not been touched by the conflict. Hundreds of thousands have been crippled and numerous women and children who have become widows and orphans are faced with especially great difficulties. More than 2 million Afghans have been driven from their homes inside their country and additional millions have fled to foreign countries. It will be no easy task to help all of them to return and to rebuild their lives. The Afghan economy has sustained heavy damage. Agricultural production has declined dramatically. Fields, orchards, forests, and irrigating plants have fallen into disuse or been destroyed. Roads and bridges must be rebuilt. In many areas, most of the hospitals, clinics, schools, and mosques have been reduced to rubble. Countless mines must be removed.

The United Nations will try to help the Afghan people. But these efforts will only be crowned with success if men and women of good will throughout the world join together in meeting this challenge. Government and private aid organizations need your inspiration and support in order to improve the situation in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan was devastated by a conflict to which 1 million people fell victim, which turned more than 5 million into refugees and drove 2 and 1/2 million more from their native land. After a decade of suffering and destruction the possibility for peace now exists. The Afghans are a hardy and proud people, well known for their courage and imagination. With the help of the world community they will return to their native land and rebuild it.

I call on you to lend support to this historic endeavor.

1. The Geneva Agreement and Its Realization

After almost 7 years of negotiation, the agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan was signed in Geneva on 14 April 1988. The Soviet Union and the United States also affixed their signature to the agreement as "international guarantee powers." The agreement consists of the following five sections:

1. Bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations with particular emphasis on non-interference and non-intervention.

2. Declaration of the international guarantee of this agreement, signed by the Soviet Union and the United States.

3. Bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees.

4. Agreement on mutual relations for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, co-signed by the Soviet Union and the United States.

5. Appendix: protocol regarding the conditions for UN supervision of the implementation of the agreement.

[Boxed material]

[Official Seal]

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

The United States has declared its readiness to act as a cosignatory power for the political settlement of the situation in Afghanistan. We consider this settlement as an important step toward the pacification of Afghanistan which puts an end to bloodshed in this unfortunate nation and permits the millions of Afghan refugees to return to their native country.

In agreeing to serve as a cosignatory power, the United States issue the following statement:

(1) The commitments to the withdrawal of forces listed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement on mutual relations constitute the central point of the entire settlement. The fulfillment of these commitments is essential for the attainment of the goals of the agreement: the end of outside interference and the reestablishment of the right of the Afghan people to self-determination as prescribed by the United Nations Charter and the UN General Assembly resolution on Afghanistan.

(2) The commitments entered into by the cosignatory powers are symmetrical. In this regard, the United States have put the Soviet Union on notice that if the Soviet Union, in accordance with its commitments as a cosignatory power, provides military assistance to parties in Afghanistan the United States reserve the right to provide equal assistance in accordance with their commitments as a cosignatory power.

(3) In serving as a cosignatory power to this agreement, this does not entail in any way U.S. recognition of the present regime in Kabul as the rightful government of Afghanistan.]

The following unilateral declarations by the parties to the agreement and the cosignatory powers supplement and delimit the provisions of this Geneva accord:

a) Letter by the foreign minister of Pakistan to UN Secretary General, dated 14 April 1988 expressly stating that Pakistan, notwithstanding its signature under the Geneva agreement, stands firm in refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the Kabul regime.

b) Letter by U.S. Secretary George Shultz to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, dated 20 March 1988, stating that following consultations with Pakistan and UN Deputy Secretary General [Diego] Cordovez, the United States reserves the right to continue supplying the mujaheddin with weapons as long as the Soviet Union continues to provide assistance to the Kabul regime.

c) Letter by Shevardnadze to Shultz, dated 9 April 1988, stating that the Soviet Union takes note of this decision by the United States. These American reservations are also contained in the following official "U.S. Statement" submitted at the time of the signing of the agreement on 14 April 1988:

Although the first section of the Geneva accords calls for non-interference by Afghanistan and Pakistan in each other's internal affairs, this mutual understanding is controverted by the exchange of letters between Schultz and Shevardnadze. The provisions of the agreement expressly prohibit the presence or equipment of groups in one of the two nations which are engaged in hostilities against the government of the other. With the tacit consent of the Soviet Union, however, the United States reserved the right to continue arming and equipping the mujaheddin who are fighting the Kabul regime—with the aim of establishing a certain proportionality to continuing Soviet assistance to Kabul. American arms shipments, however, can only proceed via Pakistan. This discrepancy between the agreement and the exchange of letters has led the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime to accuse Pakistan of continuing violations of the agreement.

The third section of the agreement calls for the voluntary repatriation of refugees under the supervision of a mixed commission. But since Pakistan does not recognize the legitimacy of the Kabul regime, this commission cannot be formed of representatives of the two countries concerned.

The fourth section, the essential core of the agreement, establishes the modalities for the solution of the most crucial set of problems, i.e., the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Half of all the Soviet units are to be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the remainder by 15 February 1989. While the Soviet Union, reacting to the pressure of world opinion, is withdrawing its ground forces, no agreement exists on the withdrawal of the several thousand Soviet advisers to the Afghan Army and the Kabul civilian administration.

The concluding protocol outlines the responsibilities and powers of the United Nations. The first priority was to create an international group of officers to monitor and

control the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan. This organization, operating from separate headquarters in Islamabad and Kabul, has since coordinated its activities and proved its worth.

UN assistance in the repatriation of refugees from their camps in Pakistan and Iran, as specified in the third part of the agreement, has run into serious problems. Although major financial and material aid has been promised and Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan has been appointed coordinator for the UN Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Program Relating to Afghanistan, there are four reasons why the refugees hesitate to return to their native country:

1. because of the continued existence of 10-13 million mines (by U.S. estimates) in entire regions, settlements and pastures; along caravan trails and mountain passes;
2. because of the lack of political and military security in Afghanistan;
3. because of the destruction of the agricultural infrastructure, especially of surface and underground irrigating plants;
4. because of the continued existence of the communist regime in Kabul and continuing Soviet occupation.

The last named reason appears to be the most crucial one for the decision of most refugees to remain in exile. It was the ruthless policy of the communists, after all, who tried to impose their radical views with the help of decrees and force of arms which triggered the general exodus, driving more than one-half of the population from its homesteads.

2. Highway System and Soviet Withdrawal

The Soviet command completed the first half of its troop withdrawal with the aid of transport planes and by road on schedule on 15 August 1988. As they did during the 1979 invasion, the Soviets used both the East axis (Jalalabad-Kabul-Termez/Sherkan Bandar) and the West axis (Kandahar-Herat-Kushka) for the withdrawal of their forces. The condition and the natural characteristics of these two axes have also had a major impact on the conduct of combat operations between 1979 and 1988. Since there are no railroads or navigable rivers in Afghanistan for transport and resupply, the role played by the road network is a particularly important one.

Let us turn first of all to the East axis. It was built in the fifties and sixties under the direction of Russian engineers and represents the shortest route between the Soviet Union and the Afghan capital of Kabul. Coming from the border towns of Hairatan (near Termez) and Sherkan, the two branches of the road merge at Pul-e Khumri and then lead to Kabul via the Salang Pass. At about the same time, the

Americans provided aid in the improvement of the highway from Kabul via Jalalabad to Torkham on the Khyber Pass at the border to Pakistan.

There are huge differences in elevation to be overcome along this axis. Starting at the Amu Darya river on the border, the highway follows the course of the Kunduz river through the Bakhtrian Plain at an elevation of 400-500 meters above sea level to Baghlan. There are two locations at which the deployment capability of an advancing division can be restricted, i.e., in crossing the Darya-ye Kunduz over a bridge only 7 meters wide and in the gorge south of Aliabad. Beyond Baghlan, the highway, at times a mere 8 meters wide, begins to climb steadily. Wedged in between the riverbed and the rock-faces of the Hindukush foothills, it reaches the town of Doshi at an elevation of 850 meters above sea level. At Doshi, a gravel road branches off which leads to Kabul via the Shibar Pass. This route which was used until the Salang Pass surface was improved is 200 km longer than the new highway. At an average grade of 5 percent, the new road climbs for 70 km to an elevation of some 3,400 meters above sea level and passes through the central chain of the Hindukush in a 2,675-meter long tunnel. A subsequent avalanche gallery 4,972 meters in length makes it possible to use the highway during the winter months as well.

From the crest of the pass, the road descends (at times in S-curves) to Charikar, 1,550 meters above sea level. In some spots, the downgrade is more than 7 percent and traffic is additionally hampered by a large number of tunnels, galleries and bridges between 6.80 and 8.80 meters in width. The highway then climbs to an elevation of 1,922 meters above sea level once again and, after crossing a small pass, reaches the capital city of Kabul which is situated at an altitude of 1,800 meters. Aside from a few wider valley floors, mechanized and motorized units are limited to this highway and must proceed in single file. For large-scale movements the road will only accommodate one-way traffic.

Beyond Kabul the highway winds through the Tang-e Gharu gorge, descending steadily along the Kabul river to 570 meters above sea level at Jalalabad. It then crosses the alluvial basin of the Darya-ye Kabul at an elevation of some 500 meters and finally climbs to the border town of Torkham at 720 meters above sea level. At Torkham, the highway starts to climb toward the roughly 1,000 meter-high Khyber Pass and at this point links up to the Pakistani railroad system.

Because of the many natural and artificial obstacles a modern army is no more able to accomplish major troop dislocations in a brief period of time than armies in times past could. Truck convoys can only move at a snail's pace and may be halted at any time. There are three consequences to be drawn from these peculiarities of the eastern axis:

1. The Soviet command was unable to deploy, station, and supply a larger troop contingent than the one committed to operations in Afghanistan in the interior of the country.

2. The Panjshir Valley mujaheddin under their commander Ahmad Shah Mahsud managed to interrupt the Salang highway time and again by simple means, inhibiting and delaying the resupply of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

3. The Soviet divisions not only left their heavy weapons (such as artillery) and numerous supplies behind in Afghanistan to strengthen the Kabul regime's army but also to facilitate their own withdrawal and to accomplish it with as little delay as possible.

The differences in elevation along the western axis may be fewer and the snowfall may not be as heavy during the winter months. Nevertheless, the problems to be overcome along this highway should not be underestimated. From the Soviet-Afghan border at Kushka the highway follows the Rud-e Kushk at an elevation of 700-800 meters above sea level, crossing the 1,550 meter-high Kotal-e Banda Pass some 70 km further on. At 110 km, the highway reaches Herat which is situated in the Herirud Valley at an elevation of some 920 meters above sea level. 60 km south of Herat the western axis attains its highest point, the Mir Ali Kotal, at an elevation of some 1,750 meters above sea level.

These mountain chains which are foothills of the Hindukush could be circumvented by means of a detour along the Iranian border through the Dasht-e Ateshan desert. But because of the lack of water and the soil characteristics of this region such a detour could only be attempted with the help of mules and camels.

From Adraskan to Dilaram the highway runs along the foot of the mountains, through steppes and scree deserts. Natural obstacles are formed by narrow passages and countless river beds which are almost dry in the summer but become raging torrents when the snows begin to melt.

There are no tunnels along the entire length of the western axis. With just one exception, the highway bridges can only be traversed one-way by heavy vehicles. The entire road, from the Soviet frontier to Kandahar, was built according to the concrete slab principle. In 1978, its condition was rated as average to good. But in the interim, many discrete seams have formed between the individual concrete slabs—most likely because of faults in the roadbed. Even at that early date deficiencies in the construction of the bridges and the quality of materials used to build them had been detected. The concrete cracked and chipped and this led to corrosion of some of the reinforced steel segments. From the military point of view, the western axis is in less danger of attack by the mujaheddin than the east axis. In the open terrain the Soviets thus have a less difficult time guarding

against attacks and ambushes. Generally speaking, the western axis is more efficient than the east axis; but even along this route an army on the march can only move in battalion or company strength. The Soviet doctrine of deployment during the attack phase can only be implemented to a limited extent.

In light of the inadequate infrastructure, of the limited transport capability of the highway system and the absence of railroad lines, the Afghan rulers decided very early on to devote special attention to aviation and airfields in opening up the country. As early as 1919, the Bolsheviks placed 13 airplanes as well as the necessary pilots and mechanics at the disposal of King Amanullah. At the same time, construction was started on airports and airfields. In 1928, regularly scheduled air service between Moscow, Tashkent and Kabul was inaugurated. In 1932, airports in Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat as well as airstrips in Jalalabad, Khanabad, and Mazar-e Sharif were already in operation. About 1935, German instructors took over the training of Afghan pilots and Luftwaffe inaugurated a once-a-week flight from Germany to Teheran and Kabul via Turkey. In the fifties, the Americans built an international airport near Kandahar while the Soviets enlarged the civilian airports of Kabul and Herat and built a military airfield in Begram for use by the Afghan air force.

Following the 1979 invasion, the Soviets continued upgrading the airports and airfields. The airstrips at Farah, Ghazni, Faizabad, etc. were transformed into genuine military airfields. Most importantly, however, the Soviets built an air base for long-range fighters near Shindand, 100 km south of Herat.

But weather conditions placed restrictions on the year-round usability of the military airfields. Along the western axis, flying conditions are good between May and September; but sand and dust storms may occur without warning and make flying difficult. Between December and March, heavy cloud cover and snowstorms alternate with good flying weather. In the spring, rain and flooding are apt to render the landing strips unusable and during the winter months the airfields north of the Shindand-Kandahar line are frequently snow-covered and thus virtually unusable. Comparable problems tend to arise along the eastern axis as well. The Kabul airport may be shut down for days at a time during the winter months and in Jalalabad the Indian summer monsoon rains may suddenly curtail flight operations. Essentially, the best and most reliable weather and flying conditions exist in all of Afghanistan in October and November.

The pullout of Soviet forces between 15 May 1988 and 15 February 1989 is also affected by the condition of the infrastructure, by weather conditions as well as the availability of water. Given the dry continental climate of Afghanistan, water supply has determined the location of a conqueror's bases throughout history. Along the western axis, an occupying power must rely on the oasis-type water supply available in population centers

such as Herat, Shindand, Farah, Dilaram, Girishk, and Kandahar. The stretches in between which run through steppe-like and desert-like terrain can only be secured at heavy logistic cost.

The following security measures were taken along both axes in order to prepare for and implement the Soviet pullout:

1. Reconnaissance. A detailed topographic assessment of withdrawal routes was made with special emphasis on the sites most vulnerable to possible attack. At the same time an attempt was made to use political measures to motivate the population resident along these routes to behave in a peaceable manner. To deal with critical situations, plans for troop reinforcements and counterattacks were discussed. All this was done in close coordination with the Afghan Armed Forces. In addition, intelligence was collected on mujaheddin movements along the main withdrawal routes.

2. Dug-in Positions. Armored vehicles were dug in next to the highways and on commanding mountaintops in the vicinity of the withdrawal routes. Existing strongpoints were reinforced with personnel and equipment for the duration of the withdrawal.

3. Mobile Units. Armored personnel carriers were used to protect the flanks of the retreating forces. It was their job to prevent the mujaheddin from moving into position, concentrating their forces or preparing ambushes.

4. Area Protection. The columns were constantly protected from the air by helicopters and ground-attack aircraft. Helicopters flying at low altitudes protected the flanks and advance detachments. Aircraft were used to reconnoiter and attack long-range rocket launcher positions.

5. Roadblocks. While the troop movements were going on, the withdrawal routes were closed to all other traffic in order to attain greater rate of march and to prevent an interruption of the pullout. As a result, the Soviet convoys were able to maintain speeds of roughly 15-25 kilometers per hour.

The withdrawal mode adopted thus far makes it plain that the Soviet forces are able to get out of the country on schedule without serious losses while leaving most of their heavy equipment behind. Of the 30,500 Soviets officers and enlisted men who left Afghanistan by 5 August 1988 some 20,000 were evacuated on transport planes. Only 10,500 men were withdrawn to the Soviet Union by road (both along the western and the eastern axis) but these units also left their heavy material, ammunition and some of their equipment behind in their former bases which were taken over by units of the Kabul regime's forces. Had a slow-moving army such as the Red Army wished to carry all of its material along in a full-scale withdrawal it would have had to resort to kilometer-long transport convoys which would have

taken days or even weeks to make the journey. Mujaheddin ambushes and surprise attacks would have caused heavy losses, adding substantially to the casualty figures already announced by the Soviets of 13,110 dead, 35,478 war injured and 311 missing.

The accuracy of these casualty figures for the period from December 1979 to August 1988, given out by the Soviet war ministry, is open to question. Soviet units in Afghanistan not only suffered casualties in combat but also as a consequence of the poor hygienic conditions. Countless Soviet soldiers died of typhoid because of polluted drinking water. But cholera, malaria, amoebic dysentery, and other diseases claimed victims as well.

The garrisons given up by the Red Army were turned over to the Kabul forces. Given the chronic personnel shortage of the Afghan units, plans had to be changed drastically in order to fill the gaps left behind by the departure of Soviet forces. For this reason a large number of garrisons (particularly in the eastern provinces) were hastily evacuated almost without a fight and large quantities of equipment and, in some cases, even ammunition stores were left behind.

On the other hand, developments in October and November 1988 (especially the stationing of modern MIG-27 fighter aircraft at Shindand) seem to indicate that the air force units will at least temporarily remain at their bases to provide fire support to the Afghan forces. In addition, SCUD-B surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 280 km were deployed in the vicinity of Kabul and already used against targets in the Jalalabad region. It is doubtful as well whether special units such as the paratroops of the airborne assault brigades and the SPETSNAZ units will be withdrawn prior to the 15 February 1989 deadline.

As we have already noted, it is as yet unclear whether the thousands of Soviet advisers of the Afghan Army and the Kabul regime will have left by this date. These advisers which constitute the backbone of the army and the bureaucracy are indispensable for the survival of the regime. The pertinent section of article 5 of the Geneva accords on mutual relations reads as follows:

"In accordance with the time frame agreed upon between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan there will be a phased withdrawal of the foreign troops which will start on the date of entry into force mentioned above [15 May 1988]. One half of the troops will be withdrawn by 15th August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed within 9 months."

The abovementioned time schedule agreed upon by Moscow and Kabul is not part of the Geneva accords however. It is said to be part of a document signed on 8 February 1988 on further Soviet-Afghan military cooperation, e.g., the training of Afghan officers in the Soviet Union and the delivery of war material.

3. The Political Leadership of the Resistance

The basis and motivation of Afghan resistance to the Soviet-imposed Kabul regime and the 1979 Soviet invasion was and still is determined by the desire of the Afghans for individuality and communal independence. This, in turn, is a result of the country's topography, its lifestyle and culture, and the entire social and religious context. Thanks to this desire and the factors on which it is based, Afghan resistance has remained unbroken to this day. But these very same characteristics have made unification of the resistance movement impossible. This lack of unity—which has also had certain positive effects in that the Soviets were confronted by a many-headed hydra—is characterized by additional peculiarities of the Afghan social system. Thus, personal individualism militates against the organizationally necessary formation of groups among the mujaheddin to help provide leadership to the resistance movement. The communal discussion of all issues militates against the necessity for secrecy in the planning of military operations. The religious orientation of some leaders of the resistance does not conform to Afghan nationalism or to the traditionally "open" Islam of the Hanafi sect. What is more, the leaders of the various factions are unable fully to trust each other and, in some cases, even their own commanders for fear of losing their own power base.

These divisive factors have been and continue to be reinforced by the fact that the resistance must still rely on financial and military assistance from abroad, often with ideological strings attached, and that communist agents have infiltrated the factions and commando units, causing even more disunity among the mujaheddin.

There are various groups which claim to be the rightful leaders of the resistance movement:

1. the seven Sunni "parties" in Peshawar, Pakistan;
2. the Shiite groups in Peshawar, Quetta, and in Iran;
3. the "transitional government in Peshawar under Minister President Ahmed Shah which was established by the seven Sunni "parties;"
4. the commanders of the resistance inside Afghanistan.

The seven "parties" in Peshawar have primarily been concerned with providing logistic support to the resistance since the beginning of the war and have channeled humanitarian, financial and, above all, military aid into Afghanistan. Given the social background and the political and religious inclinations of their leaders, these "parties" may be described as traditionalist or Islamist-religious. The following are some of the traditionalist or moderate "parties" which advocate a reestablishment of

the old order under former Afghan King Mohammad Zaher Shah:

- a) Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami led by Maulawi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi;
- b) Jabha Nejat-e Melli led by Sibghatullah Mujaddidi;
- c) Mahaz-e Melli-ye Islami led by Pir Syed Ahmad Gilani.

The Islamist-religious "parties," often described as fundamentalist and hoping for the establishment of an Afghan Islamic Republic, include the following:

- a) Hezb-e Islami (I) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar;
- b) Hezb-e Islami (II) led by Muhammad Yunus Khales;
- c) Etehad-e Islami led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf;
- d) Jamiat-e Islami led by Burhanuddin Rabbani.

Four of the "party" leaders (i.e., Nabi, Hekmatyar, Khales, and Sayyaf) are Pushtus whereas Rabbani is a member of the Tajik tribe. Gilani and Mujaddidi are members of influential Kabul families. According to information from a variety of sources, none of these "parties" has been free of corruption in the allocation of funds. Huge sums of money thus are not finding their way to the Afghan resistance but are somehow disappearing inside Pakistan.

Until recently, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was the "party" leader who enjoyed most of the political and military support rendered by the Pakistani authorities. This was due to Hekmatyar's political affinities to Pakistan's former president, Zia ul-Haq. Immediately following the 1973 coup in which Mohammad Daud, the king's cousin, brought down the monarchy, Hekmatyar and several other Kabul University students who all belonged to the Moslem Youth organization affiliated with the international Moslem Brotherhood (Ikhwan ul-Muslimin) had gone into exile in Pakistan in order to fight Daud and the communists who supported him from there. In Pakistan, Qasi Amin, one of the students, founded the Hezb-e Islami party. At that time, Hekmatyar as well as Rabbani, Khales, Maulawi Mansoor, commander Jalaluddin and commander Ahmad Shah Mahsud were members of the party. Following the communist takeover in Kabul in April 1978, the various Moslem organizations began to support the Hezb-e Islami. This financial support was provided both by the Moslem Brotherhood and Jamiat-e Islami, a Pakistani political party. The deceased president of Pakistan, Zia ul-Haq, also had links to this party.

At least some of the subsequent disputes and party splits were a consequence of the influence exerted on the individual party leaders by Pakistan; but religious issues

also played a role in these developments. The representatives of the traditionalist-moderate Afghan brand of Islam are confronted by adherents to the extremist revival movement of the Moslem Brotherhood and the Saudi Wahhabi sect is also trying to gain supporters by providing generous financial aid to individual "parties." An additional reason for the disputes are the differences between the predominantly Pushtu "parties" and the Tajiks who support Rabbani for the most part.

Comparable tensions, such as divided Protestants and Catholics in Europe as late as last century, exist in Islam between the Sunnis and Shiites. With few exceptions, the Afghan Shiites are members of the Hazara tribe in the center of the country. They, too, are divided into a large number of groups which differ primarily in their relationship to Iran. In Peshawar, only two Shiite "parties" are represented, i.e., the Shura-ye Enqelabi-ye Ettelaqi-e Islami, led by Sheikh Beheshti, and the Harakat-e Islami, led by Ayatollah Mohammad Asef Mohseni.

Both "parties" have their headquarters in Iran. Additional Shiite groups have formed in Quetta and in Iran, however; among them the Sazman-e Nasr (the Organization of Victory), led by Sheikh Sadeqi; the Pazdaran-e Jihad-e Islami (Guardians of the Islamic Holy War); the Hezb-e Illahi (the Party of God) and the Jabba Mutehid-e Enqelab-e Islami (the United Front of the Islamic Revolution).

In addition, there are smaller groups some of which have joined forces with Ayatollah Mohseni's Harakat-e Islami. While Sheikh Beheshti's nationalist-Afghan Shura was attacked in the past by Sadeqi's Khomeini-oriented Nasr, the battles these days, which are said to have left thousands dead, are fought between Mohseni's Harakat and Nasr. The reason for these confrontations is the attempt by Iran to increase its influence among the Afghan Shiites and to manipulate their groups for their own purposes. The heavy ideological indoctrination of Afghan refugees in Iran serves the same purpose.

Under pressure of Pakistani government agencies, the seven Sunni groups in Peshawar which designate themselves as the IUAM, the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujaheddin, formed a so-called transitional government in 1988. Ahmed Shah, a Pushtu belonging to Sayyaf's party, the Etehad-e Islami, heads this "government" as minister president. All seven groups are represented in this "government" by members of their political staffs. The traditionalist "parties" led by Gilani, Mujaddidi and Nabi Muhammadi vehemently opposed this project (even in writing) but were forced to bow to the pressure.

The "government" of Ahmed Shah who is married to an American, has studied in the United States and belongs to the Wahhabi sect is not given the slightest chance of success by anyone with any knowledge of the situation of establishing itself as a genuine government in Kabul and receiving the support of the Afghan people.

4. The Military Leadership of the Resistance

The commanders inside Afghanistan fall into three categories:

In the three years from 1973 to 1975, the government's subsidies to the electricity companies amounted to SR186.6 million which went up to SR5.4 billion in 1980. The subsidies witnessed a skyrocketing rise by the end of 1986 when they amounted to more than SR25 billion. 1. Islamic intellectuals;

2. members of the Islamic clergy (mullahs, sufis);

3. lesser notables such as maleks, khans, etc. and leaders with roots among the people.

The Islamic intellectuals are affiliated for the most part with the "parties," e.g., Rabbani's Jamiat-e Islami, Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami (I) and Khaled's Hezb-e Islami (II). Like the leaders themselves, these commanders acquired their political beliefs during their years of study at the University of Kabul in the sixties and seventies. As a rule, they studied at the school of engineering or in the theology department which only accepted high school graduates as distinct from the traditional religious schools. These men are therefore not only well versed in technology and religion but have also received a solid general education. Even during their student days they fought for their religiously motivated refusal to accept communism/atheism both in political-rhetorical terms and in a hands-on manner with adherents to Marxist ideologies. In years past, the commanders have also had to prove their mettle as good organizers and administrators.

One ideological problem confronting these men has been the conflict between Hekmatyar and the other two parties which has raged for 10 years and even today leads to armed conflict between them. Hekmatyar's and Khaled's supporters are Pushtus for the most part while Rabbani's Jamiat-e Islami recruits most of its members from among the Tajiks and Uzbeks. While Rabbani and Khaled have succeeded in winning over the lesser notables beholden to traditionalism and the moderate clerics, Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami is waging a sometimes ruthless war on the khans, tribal elders and mullahs at the local level in order to expand its political sphere of influence.

Many of the commanders whose names are known in the West are affiliated with one of the three abovementioned parties: Ahmad Shah Mahsud and Ismael Khan with the Jamiat; Maulawi Jalaluddin Haqani, Amin Wardak and Abdul Haq with Khaled's Hezb and engineer Bashir with Hekmatyar's Hezb. In the case of these commanders, two different political organizations have emerged:

1. Mahsud, Ismael Khan, and Amin Wardak have succeeded in establishing genuine political organizations in the zones under their control;

2. notwithstanding their tough-minded student past, other commanders have adjusted to the traditional power structures and have become new "tribal elders," competing with the old leadership elite, e.g., Basir Khan in Badakhshan, an adherent of the Jamiat-e Islami.

In the former case the commanders have tried to set up a modern-day administration, complete with committees, popular representation, schools and clinics and have been able to wage a modern-day guerilla war at the same time. It is no accident that the two major fronts of the Afghan resistance are commanded by two young intellectuals such as Mahsud and Ismael Khan. In the latter case leadership is more in line with Afghan tradition complete with lengthy debates prior to and following military operations which continue until a general consensus has been reached.

The second group of commanders, made up of members of the mullah and sufi communities, has been educated in traditional religious schools which are not under government supervision. As a rule, they received their higher religious education on the Indian subcontinent and only rarely in Arab countries. Under the monarchy and the Daud "republic" they were scarcely able to engage in political activities. As a result of the increased secularization of official law and the growing importance of the tribal elites at the head of the government and the administration they had even been shunted to the sidelines. As conservative supporters of a return to Shar'iah, i.e., Islamic law, but not of a full-fledged Islamic revolution, they withdrew to the village Koran schools where they taught in the conservative-traditionalist manner. As faithful Moslems, they have been protesting against the growing atheistic influence of the communists since 1970.

Men such as Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, a religious member of parliament in the king's days, or the Mujaddidis, who had always fought for the preservation of tradition against the reform-oriented monarchy, were their role models. These religious commanders who are often members of Sufi brotherhoods (e.g., the Naqshbandia and other "dervish" orders) established the Koran schools in the provinces as resistance centers following the communist coup. Many of these mullah commanders are members of Nabi Muhammadi's traditionalist Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami. Their sphere of influence extends across the Pushtu South where, like Mullah Muhammad Shah in Farah and Nassim Akhundzade in the Helmand region, they are frequently effective beyond existing tribal borders. Mullah commanders are also active in the Uzbek North and in central Afghanistan, e.g., Qayum in Bamian and Islam in Aibak/Samangan.

The third group of commanders, the local village chairmen, elected by popular vote for their bravery, are rarely in control of large areas. For the most part, they champion the interests of their village or community. Even in the old days the authority of these notables was not generally recognized. It has not increased during the course of the war and its influence thus is limited.

Commanders of this type usually join Gilani's or Mujadidi's "party" and are effective in those areas where the power structures are ill-defined, i.e., in the border regions of the Hazarajat and the isolated valleys of the Hindukush, etc. Interestingly enough, their number is smaller in the Pushtu tribal areas where the traditional religious leaders have replaced them.

But in the northern provinces both the traditionalist mullahs and the Islamic intellectuals often have a difficult time replacing the local notables. This applies in particular to the Turkic Uzbek and the Turkoman tribes entire extended families and village communities of which fled to Afghanistan between 1917 and 1930 in order to escape the Sovietization of Central Asia. One such commander is Baz Mohammad in Barfak in Baghlan province who is affiliated with Gilani's party.

Commanders who rose from the ranks of the common people because of their bravery in battle rarely occupy a higher-ranking position in the resistance hierarchy which extends beyond their local significance.

5. Successful Example of Modern Guerilla Warfare

Up to now, only Ahmad Shah Mahsud has succeeded in bringing off a modern conception of guerilla warfare. Thanks to successes achieved against Soviet units and Afghan regulars in the Panjshir Valley he was able to unify a sizable number of commanders fighting in the North in a Council of the North for the purpose of coordinating their operations. Based on his basic scheme, Mahsud began to set up four different types of combat units 2 years ago, i.e., the mujaheddin "Kharargah;" the "Zarbatee" combat groups; the "Motaharek" mobile groups and the "Keta'at-e Markazi" special operations commando units.

The "Kharargah" mujaheddin are a kind of village defense force. In each instance, six or seven villages are unified under a single commander who sets up a joint strongpoint. In the Panjshir Valley, for example, there are 22 such strongpoints. In case of attack, the villages receive support from the "Zarbatee" combat groups. Every strongpoint has a group of 30-35 men at its disposal.

The well-trained Motaharek mujaheddin who wear uniforms serve as the mobile combat and support element of an entire valley. These combat-seasoned mujaheddin are used exclusively in military operations. As long as they are part of such a motaharek group, the individual members are not allowed to leave their unit. These combat groups may also be used in operations outside their home valley.

The Keta'at-e Markazi special operations units are used in assaults on enemy garrisons. The members of these special units who come from various regions are

recruited from among the best of the mujaheddin. Many of them have received advanced training and have volunteered for this high-risk service under Mahsud's command.

To bring about the total destruction of the communist regime in Kabul, Mahsud has plans to set up a guerilla army consisting of 10,000 mujaheddin from a variety of provinces. With this army's help he also hopes to prevent chaos from breaking out once the regime has collapsed.

In addition to building up a military force and command structure, Mahsud has also organized the civilian political administration of his territory, creating committees on education, health, finance, and law. He is also devoting just as much attention to supplying the population with food, medicine, and fuel as to military resupply.

6. Balance of Forces Between Kabul Regime and Resistance

At the present time (October 1988), the armed forces of the Kabul regime appear to consist of the following:

1. the regular army, numbering between 35,000 and 40,000 men;
2. the air force, numbering between 5,000 and 8,000 men;
3. the border troops, numbering 7,000 men (?). According to former officers of the Afghan Army, one brigade of such troops is said to be stationed in each of the border provinces;
4. the WAD (KHAD) state security service, numbering 40,000-50,000 men of the ministry of state security under Parkham direction;
5. the police or sarandoy, numbering 30,000 men, which is under the supervision of the interior ministry dominated by the Khalq faction;
6. the militias recruited from among the tribes by means of money and weapon allocations—but whose reliability is open to question;
7. the guards of the Parkham and the Khalq communists.

In addition, there are armed members of the Patriotic Union, cadets of the youth organization, members of women's and workers' collectives, factory security units and so on. Western and Pakistani experts estimate that the non-army forces of the Kabul regime (such as the police for example) number 120,000 men. The total number under arms, including the army, is estimated at 155,000 to 160,000. In a recent interview, the communist head of state [Mohammad] Najibullah stated that

the Kabul regime would have 400,000 men at its disposal—an unlikely figure in view of the military situation in Afghanistan and the fact that the remaining population of the country only numbers 10 million.

The army under the command of Chief of Staff Mohammad Asef is structured as follows:

I Corps (Kabul):

- 8th Motorized Rifle Division in Kabul Kargha
- 11th Motorized Rifle Division in Jalalabad
- 9th Mountain Division in Kunar province (?)

II Corps (Kandahar)

- 15th Motorized Rifle Division in Kandahar (?)
- 7th Armored Brigade in Kandahar
- 7th Motorized Rifle Division in Qalat/Zabul or Kandahar

III Corps (Gardez)

- 12th Motorized Rifle Division in Gardez
- 25th Motorized Rifle Division in Khost
- 14th Motorized Rifle Division in Ghazni province

IV Corps (newly formed for Herat)

The following units are under the immediate command of the defense ministry:

- 17th Motorized Rifle Division in Herat
- 18th Motorized Rifle Division in Mazar-e Sharif
- 20th Motorized Rifle Division in Baghlan
- 99th Missile Brigade in Kabul
- 88th Artillery Brigade in Kabul (?)
- 21st Guard Regiment in Kabul (?)
- Two transportation regiments
- 4th and 15th Armored Brigade in Kabul
- 37th Commando Brigade in Rish-Khor (Kabul)
- 38th Commando Brigade plus 444th and 73rd Regiment in the Panjshir Valley
- 466th Commando Brigade, location unknown

- 666th Commando Brigade in the Khost/Paktia region

All of these units are substantially below strength. The authorized inventory of a battalion, for example, is 700 men but its actual strength is usually less than 100.

The air force is made up of three air regiments and one training regiment. It has an inventory of 100-150 combat aircraft including Su-7B's, MiG-17's, MiG-21's and Su-22's. In addition, the air force has an indeterminate number of Mi-8 and Mi-17 attack and transport helicopters, Mi-24 Hinds and Mi-25's and, according to latest reports, some Mi-35's. It is not known how many aircraft lost to Stinger missiles, mainly in 1987 and during the first quarter of 1988, were replaced by the Soviets. Units of the Afghan Air Force are stationed at the following air bases: Begram, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, Kabul, Shindand, and Mazar-e Sharif (where the training regiment is located).

The combat effectiveness of the Kabul army can be assessed as follows on the basis of personal experiences by officers who have recently defected to the resistance: Afghan conscripts are trained poorly or not at all and are not motivated for combat. Officers of the rank of major and above, on the other hand, are well-trained, many of them having attended the Frunze Academy in the Soviet Union. While individual soldiers are highly inclined to desert, entire units will defect to the resistance only after thorough negotiations. In all likelihood, there will not be any desertions to Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami.

Experts from the Pakistani Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad estimate that the Afghan resistance is made up of 130,000-160,000 permanently armed mujaheddin. They are spread all over the country and their affiliation with the seven Peshawar "parties" is said to be as follows:

Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami (I), 35,000-40,000 men Rabani's Jamiat-e Islami, at least 25,000 men Gilani's Mahaz-e Melli, 18,000-20,000 men Sayyaf's Etehad-e Islami, 15,000-20,000 men Nabi's Harakat-e Enqelab, 20,000-25,000 men Khales' Hezb-e Islami (II), 10,000 men Mujaddidi's Jabha Nejat-e Melli, 15,000 men at most.

Because of the changing and sometimes multilateral relationships exact figures are hard to come by. For that matter, the above figures do not include the mujaheddin affiliated with the Shiite groups. At least 12,000 of these more than 130,000 mujaheddin must be considered full-time professionals. Because of their strong motivation and thanks to foreign weapon shipments as well as the seizure of Soviet and Afghan arsenals, the military balance is likely to shift increasingly in favor of the mujaheddin despite all their internal differences as the Soviet pullout progresses.

Within the communist regime, too, new factions have emerged since Babrak Karmal's fall from power. The more nationalist-minded Khalq (or people) faction, supported by the interior ministry's police units (sarandoy)

and the lower army ranks is opposed by three groups belonging to the Moscow-oriented Parcham (or banner) faction, i.e., the Najib-Parcham, the Babrak-Parcham and the Keshtmand-Parcham. The supporters of these groups are to be found in the WAD/KHAD state security service, in the air force, in the guard units and among non-Pushtu intellectuals. The different factions are frequently involved in armed conflict among themselves inside Kabul. The political collapse of the PDPA, the Afghan Communist Party, is likely to occur soon after the Soviet withdrawal is completed. The continued presence of the Soviet advisers might help delay it.

As of the fall of 1988, the military situation may be assessed along the following lines:

1. The mujaheddin are in control of a good 80 percent of the country; they are well armed, have never been decisively defeated and, as a result, their fighting spirit is exceedingly high.

2. Following the withdrawal of Soviet and Kabul regime forces, the mujaheddin assume control of the abandoned territory. The Kabul forces either withdraw precipitously (as in the case of Barikot) or effect an orderly withdrawal of entire provinces (as in the case of Paktia).

3. Some provincial capitals have already fallen to the resistance. The Soviet and Kabul air forces' reaction was to carry out heavy bombing raids against these cities, using medium-range Tu-26 Backfire bombers, Su-24 Fencer heavy fighter bombers and MiG-27 ground attack planes. Should these attacks continue (some of which are flown from Soviet territory) the only alternative is for the United States to resume shipment of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.

4. Even though the customary tensions between the various "parties," particularly between Hekmatyar and the other leaders, continue unabated, this is not to say that a civil war has broken out in Afghanistan among the mujaheddin. In the interior, the major commanders are playing a decisive role in shaping the future. The political squabbles in Peshawar have an impact only on the Kabul area. Almost everywhere else the decisions have been made and the political balance among the "parties" and the various commanders appears to be stable.

In addition to the cities and highways held by the regime, we may differentiate between three zones inside Afghanistan:

1. zones controlled exclusively by one of the "parties," e.g., the northern provinces, by Mahsud or the western provinces, by Ismael Khan;

2. zones controlled by several parties but characterized by overarching structures, e.g., religious uniformity, tribal or non-partisan council. Kandahar is a good example of this;

3. zones controlled by several parties engaged in open or latent conflict with one another because of the nonexistence of common structures. In such cases the mujaheddin are unable to govern the particular region, e.g., the northern fringes of the Hindukush mountains and the zones which lie between the major frontlines. In these anarchic zones the resistance does not exercise any genuine control.

Kabul is the only area in which all "parties" more or less agree on the military strategy to be pursued and in which they actually cooperate. The fall and capture of the capital alone will decide whether the resistance is capable of determining the future of Afghanistan. Since July 1988 the mujaheddin groups representing various "parties" have been firing multiple rocket launchers at regular intervals on military or politically significant targets inside Kabul. These new, easily transportable multiple rocket launchers are Egyptian versions of the Soviet BM-21 with a range of 21 km. Since the target accuracy of these weapons is inadequate, the bombardments are likely to have hit civilian targets as well. This fact is being exploited by Soviet and Kabul propaganda in order to discredit the mujaheddin both among the capital's population and internationally. For this reason the resistance fighters have disseminated the following appeal by Abdul Haq in Kabul:

[Boxed Material]

Hezb e Islami Afghanistan
Under the Leadership of
M. M. Yunus Khales
Honorable Citizens of Kabul,
Sisters and Brothers

[seal]

[Afghani text]

For some time, the atheist government installed by the Soviets has been directing its propaganda against the mujaheddin. This propaganda is a sign of its weakness.

The most recent mujaheddin attacks on Kabul which were directed exclusively against military targets were portrayed by the Kabul regime as a premeditated mujaheddin plan to murder civilians and to destroy mosques and other holy places.

This Soviet propaganda pursues two objectives:

1. to vilify the mujaheddin and to incite the people against them and their aims;

2. to justify a possible delay of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

According to reliable information and eyewitness reports, the communists fired missiles from their own bases in and around Kabul against civilian targets and caused the death of several innocent families in order to realize their inhuman plans.

We, on the other hand, have instructed our mujaheddin groups around Kabul to carry out their attacks as precisely as possible and have urged and expressly ordered them not to attack any areas frequented by civilians.

Nevertheless, it is possible that some groups fired their missiles at such areas by mistake; the units under my command, however, are not responsible for anything along these lines. If it occurred on purpose, then it was certainly not done by any mujaheddin.

It is out of the question that the mujaheddin would attack their families, relatives and friends inside Kabul; in particular since it is their intent to liberate these people, to deliver them from the tyranny of the Soviets and their puppets.

The bloodthirsty and cruel communists who do not hesitate to kill and to commit crimes of a magnitude we have not often experienced in the history of mankind are trying to pretend by means of their propaganda that they are in the right.

The targets of our mujaheddin are the military bases of the Soviets and the communists. Since it is very difficult to aim these missiles accurately, we urgently ask the families living in the vicinity of such military bases to leave this area so that they will not be injured.

[2 August 1988]

Abdul Haq
Commander of the Kabul mujaheddin

Let us now return to the armed forces of the Kabul regime—and to the question of the communists' survival. The members of the WAD/KHAD state security service and of the police are the most reliable. In contrast to the conscripts, desertion for many of them would be tantamount to committing suicide; the reason being the killing and torture committed by the WAD. WAD will survive or fall together with the communist regime.

To defend Kabul, Najibullah has concentrated some 40,000 members of these most reliable forces, primarily from among the sarandoy or police units. WAD units have been given the responsibility of defending important bases in the provinces of Kandahar, Ghazni, and Nangarhar.

Najibullah has assigned additional security tasks in the provinces to the border troops and militias. Although militia combat effectiveness is high due to their equipment and combat tactics (which resemble those of the mujaheddin), their political reliability vis-a-vis the regime is a big question mark. Particularly in case of the Pushtu tribes in the Khyber Pass area support of one side or another in case of conflict is purely a question of financial-economic opportunism and has little to do with their own political convictions. Last century, the English either took advantage of this or were forced to learn it the hard way on some decisive occasions.

We have already referred several times to the high inclination of the conscripts to desert. Staff officers as well as lower-ranking officers and captains who have been given higher ranks than they deserve on the basis of their qualification thanks to their membership in the communist Khalq party are somewhat more reliable. But without their Soviet advisers the large formations are not capable of carrying out large-scale operations. Since the Soviets have no interest in a general collapse of the army as an effective fighting tool of the regime, they will no doubt leave their military advisers in Afghanistan as long as possible. As we have noted before, this is made easier for them by the language of the Geneva accords. In essence, the mission assigned to Kabul and its security forces by the Soviets probably goes something like this:

1. secure the withdrawal of Soviet forces and hold on to the capital city of Kabul as long as possible;
2. if the position in Kabul can no longer be held over the long term and if no generally accepted successor for Najibullah can be found, the seat of government is to be relocated in the newly created provinces which comprise the area between Andkhoy and Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan;
3. this last position must be held at all costs because a total collapse of the regime would cause the Soviet Union to lose control of the significant natural gas deposits near Shiberghan.

7. The Political Future of Afghanistan

At the present time the struggle for power between the resistance and the communist regime is still in full swing. But following the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the days of the present Kabul regime are likely to be numbered. The Soviets, however, may replace Najibullah even prior to the final collapse. High-ranking Pakistani officials as well as political advisers of the resistance believe that Najibullah will be replaced by Sayyid Muhammed Gulabzoi, the leader of the Khalq faction. Gulabzoi, a lieutenant general and a member of the PDPA central committee, holds the post of interior minister and thus commands the sarandoy. One indication for this possible change is the fact that Najibullah did not dismiss in principle former UN deputy secretary general [Diego] Cordovez' request that he step down.

Others have named Ahmad Shah Mahsud, the Panjshir Valley commander, as another possible successor to Najibullah. To us, however, it seems highly speculative to suggest that the Soviets should have chosen him as their new strongman and that they would be able to get along with him without difficulty. It is true that Mahsud and the Kabul regime have agreed on ceasefires in the past. In its 28 July 1988 edition, THE MUSLIM, a Pakistani newspaper, announced that a new ceasefire had been worked out between Mahsud and the Soviets. Although the 29 July 1988 issue of THE MUSLIM carried an immediate denial by Mahsud's brother that

such a truce had been concluded, the fact remains that there has been no fighting between Mahsud's units and the withdrawing Soviet forces since June 1988 either in the Panjshir Valley or along the Salang highway.

Mahsud, a Tajik, is not likely to be happy with the Peshawar Pushtu "parties" taking over in Kabul. He would lose a lot of influence in such an event and would deprive the Tajik people hardly any of whom fled the country unlike the Pushtus of the fruits of their resistance struggle. It is conceivable therefore that he might assume power in Kabul with the consent of the Soviets, drawing on the support of his power base in northern Afghanistan. Drawing on his own mujaheddin groups and the remnants of the Kabul army, he would be able to build his planned new army and maintain his position while seeing to law and order in the non-Pushtu areas. It is also conceivable that he might merely assume the leadership on a temporary basis until a loya jirga or great electoral assembly was held and would then turn power over to an elected leader. But in view of Mahsud's record of resistance against the Soviets and Kabul communists he is unlikely to agree to such an offer. In the past, the Soviets have tried on different occasions to discredit Mahsud with the help of propagandistic disinformation and doctored photographs. In any event, Mahsud will be a power factor in a new Afghanistan and the Soviets as well as the Pakistanis will have to take that into account.

The Pakistani Government's policy regarding the Afghanistan problem and support for the resistance is full of contradictions:

1. By transferring weapons, permitting the operation of training camps and extending advice in military matters, Pakistan provides real support to the resistance. At the same time, however, this assistance is undermined in that weapon shipments are not allowed to take place in sufficient quantity.

2. In order to have the resistance present a unified image to the outside world Pakistan has forced the "parties" to form an interim government under Ahmed Shah. At the same time this "government" discredits itself by making statements regarding a future union of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This contradictory policy appears to be determined by the aims of the Pakistani Government. In looking to the future, Pakistan would like to see a definitive solution and the stabilization of the Durand Line, i.e., the western border of Pakistan established by Great Britain. Toward this end, the Pakistanis need a Kabul government friendly to them. Men such as Hekmatyar and Sayyaf, both imbued with pan-Islamic ideology, present themselves as good partners in negotiations in that they are less interested in nationalistic Afghan objectives. This is one reason why Pakistan gives preference to providing equipment to Hekmatyar's fighting units and Sayyaf is

able to count on generous financial assistance from the Arabs trying to force their Wahhabi ideas on the Afghans via Sayyaf's Islamic "party."

But this policy is not being applied in a straightforward manner. The reason for it is Pakistan's historic fear of the Afghans who repeatedly used their mountain valleys as jumping-off points for invasions of the Indus region. This is why the interim government is not supported to the point of being able to act independently. It is solely meant to serve as a Pakistani satellite government in Kabul and this fact appreciably reduces the prestige of Ahmed Shah and his ministers in Afghan eyes—insofar as they are being taken note of at all. In the long run, this policy is not likely to pay off for Pakistan:

1. If Pakistan decides to use the interim government to extend its influence over all of Afghanistan and not just the eastern provinces, Iran and the Soviet Union will also try to expand their influence on Afghan policy and/or to maintain it.

2. A Pakistani satellite government in Kabul that relied exclusively on the Pushtus and on supporters of the Islamic religious groups would not only provoke opposition among the traditionalist "parties" but also that of Farsi-speaking population groups who are no longer willing to accept traditional Pushtu domination after 10 years of war.

3. Under the circumstances, the war in Afghanistan would continue in the form of a civil war where the opposition would then be directed against the Pakistani puppet government. By attempting to impose a government on the Afghans from the outside, the Pakistanis would be repeating the mistake the Soviets made.

4. If this almost purely Pushtu interim government were to set itself up and maintain its hold in Kabul, the good relations which have built up between the "parties" and the Pakistani Government since 1979 would do an about-face sooner or later. The dispute over the Durand Line would ignite once more and the restlessness would spread to the Pushtu tribal areas inside Pakistan. As a result of weapon purchases and arms smuggling these ethnic groups are now heavily armed and will enter the service of the highest bidder. The opposition in the Pakistani provinces of Sind and Baluchistan would take advantage of these disturbances in the Pushtu tribal areas to further their own ends.

The Pakistani foreign ministry appears to have recognized these dangers. Thus far, however, it has not been able to prevail over the generals and their policies. But present political developments in Pakistan are likely to result in strengthening the position of the civilian authorities. Otherwise, the United States is the only power capable of forcing Pakistan to change its policy. But as of now, after gaining its prime objective, i.e.,

getting the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan, the United States is looking on passively without any clear political concept of its own.

The threat of a disintegration of Afghanistan following the Soviet pullout and the removal of the communist leadership would intensify as a result of various heretofore hidden tensions:

1. the conflict between the Pushtus and the Farsi-speaking population groups in Afghanistan. This is all the more likely because the Tajiks now make up the largest population group in view of the fact that almost 85 percent of the refugees are Pushtus.
2. the conflict that has been going on ever since the establishment of the Afghan state between the central government and the regions and ethnic groups which have continually tried to evade domination by Kabul.
3. the religious conflict between the Sunni majority and the traditionally suppressed Shiite minority of the Hazara.
4. the revival of the Pushtu tribes' demands for the establishment of "Greater Pushtunistan" which would include Pakistan's Northwest Frontier province up to the Indus River.
5. the new conflict between the moderate brand of Islam thus far predominant in Afghanistan and the militant Islamic Wahhabism espoused by some of the "parties."
6. the dispute between the conservative maleks and mullahs and some of the progressive [military] commanders over the future of the nation.

From the Western point of view the only sensible alternative for a solution of the Afghanistan problem is the proposal made by UN mediator [Diego] Cordovez. It is based on clear recognition of the fact that the communist regime in Kabul must be removed under any circumstances, if peace is to return to Afghanistan. The execution of this peace plan is divided into the following five steps:

1. resignation of Najibullah and his communist government;
2. proclamation of ceasefire;
3. establishment of a national interim government. Only persons generally recognized as independents would be acceptable as members of such a government. Some of the traditionalist personalities mentioned thus far have included former King Zaher Shah, former minister president Dr Yussuf and other former cabinet ministers. The 30 wise men constituting the interim government would have to waive their seat in a future regular government in advance.

4. call for a loya jirga or great electoral assembly by 15 March 1989 by the interim government;

5. installation of a broad-based government by the loya jirga by 15 March 1989. This government would be charged with drawing up a new constitution and the holding of general elections.

Above all the Islamic religious "parties" but also Pakistani sources call this proposal impossible to implement—for the following reasons:

Never before have foreign mediators lacking the appropriate powers been able to force a government to resign.

Given the situation in Afghanistan, particularly during the still continuing Soviet occupation, a ceasefire could not be implemented.

Traditional Afghan society has been destroyed by the war to such an extent that a representative electoral assembly could not be convened. Instead of such an assembly general elections would have to take place.

The commanders would not submit to a provisional interim government of 30 wise men.

The representatives of the traditionalist factions are among those who counter this criticism most of all by saying that the commanders would indeed accept such a provisional government and that the only practical way to peace in Afghanistan at this time would be via such a traditional assembly, the composition of which would of course have to be discussed.

The primary problem with the Cordovez Plan is its practical implementation. But since it represents the only alternative to chaos, the necessary steps to implement it must be undertaken. This is also in the West's interest.

Thanks to the Afghan resistance since 1979 Soviet expansion has been stopped, if not even contained. The Red Army has suffered a military defeat.

The aftereffects of the Soviet pullout are already becoming apparent in East Europe. It is by all means conceivable that this pullout and the precarious economic situation in the USSR might cause the Soviet leadership to withdraw divisions from its East European approaches, thereby not only contributing to a relaxation of tensions but also relaxing the political suppression of the peoples of East Europe. Such a development might lead to a better and more peaceful world. The peace we have been waiting for so long might perhaps soon become a reality.

Events in Afghanistan have roused the world and made it realize it what Homer Lea, a military historian, wrote around 1912 in his book, "The Day of the Saxon:"

"In the development of the Russian Empire we notice more than anywhere those characteristics which make up the imperceptible, slow process of growth in nature. Russian expansion proceeds with elemental regularity. Like that of a glacier, this movement is recognizable only over extended periods of time. Its terrible and inexorable progression is so imperceptible that we do not notice it until after it has passed a certain point. Whatever this glacier does not crush it uproots. And what it does not uproot, it pushes in front of itself until it is swallowed up by a small or large crevasse along its way."

Around Christmas 1979, that point was reached in Afghanistan. In the intervening 9 years that glacier has uprooted half the population of this country and pushed it in front of itself. But contrary to all initial predictions the Afghan resistance has held fast in the face of this onslaught and has shown the whole world that even a glacier will reach a point of no return one day. But this, too, was foreseen by Homer Lea back in 1912:"

[There are certain places in the world] of odd and ominous significance to mankind, insofar as they give direction to the conquests of mankind. In such areas victories are decisive whereas defeats are tantamount to national ruin. Such places are the gates through which nations come and go; sometimes triumphal arches, but sometimes those narrow exits through which nations, like individuals, disappear forever. Herat is such a place; Kabul is another! In the whole world there are no two places like these in terms of importance." (in Homer Lea, "Vergessene weltpolitische Einsichten" [Forgotten Insights into World Politics], Zurich, HeCHt-Verlag, 1980).

The free world owes a lot to the successful resistance of the Afghans and to the incredible sacrifices made by this brave people. It is thus no more than fitting that the West now render all the assistance and support necessary to restore peace in Afghanistan. The Soviets with all their advisers must withdraw from Afghanistan unconditionally. Only a politically secure peace not endangered by any outside power will create the conditions for the reconstruction of the country.

8. The Reconstruction of Afghanistan

The infrastructure and economy of Afghanistan have suffered enormous destruction as a result of the war. At least 1.2 million people have died. Of the estimated 15 million inhabitants of Afghanistan 5.5 million fled to foreign countries, above all to Pakistan and Iran but also to India and the West. Inside Afghanistan, an estimated 2 million more left their homes and villages and sought refuge either in Kabul which was never attacked from the air or in the mountains.

Extensive research by the Swedish Afghanistan Committee and by heads of other humanitarian aid organizations have referred to the 50 percent clause:

50 percent of the population are refugees;

50 percent of all buildings have been destroyed;

50 percent of all arable land has been destroyed;

50 percent of all irrigation plants have been rendered unusable;

50 percent of all livestock has been destroyed;

50 percent of all pastures are full of mines;

50 percent of all roads and bridges are in ruins;

50 percent of all fruit trees and the few forests have been destroyed;

50 percent of the remaining population suffer from diseases which had already been eradicated, e.g., malaria, tuberculosis, intestinal ailments, leprosy, etc.

50 percent of the schools no longer exist;

50 percent of all industrial plants are standing idle.

Although the Geneva accords call for voluntary repatriation of all refugees, they have remained in their camps with few exceptions to this day. The necessary conditions for their return do not yet exist. The Geneva-based UN organizations, i.e., the UNHCR, FAO, WHO, etc., are drawing up plans for humanitarian and economic assistance programs for Afghanistan under the direction of special coordinator Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan.

One of the major obstacles to a mass return of refugees is the extensive mining of Afghanistan. According to American estimates, 10-13 million mines have been planted from the air or on the ground. The Soviets appear to have only some of the mine plans in their possession. They themselves have informed UN mediator Diego Cordovez that a total of 2,131 minefields were planted; but this number appears to include only those planted to protect their own garrisons. It does not include the numerous butterfly mines which were dropped by airplanes over mujaheddin supply routes and the vicinity of insurgent villages. Since these mines are primarily made from plastics, they cannot be located by conventional mine detectors. What is more, visual detection is difficult as well because of the brown, grey, beige, etc. "camouflage color" of the mines. These mines pose a special threat to the Afghan peasants both in tilling the soil and for their livestock on the wide-ranging, sparse pasture lands.

Some of the plans for removing the mines are quite outlandish. The Arabs, for example, are said to have suggested that the Afghans be given several million sheep which would be driven across the minefields, causing the mines to detonate. The UN has come up with a more

realistic approach to the problem, i.e., to train thousands of Afghan volunteers in the Pakistani refugee camps in ways of removing the mines.

In addition to the 23 known types of mines used by the Soviet forces in Afghanistan the mines (some of them homemade) planted by the resistance must be taken into account. For the most part, these are antitank mines planted in the installation of ambushes along the roads inside Afghanistan. [As in the case of the Soviet mines] there are no plans for these mines which pose a threat to the normalization of road traffic.

As soon as the removal of mines from roads and the vicinity of settlements has been completed the economic and social reconstruction can begin. In addition to industrial projects this includes the agricultural sector most of all; in particular the reactivation of irrigation plants and the supply of seed and fertilizers. Agricultural machinery is needed just as badly as livestock and breeding cattle. In the social sphere, special attention must be devoted to the restoration of the health and education systems. Teachers must be trained, teaching materials must be made available. There will be a particularly urgent need for assistance in training and integrating the tens of thousands of war wounded, amputees, paraplegics, and the blind as well as the widows and orphans.

Additional problems just as hard to solve from a logistic point of view as any other include the rebuilding of destroyed houses, farms and villages. The floors and walls of houses, to be sure, can be prepared in the traditional manner from clay, natural stones and clay bricks readily available everywhere but the doors, windows and roofs require wood not enough of which is to be had in the devastated country.

Fuel for heating and cooking must be procured and distributed. The cows which provided the dung as fuel for baking and cooking are gone. Many of the poplars and willows alongside the old irrigation canals have withered or been chopped down.

Parallel to this material and social reconstruction program the country needs to be fully pacified through the demobilization of the mujaheddin combat groups and the establishment of a new security force. The latter should not be in the form of a national army and be equipped solely with light infantry weapons so that it cannot be used by one "party" or another to further its own objectives.

With a view to long-term political and economic stability in the entire region thought might be given to the plan drawn up by Dr Azizullah Lodin, an Afghan, calling for the creation of a regional economic union consisting of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran which had already been the subject of discussion between President Ayub Khan, the Shah of Iran, and Prime Minister Mohammad Daud in 1962. Under the present circumstances all three nations would benefit from such an economic union. While

Afghanistan is rich in raw materials, Iran and Pakistan have well-functioning infrastructures and well-trained labor forces. An economic union of this kind might also serve to defuse political problems such as the Pushtunistan issue or the Baluchi aspirations to independence.

The West, the Soviets, and the Arabs should lend their support to the creation of this economic union in their own interest. While the Arab oil nations might provide the necessary capital, Western assistance would be in the form of transfer of technology and training of skilled labor. The Soviet Union might figure as a potential raw material customer and would have the additional advantage of having contained Islamic fundamentalism along its southern flank. And West European and Japanese oil supplies from the Middle East would no longer be jeopardized by the threat of a relapse of the entire region into a fundamentalist Middle Ages.

9. Swiss Humanitarian Aid for Afghanistan

Without a doubt, Afghanistan is one of the nations hardest hit by need and misery. In contrast with most other disaster areas, this situation has not been the result of natural catastrophe but of human action. Countless cities and villages have been destroyed by bombs and shells. There is a lack of medical help, of food, household articles, and equipment; in a word, a lack of just about everything. Thus there is a need for aid. But who in Switzerland does anything about it?

The government has been extending aid ever since the war started but most of it benefitted the refugees in Pakistan. It was extended via different aid organizations, in part via the International Red Cross. This assistance has been on the rise over the past few years, it is true, but in light of the magnitude of the need the few millions spent each year on the average have been modest at best.

The large private aid organizations which are well known to the public and make their collections do not view Afghanistan as a problem at all or as a fourth-rate one at most. The focus of their activity is somewhere else entirely, in Tanzania, Mali, Ethiopia, Bhutan, Rwanda, and Nicaragua for instance. They have their favorites; Afghanistan is not one of them. Individual spokesmen of these organizations do offer different reasons for the sparse or nonexistent aid, e.g., the difficulty of working inside the country and the confused relationships within the resistance movement. At least with regard to the refugees in Pakistan, however, such attempts at explanations are without foundation from the start. What is more, foreign institutions have indeed found ways of operating inside Afghanistan. Thus one is led to the conclusion that political considerations are playing a decisive role here.

Proof of the fact that effective aid can indeed be dispensed if there is a genuine desire to do so is provided by a large number of small, private Swiss organizations which are active inside the country as well as in Pakistan among the refugees. They are supplying sanitary materials, drugs, clothing, food, and various everyday goods. They lend support to agricultural construction projects and the building of clinics and schools. They supply equipment for irrigation systems as well as farm equipment. They make medical aid available to the civilian population and the freedom fighters. They improve the living conditions inside the refugee camps and provide information on the situation, the country and the population.

They collaborate with recognized specialists, i.e. physicians, nurses, agronomists, technicians, and journalists who are working on the spot, who are familiar with the

problems on the basis of their own experiences and must often do their work while their lives are in danger. They thus are representatives of a humanitarian Switzerland, thereby to some extent filling the gap inexplicably left open by the large aid organizations which constantly boast of their work on behalf of the poor.

The representatives of these organizations who are young people for the most part are making a major personal commitment. They collect the necessary money, frequently on a local basis among the donor community. Their roots are also on the local level and they make do with a minimum of administrative overhead. In general, they work independently, nurturing their special, limited sphere of operations but are part of a loose Switzerland-Afghanistan fellowship and do exchange information. The following organizations are members of this joint body:

Name of Organization	Name of Contact	Address of Contact	Telephone Numbers	Postal or Other Checking Account Number
Coordination	Dr Rudolf Friedrich, chairman;	PO Box 166	052/2261484	
Schweiz-Afghanistan [Switzerland-Afghanistan Coordination]	Helena I. Schmidhauser, secretary	8402 Winterthur	052/222434	
Afghanistanhilfe Schaffhausen [Schaffhausen Aid for Afghanistan]	Verena Frauenfelder	Rosenbergstrasse 51 8212 Neuhausen	053/253379 (b) 053/223385 (h)	82-2787-6 Schaffhausen
Arbeitsgemeinschaft "Pro Afghanistan" [Pro Afghanistan Working Group]	Bruno Peter	PO Box 71 5432 Neuenhof	056/864142	50-1970-4 Hypo-Aargau No. KI-2165668.6
Comite Suisse de Soutien au Peuple Afghan [Swiss Aid Committee for the Afghan People]	Pierre de Chastonay, president Silvio Bircher, member of national assembly, vice president Dr Micheline Centlivres, editor	2, Rue de la Serre 2000 Neuchatel	027/551980 064/241250 038/247682	19-81-6 Banque Cantonale du Valais, Sierre
Freies Afghanistan Schweiz [Free Afghanistan Switzerland]	Marcel Aebi, president Andreas Oertli, treasurer Anita Voellmy, secretary	PO Box 5001 Aarau	064/226722 01/3624626 064/343185	50-257-0 Aarau
Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde Afghanistans [Swiss Association of the Friends of Afghanistan]	Peter Hoegl, president Marie-Rose Nicod, humanitarian aid	Dorfstrasse 81 3073 Guemlingen	031523980 021/220420	10-15753-9 Lausanne

Name of Organization	Name of Contact	Address of Contact	Telephone Numbers	Postal or Other Checking Account Number
Schweizerisches Komitee fuer ein freies Afghanistan [Swiss Committee for a Free Afghanistan]	Thomas Schmidhauser, resident E. Hostettler, vice president Helena I. Schmidhauser, secretary	PO Box 166 8402 Winterthur	052/227015 052/222434 052/222434	84-1900-1 SBV Winterthur "Afghanistan"
SOI Hilfsfonds fuer Afghanica	Dr Peter Seger, member of national assembly	PO Box	031/431212	30-4474-8
Schweizerisches Ost-Institut [Swiss Institute for Eastern Affairs Aid Fund for Afghanistan]	Peter Dolder/U. Stump	3000 Bern 6		Bern
Stiftung Bibliotheca Afghanica Schweizerisches Afghanistan-Archiv [Bibliotheca Afghanica Foundation Swiss Afghanistan Archive]	Dr. Theo Meier, president Paul Bucherer, director Prof Albert A. Stahel	Benzburweg 5 4410 Liestal	061/9219482 061/9219838 01/9151988	40-4221-0 Basel
Vereinigung Afghanistan-Projekte Association Projets d'Afghanistan [Afghanistan Projects Association]	Dr. Theo Locher, president Hans Gmuender, municipal councillor, treasurer	Industriestrasse 5 2555 Bruegg	032/5320553 032/417585	25-26108-0 Biel/Bienne

As the Soviet forces gradually withdraw the need for assistance does not get any smaller. Now is the time to tackle reconstruction. Although the international organizations have developed ambitious plans experience has taught us that the need for aid on a small scale will continue, e.g., shipments of food, medicine, clothing and articles of daily use. Based on past experience, the large aid organizations can be expected to do little, if anything. We are therefore appealing to the [Swiss] government to make more funds available in the future via the Directorate for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid. And we also appeal to all those who are dissatisfied with the performance of the major aid organizations with regard to Afghanistan. You may send your contributions to the abovementioned small organizations which may not have the necessary funds to direct high-sounding appeals to the public but which have been extending effective assistance for years.

10. Lessons for Switzerland From Events in Afghanistan

Afghan resistance against the communists has been under way without letup since 1978 and against the Soviet occupation since 1979. The question for us is

whether there are any lessons to be learned from this war that can be applied to the defense of Switzerland. Toward this end, we must look at and compare the Afghans' sense of identity and their cultural/social environment with our own.

The Tajiks and Pushtus are Indo-European ethnic groups which often are surprisingly close to us both in their language and their traditions. Turkomans, Uzbeks, Hazaras and others are part of the Turkic-Mongolian ethnic group. But the bond that unites all these ethnic groups is their 1000-year-old membership in Islamic cultural society. Jews and Christians are accepted as "possessors of the book" who believe in God; but atheism is considered hateful. Due to the sometimes deadly natural environment of the country the population is accustomed to hardship and deprivation.

In the midst of his mountains and deserts the individual Afghan is a man who loves personal freedom and self-determination most of all. The country was never colonized and has never been subjected to foreign domination. The Soviets are not the first to have experienced this; the British suffered one of the worst defeats of their colonial era during the last century there. Independent as

he is, the Afghan hates every type of coercion by a collective and the domination by a central authority. This is the very reason why the population immediately turned its back on the communists who ruled Afghanistan from Kabul by authoritarian decree and coercion. Resistance against the openly professed atheism [of the communists] is intensified and justified by Islam. Thus, the desire for freedom and the strength of religious belief contribute in equal measure to the motivation of the mujaheddin.

It is in this environment that a special attitude toward military matters tends to flourish. A free man is distinguished by the fact that he bears arms. But he who bears arms must know how to handle them and must be prepared to use them to defend his honor, his property and his family. That is why the Afghan code prescribes that as a rule only armed men may be attacked but that the aged as well as women and children must be spared.

Afghan individualism stood in the way of the establishment of an organized army for a long time. It was not until the end of the last century that Emir Abdur Rahman Khan, the iron-fisted ruler of Afghanistan, succeeded in building up an army as an instrument of central power. It was ruthlessly used both to put down revolting Pushtu tribes and to suppress the non-Pushtu minorities. It was no accident that this army was looked upon with disfavor both by the tribes and the population as a whole. Ever since its creation the army was a foreign element in Afghan society.

It is easy to see that the Afghan mentality of individualized warfare does not correspond to Switzerland's modern military establishment. If anything, the Afghan conduct of operations might be compared to the Swiss military establishment of the 14th and 15th century (especially the Saubanner campaigns). In both instances, the individual fighter is bound only by personal loyalty to this commander. The concept of promotions in rank is of no consequence. Only those men who have lots of charisma, who come from a distinguished family or have proved their mettle in combat can advance to the position of squad leader.

In spite of these differences to the present-day Swiss military establishment there are at least three lessons to be learned from this war:

1. In contrast to the increasing mechanization of European armies, the war in Afghanistan points to a revival of the infantryman. The successes of the Afghan resistance have given proof of the importance of the foot soldier in modern war insofar as he has modern antitank missiles and, in particular, modern anti-aircraft weapons at his disposal. Based to some extent on the Afghan experience, Switzerland, too, will probably be purchasing Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. These modern weapons provide the infantryman with a great deal of firepower in addition to unlimited mobility in difficult terrain.

2. Without a doubt, the unwieldy Soviet army is extremely vulnerable to ambushes and surprise raids, etc. The creation of special hunter-killer teams to help take out enemy headquarters must be considered. As compared to other solutions, such teams would meet cost-benefit requirements.

3. The war in Afghanistan has also demonstrated what an important role heavy artillery, multiple rocket launchers and ground-to-ground missiles still play in Soviet warfare. As in the past, the artillery constitutes the prime fire support element and as a rule commanders use it in preference to tactical aircraft. Since some of these artillery bases would probably be located beyond Swiss artillery range, they would have to be taken out by long-range ground attack aircraft. At the present time, Switzerland has no such weapons. The end of the war in Afghanistan will no doubt lead to further studies and thus provide additional conclusions regarding modern warfare. In principle, however, the lessons to be drawn from this war are plain:

For the first time since 1945 the Red Army has suffered a military defeat. The pullout now begun could be the beginning of a no longer reversible process which may lead to long-lasting peace in this world.

Whatever the future political and strategic international situation may look like, we are indebted to the Afghans for their resistance by which they offered proof of the exceptional significance of personal courage, imagination, perseverance, and undying hope. As yet, however, the Soviet withdrawal has not been fully completed; half of the population are still refugees and reconstruction has scarcely begun. All we can do is hope that all the sacrifices made by the Afghan people will be rewarded by a future of peace and freedom.

Personal Conversations 1988:

Islamabad:

-Ietikhar Murshed, Director General Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

-S.A.H. Ahsani, former Pakistani ambassador, director, Foreign Service Training Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

-Shahryar Rashed, director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

-Lt Gen Kamal Matinuddin, director general, Institute of Strategic Studies;

-Prof Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, chairman, Department of International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University;

-Anne Willem Bijleveld, Deputy Chief of Mission, UNHCR;

-Dr Mohammad Afaf, Institute of Strategic Studies;

-Fazal-ur-Rahman, research officer, Institute of Strategic Studies.

Peshawar:

-Brig (Ret) Fahimullah Khattak, Commissioner for Afghan Refugees;

-Ahmad Zeb Khan, Chief Protocol Officer, Afghan Refugees Commissionerate;

-Prof Fath-ur-Rahman, chairman, Department of Political Science and Bashir A. Qureshi, Institute of Regional Studies, Peshawar University;

-Mr Abdullah, director, Provincial Services Academy;

-Prof Azmat Hayat Khan, Area Study Centre (Central Asia), Peshawar University;

-Sahar Gul, liaison officer, Afghan Refugees Commissionerate;

-Michael E. Malinowski, principal officer and consul, US;

-Richard E. Hoagland, director, American Center;

-Prof Louis Dupree and Nancy Hatch Dupree;

-Pir Syed Ishaq Gilani;

-Prof Syed Mohd. Yusuf Elmi, director, Afghan Jihad Works Translation Centre;

-Haji Syed Daud, director, Afghan Media Resource Center (AMRC);

-Chris Nation, photography advisor, AMRC;

-Engineer Syed Naim Majrooh, director, Afghan Information Center (AIC);

-Prof Rasul Amin, director, Writers Union of Free Afghanistan (WUFA);

-Judge Mohammad N. Zalmy, president, National Committee for Human Rights in Afghanistan;

-Omar Malikyar, Voice of America (VOA);

-Dr Azilullah Lodin, political adviser to the leader of Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami;

-Azim Wardak, Hezb-e Islami Yusuf Khaless;

-Hamed Karzai, director of press and information,

-Jabha Nejat-e Melli (Afghan National Liberation Front);

-Engineer E. Mayar, Jabha Nejat-e Melli and OSULA e.V.;

-Yari Ahmed Shah, Jabha Nejat-e Melli;

-Masood Khalili and Mohammad Shuaib, Jamiat-e Islami;

-Mohammad Yahya Mahsud and Ahmad Wali Mahsud;

-Maj Nasrullah Saqi, Mahaz-e Milli-ye Islami (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, NIFA);

-Soleiman Yari, Hazara, member of the Alliance of Nine (Shiite);

-M. Qasim Wafa, Harakat-e Islami Afghanistan, Ayatollah Mohammad Asef Mohseni (Shiite);

-Andre Collomb, head of delegation;

-Andreas Wigger, deputy head of delegation;

-Aldo A. Benini, delegate, International Committee of the Red Cross;

-Gerd Kellermann, deputy director, Austrian Relief Committee for Afghan Refugees (ARC);

-Saira Shah, International Information Office; Dr Reinhard Eroes, director, German Afghanistan Committee; Dr Karl Viktor Freigang, chief officer, German Afghanistan Foundation;

-Gottfried Marienfeld, German Agency for Technical Training Programmes (GTZ);

-Save the Children (UK);

-Union Aid for Afghan Refugees.

Bibliotheca Afghanistanica Foundation

Why There Is a Need for a Foundation

Ever since antiquity Afghanistan has been a melting pot of peoples and a major center of culture, religion and political power which radiated deep into Central Asia, India and to the Mediterranean. The memory of this historic heritage became lost time and again—either because of invasions by wild hordes from the Asian interior or because of disorder within the country itself. The present disorders, too, have led to the large-scale destruction of cultural values.

Present developments point up the international importance of the Bibliotheca Afghanistanica as a documentation center. It was established as a result of private initiative in 1968, was opened to the public in 1976 and has been a foundation since 1983. The board of the foundation,

under the chairmanship of former government councillor Dr Theo Meier, is made up of nine members from Germany, France, Austria, and Switzerland. The foundation is under the supervision of the Swiss department of the interior and its accounts are audited by the financial control authority of the canton of Baselland.

As of now, the archive contains more than 10,000 titles with the emphasis on the natural conditions, the culture and the history of the country. The archive also has a large number of maps, plans, posters, etc., and a collection of almost 13,000 slides and photographs. These material resources were placed in trust with the foundation by the founders. In addition, large quantities of material have been deeded to the foundation. Numerous Afghanistan experts have contracted to bequeath their collected materials to the Bibliotheca Afghanica Foundation.

Contributions to the foundation are tax-free in most cantons.

Additional information regarding the library and the foundation may be obtained from: Afghanistan-Archiv, Benzbüchelweg 5, CH-4410 Liestal [Switzerland]. Telephone: 061/9219838. Postal Checking Account No. 40-4221-0.

Purpose of Foundation

The goals of the Bibliotheca Afghanica Foundation are outlined as follows in the foundation charter:

Article 2

1. The purpose of the foundation is to further research and education about Afghanistan and the geographically or culturally adjacent territories—with special emphasis on the natural conditions, the culture and the history of the region, in adherence to political and religious neutrality.

2. This is achieved in particular by collecting, preparing, and disseminating information through:

- operation and expansion of an archive containing

literature on Afghanistan;

publications from Afghanistan;

manuscripts;

maps, plans and posters;

drawings, photographs, films, etc.

- organization and holding of

courses and seminars;

lectures and demonstrations;

exhibits and other events;

- publication of a series of papers containing articles relating to the abovementioned themes;

- facilitation of accessibility to literature through the preparation and publication of a bibliography and of book reviews of new publications;

- collaboration with institutions and experts both inside and outside Switzerland;

- supply of bibliographic, touristic, alpinistic and general information in order to awaken the interest of a wider audience.

3. It is the special desire of the foundation to contribute to the preservation of Afghan culture.

Relations Grow With African Nations

46000064a Kabul *THE KABUL TIMES* in English
16 Dec 88 pp 1, 2

[Text] Mr Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia recently delivered in Zambian state palace, the statement of that Republic on recognizing the State of the Republic of Afghanistan.

The recognition of State of the Republic of Afghanistan by the Zambian Republic is a proof to the correct and constructive policy pursued by Republic of Afghanistan in the sphere of international relations.

The people of Afghanistan are desirous of establishing their relations based on the principles of equality, mutual respect to the independence, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.

The conclusion of the Geneva agreements on the political settlement of the issue of Afghanistan turned into a main factor for enhancing the authority and prestige of the Republic of Afghanistan in international arena.

The realistic and progressive states, including the Zambian Republic want the meticulous observance of these agreements.

The recognition of the RA by Zambia is a convincing testimony to the victory of new political thinking in international relations and expansion of mutually beneficial relations and cooperation among the world people.

The relations of Afghanistan with the African developing countries are growing.

The Republic of Zambia gained its independence in 1964. It is members of the Organization of African Unity. Coloured metals, copper, cement and chemical

industry and power energy production play a great role in strengthening the Zambian economy. Its agro-products include maize, barley, sugarbeet, onion, wheat, terrips, and tobacco.

Britain, Japan, the FRG, the United States and the South African Republic are its major trader partners.

In its foreign policy, the Republic of Zambia adheres to the non-aligned principles and maintain close relations with the majority of the world progressive countries.

In 1964, indirect ties were established between the Republic of Afghanistan and Zambia. Following the victory of the April Revolution, these relations continued as in the past. However this new development in bilateral relations of the two countries is the start of fruitful cooperation between our peoples. This attests to the improvement of the general process of international relations. This can certainly help in strengthening international security, and peace, expansion of cooperation between our countries.

Following the principles of peaceful co-existence, the Republic of Afghanistan wants the expansion of its relations with all countries of the world regardless of their different social systems.

Activities in Kabul City's 11th Precinct

46000063a *Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English*
16 Dec 88 p 4

[Article by Jamshid]

[Text] "Four hundred and fifty square meters road in Khairkhana was macadamized during the first six months of the current Afghan year and 160 square meters repaired:

Khairkhana project which is considered as one of the newly established and most populated projects in the Kabul city, covering almost 198 hectares, has a population of 350,000. 25,000 residential houses have so far been built in the project."

Mohammad Omar Naimyar, deputy head of the 11th precinct of Kabul city disclosed the above in an interview to KABUL TIMES correspondent.

He said: "Fruitful work for socio-economic welfare of the precinct has so far been carried out. We can site 152 sub-projects in this area, 40 per cent of which have so far been completed and commissioned.

"The large productive, industrial and transport institutions in the area which were recognized winner last year in the emulation drive among similar institutions in the city are Spin Ghar Construction Unit, the metal work and technical services institute, and AFSOTR Forwarding Company.

"Also, land plots at cheaper prices were sold by the Kabul municipality to private entrepreneurs of the precinct to build factories and productive units. The construction work of three such projects have been completed recently and commissioned.

"Commissioning of Taki Plastic, and Farouq Ice Factory in the district are vivid examples in this regard, the productions of which have partially meet the inhabitants' demands."

Naimyar added: "15 elementary, secondary schools and lycees are serving the children of the precinct. There are also 25 cultural centres, 2 public libraries, 3 residential areas kindergartens. There are also 2 health centres run by the Red Crescent Society. Three child and mother care clinics are also active in the precinct. The government has built there 53 mosques, 3 takias and 1 mourning hall.

He added: "The number of repatriates is increasing day by day in the precinct after the proclamation of the national reconciliation policy in the country 220 families have so far returned and given state's material and moral assistance. Shelters were provided to 3 repatriate families and 6 houses previously confiscated by the state were restored to their owners. Also, the 11th precinct of the Kabul city assisted this year, 17 families whose houses were damaged by the rockets of the opposition groups.

"Distribution of coal to inhabitants during the winter time is also part of our duty. We have distributed coal, since August, to 4,263 Khairkhana residents.

"At the initiative of the 11th precinct, voluntary works were many times organized to clean residential areas, establish control over the prices in the market, supply drinking water and repair mosques, etc.

Broad Dimensions of Afghan Commercial Activities

46000063b *Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English*
18 Dec 88 pp 1, 2

[Article by Farouq]

[Text] Trade is one of the main spheres in the national economy, and private and state sectors play a tangible role in improving the people's living standards and in meeting the needs of the citizens.

At present there are 8,200 national traders organized in 18 export and import unions having commercial transactions with the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Britain, GDR, the United States, Japan, France, Italy, FRG, India, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Arab countries, Pakistan, China, Belgium, Korea, etc.

Established with the private share are soap and oil joint stock company, tea import company, cloth import company, vehicle petroleum and Herat tea joint ventures importing the primary articles needed by the people.

Similarly set up under the Ministry of Commerce are some trade undertakings such as petroleum enterprises, food procurement department. Retail trade enterprise, dry fruits export company, Afghan CART company, etc. They have been rendering remarkable services in supplying consumer goods and primary materials according to their annual plans. The figures given below show the activities of the export and import companies, the turnover of retail and wholesale trade by the Ministry of Commerce, in the years 1986 and 1987: 215.23 million dollar and 222.67 million dollar for exports, 764.38 million and 789.87 million dollar for imports, 16,487 million Afs and 21,138 million Afs for retail trade as well as 9,846 million Afs, and 10,987 million Afs, for wholesale trade.

Appreciable is the share of private sector in the creation of industrial projects in the recent years. There are at least 370 private by-owned projects engaged in chemical industry, construction, machine building metal works, pharmaceutical products paper industry, carpentry, light industries and foodstuffs.

The growth of private sector helps in using comprehensively domestically-supplied raw material, attracting more people to work, reducing the rate of imports, enhancing the production of exported goods and supplying the local markets with consumer goods as well as in strengthening the national economy on the whole.

The government has embarked on a set of measures and facilities for enabling the growth of private sector, regulating and encouraging the activities of private ventures.

To maintain the mutually beneficial cooperation of the state with the private sector, the Economic Consultative Council (ECC) was set up in 1980. Organized in ECC are private entrepreneurs engaged in trade, industry, transport, agriculture, construction and cooperatives. Its leading staff include 44 members, 34 out of which are representatives elected by the private sector. The remaining are selected members which include high-ranking state officials engaged in economic spheres. ECC has its special committees to study the issues pertaining to different spheres of national economy.

Setting forth its views, consultations, proposals and draft legislations, the ECC endeavours to ensure the mutually-equal interests of the state and the private sector examples are, the new law on private domestic and foreign investments in the RA, the draft new law on the Chambers of Trade and Industries, the draft charter of the Union of Craftsmen, the draft code on issuing trade and service licenses for foreign and local firms, the draft procedure on license of currency brokers, the drafted procedural bill on attracting private investment for cultivating barren lands, etc.

The assistance rendered by socialist countries in the first place the Soviet Union, plays a fruitful role in strengthening different economic spheres. The assistance is meant mostly for setting up industrial undertakings shared by private sector and the government.

In line with its manifold assistance to our country, the Soviet Union recently allocated a credit of 50 million roubles for establishing 171 private industrial projects in our country.

Hungary has also agreed to set up with the cooperation of Afghan private sector 14 industrial projects. Under the same conditions,, Bulgaria has agreed the same number of projects, while Czechoslovakia's share account for 9. Polish People's Republic has also entered an agreement with Afghan side to cooperate in establishing a set of industrial projects in Afghanistan.

Prices Brought Back Under Control
46000062b Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
13 Dec 88 p 2

[Text] Kabul, 12 December, (BIA)—Large supplies of essential goods drastically brought down the rocketeering prices in the markets of Kabul city.

Prices of essential goods as flour, rice and vegetable ghee are reduced by 30 to 40 percents. The price for 16 kgs of the vegetable oil of Shama brand reduced from 17,000 Afs to 15,700 Afs the price of 7 kg of flour and rise are lowered by Afs 100 in the markets of Kabul city, the report says.

Essential goods are stocked in the markets of Kabul city and the transportation of goods continue unhindered every day from the ports and provinces of the country to the capital.

Torkham-Jalalabad, Jalalabad-Kabul Highways Totally Re-Opened
46000062a Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
13 Dec 88 p 1

[Article from Heywad]

[Text] Given below is the excerpts of an interview by Major General Mohammad Anwar, President of operation department of the Defence Ministry of the Republic of Afghanistan on the heroism achieved in the combat operations on Kabul-Nangarhar highway.

The General said that the extremist armed groups wanted to occupy Jalalabad city and along with the Pakistani militia and U.S. advisors tried to fulfill their plans, and resorted to hostile acts and created panic

among citizens in areas of Jalalabad-Torkhman and Kabul Jalalabad highways. The belligerent elements fired ground-to-ground rockets, resorted to plunder and slaying, destroyed houses and drowned hundreds of our country men in the river. They committed more unforgivable crime by conducting anti-state propaganda among the rural and urban people. They were criminals because they spread groundless concoctions against the April Revolution and the Republic of Afghanistan claiming to have the capability and power.

Therefore, to rebuff the crimes of war-mongers, regional forces, self-defence groups and armed forces of Jalalabad undertook strict measures and started their combing operations in Torkham. Deh Bala, Nazian, Pachir and Agam areas and dealt scattering blows on belligerents, and completely opened Torkhum-Jalalabad and Jalalabad-Kabul Highways, said Major General Mohammad Anwar.

He went on to say that these combat operations which were conducted to stabilize situation in the country and in the region rescued people from sabre-rattling. We have always created heroic epics in our operation for the armed forces and have suppressed the opposition groups. These operations erased all the morale of the enemy and large amounts of their arms and ammunition fell to the hands of our valorous soldiers and officers. The mopping up operations which were conducted in Jalalabad, Torkhman and Sorobi, reinstalled all security posts in Torkhman with the national flag fluttering on it, thanks to the heroism of brave militants of the armed forces. The operations totally cleaned the transit way which is open for the traffic.

Despite the stubborn resistance of belligerent elements, Kabul-Nangarhar highway was also opened for traffic. Every day over 200 passenger buses and transport vehicles go to and from Jalalabad. Drivers of joyfull for the security ensured by the security posts set up on the two sides. [Sentence as published]

INDIA

Report on Janata National Committee Meeting in Delhi

46001189 Calcutta THE SUNDAY STATESMAN in English 20 Nov 88 p 9

[Text] Madras, 19 Nov—What began as a national alternative to the Congress (I) by the merger of the Janata Party, Lok Dal, Jan Morcha and the Congress (S) as the Janata Dal, ended as a mere statement of intent to merge by "one-and-a-half parties in place of four." This was how Mr H. L. Thimme Gowda, Janata MLA from Karnataka, summed up the party's National Council meeting and plenary session held in New Delhi yesterday.

A footnote to Mr Gowda's summing up was added by Mr Syed Shahabuddin, who said, "If we function the way we have been for the last six months since negotiations for the formation of the Janata Dal began, we can never hope to replace the Congress (I) Government of Mr Rajiv Gandhi."

Ratification of the decisions taken at the Bangalore foundation conference on 11 October was a routine matter. What was expected of the Delhi meeting was the winding up of the Janata Party. No such thing happened, much to the disappointment of the merger supporters led by Mr Ramakrishna Hegde, former Chief Minister of Karnataka.

Mr Jeevraj Alva, Mr Hegde's nominee for State president, was roughed up. He was one of those insisting on instant dissolution of the Janata Party. In the end, the issue was deferred indefinitely.

Mr Ajit Singh, whose presidency of the Janata Party was never recognized by Mr Hegde, was authorized by the National Council to complete formalities for the party's merger in the Janata Dal, which was not likely to be completed till Mr V. P. Singh constituted the National Executive of the new party.

Mr H. G. Deve Gowda, the Karnataka Public Works Minister who led the anti-Hegde faction of the Janata Party in the State, had submitted a memorandum to Mr Ajit Singh, pleading for an alliance with the Jan Morcha to fight the Congress (I), instead of losing the Janata identity by merging with a "half party," meaning the Lok Dal led by Mr Devi Lal.

Signed by over 150 Janata leaders from Karnataka, including Ministers, former Ministers, MLAs, State and National Council members and district presidents, the memorandum said the Janata Dal had turned out to be a non-starter and that it would be foolish to wind up the Janata Party at this stage.

The memorandum questioned the purpose of the Janata Party merging in the Janata Dal in view of the latest split in the Lok Dal (B), the decision of the Jan Morcha to retain its separate identity and the Congress (S) opting out of the new party.

The memorialists also sought paramount importance to the Karnataka unit of the Janata Party before it was dissolved in the name of elusive Opposition unity.

Behind the mini-revolt by the Karnataka group is the strategy of Mr Chandra Shekhar, former Janata Party president, from handing over leadership of the Janata Dal to the Devi Lal-Hegde cabal.

Whereas the Bangalore foundation conference appointed Mr V. P. Singh as president of the Janata Dal on "probation" for one month, the Janata Party National Council yesterday extended the probation by a few more weeks.

Unless Mr V. P. Singh toes the Chandra Shekhar line, which means constitution of the National Executive to the satisfaction of the former Janata chief and adhering strictly to the principle of one post for one person, the Janata Party is not going into voluntary liquidation.

Mr Devi Lal will have to choose between a Chief ministership and a parliamentary board chairmanship of the Janata Dal. Other office-bearers named by Mr Devi Lal may have to be content with lesser posts.

Before the National Council met on the lawns of the Vithalbai Patel House in New Delhi, there was a stormy close-door meeting of top leaders at the Karnataka Bhavan in which Mr Madhu Dandavate made an impassioned plea for dissolving the party immediately. This was resisted by Mr Chandra Shekhar and Mr Ajit Singh.

Mr Hegde kept a low profile. Fearing an imminent campaign against his misdeeds during his five-year stewardship as Karnataka Chief Minister by the Congress (I), he sought the indulgence of party leaders in shielding him. He was not even given the opportunity to second the resolution ratifying the merger moved by Mr Chandra Shekhar. The honour went to Mr S. R. Bommai, Karnataka Chief Minister.

Mr Deve Gowda, who participated in the closed-door meeting but not in the National Council or the plenary session, was insistent on protecting the interests of loyal Janata workers. In an attack on Mr Hegde for questioning the presidentship of Mr Ajit Singh, Mr Gowda wondered what would happen if people like Mr Devi Lal and company took control of the Janata Dal.

There were heated exchanges between Mr Hegde and Mr Ajit Singh but Mr Chandra Shekhar had his way by naming the latter to preside over the liquidation of the Janata Party, after completing all formalities and outstanding issues.

Mr Ajit Singh is in no hurry to unburden himself of presidentship of the Janata Party. With a number of top party leaders about to take off on foreign jaunts, the status quo will continue for the time being.

EEC Delegation Head Tells Purpose of Visit
46001192 Bombay TIMES OF INDIA in English
25 Nov 88 p 18

[Text] New Delhi, 24 Nov (The Times of India News Service)—The European Economic Community will strive to strengthen its relations with India and other

developing countries and improve scientific, industrial, cultural and trade cooperation among the community members and the developing countries.

This announcement was made yesterday by Mr Vincenzo Giummarra, chairman of the 14-member European parliamentary delegation for South Asia. The delegation is currently touring India to understand the Indian situation and the problems to find more avenues of cooperation in various spheres of the economy.

Allaying fears that the efforts being made by the European countries to achieve economic unity by the year 1992 will make Europe an isolationist fortress and the developing countries will not be allowed to enter the European market, Mr Giummarra reiterated that the unity efforts (economic) by the EEC members were for strengthening the internal functioning of the community and it would not affect anybody from outside the group.

This visit was to improve relations so that more aid could be given to India and other developing countries, Mr Giummarra commented while talking about the question of aid to the developing countries. Similarly, bilateral aid, trade and industrial and technological cooperation would not be affected by the unity move. There would be an improvement in them, he added.

The European Parliament which represents the 12 member-countries of the community, is responsible for the democratic functioning of the EEC and takes important decisions as the budgetary allocations, aid, funding and collaborations with member and non-member countries. The parliamentary delegation for South Asia looks after the relationship of EEC countries with the South-Asian countries.

Mr Giummarra also announced that the delegation would report back to the Parliament in a positive fashion so that the matter of improving relations with India was seen in right perspective. "This is good for both the sides," he emphasised.

Talking about the India's trade deficits vis-a-vis the European countries, Mr Giummarra said the trend had been reversed in 1987 as the deficit came down from 3.3 billion ECU to 2.9 billion ECU (1 ECU equals 1.16 U.S. dollar). In 1988, the same trend had continued and efforts were being made by the EEC countries to bridge the deficit gap, he said.

Long-term industrial cooperation between India and EEC countries was also being considered to make Indian goods competitive in the European market. Similarly, technological cooperation to bring Indian industry at par with the international industry was on the anvil. These measures would reduce the deficit by increasing export of Indian goods, Mr Giummarra said.

Commenting on India's role in Sri Lanka and Male, and how it has affected the EEC perspective on India, Mr Giummarra asserted that this action had established India as a stabilising factor in the region and also a protector of democracy and not its violator. The EEC had viewed both incidents in a positive manner, he stressed.

Dwelling on the role of the EEC, Mr Giummarra said the final target was to make the European Economic Community the European political community by removing all physical, monetary and such other barriers. But that at the moment was not feasible. "So we are striving only for economic unity to make the whole of Europe a big market," Mr Giummarra emphasised.

The delegation, which was here from Monday will visit Calcutta today and the European community-aided flood protection projects in West Bengal.

Paper Lists By-Elections Due To Be Held in 1989
46001193 *Bombay TIMES OF INDIA in English*
25 Nov 88 p 9

[Article by Subhash Kirpekar, The Times of India News Service]

[Text] New Delhi, 24 Nov—A virtual mini general election is due to be held in early 1989. There are eight by-elections to the Lok Sabha from five states and as many as 33 in 16 state assemblies.

If the general elections to the Lok Sabha are held as scheduled towards the end of 1989, then this exercise (of the by-elections) will give the Congress and the parties opposing it an opportunity to test their popularity.

Indeed, if the opposition, which is making efforts to unite, succeeds in fielding a common candidate against every Congressman in the poll arena, it will be tough going for the party ruling at the Centre.

The by-elections cover the width and breadth of India. There is not a single southern state where one or the other election is not due. Similar is the situation in the northern states and also in the north-eastern states.

There is a strong possibility, according to speculation among political parties, that the by-elections will be held together with the assembly elections due in Tamil Nadu. While a 30-day notification is required for holding assembly elections, the notice required for the other by-elections is 40 days.

The states where the Lok Sabha by-elections are due are Andhra Pradesh (Tirupati), Bihar (Sohar, Bhagalpur and Sasaram), Maharashtra (Akola), Orissa (Kendrapara), Kerala (Calicut) and Delhi South.

The vacancy caused in the Lok Sabha by the resignation of Mr Chingwang Conyak (Cong.) will be filled up through a by-election only after the boundary dispute between Assam and Nagaland is settled. In Tamil Nadu, the two by-elections in Madurai and Karur will be held along with the assembly election there. The by-election in Baghpat, a seat held by the late Mr Charan Singh, will be held only after the election petition pending in the high court is disposed of.

The states where by-elections to assemblies are due are Andhra Pradesh (one), Assam (two), Bihar (six), Gujarat (four), Haryana (one), Jammu and Kashmir (one), Karnataka (two), MP (three), Meghalaya (three), Maharashtra (one), Tripura (one), Rajasthan (one), UP (three), Arunachal Pradesh (one), Pondicherry (one) and the Delhi metropolitan council (two).

IRAN

Feda'iyān-e Khalq Publish List of 100 Executed Members
46400044b *London KEYHAN in Persian* 8 Dec 88 p 4

[Text] The Central Committee of the Feda'iyān-e Khalq Organization (Majority) in Germany has released to the German media and to foreign news agencies the following names of 100 of its members who were executed last month:

Anik, Rahim Ayatollahzadeh Shirazi, Mas'ud Akhgār, Ashraf Ahmadi, Col Abolghassem Afra'y, Nasser Alma-sian, Hoseyn Eqdami, Parviz Elahi, Abu-Torab Baqer-zadeh, Abdol'azim Baqeri, Bakhtabadi, Dr Fariborz Baqa'y, Manuchehr Behzadi, Siamak Behzadi, Mahmud Behkish, Hoseyn Bigdeli, Capt Mohsen Bigdeli, Mehrdad Panahi Shabestari, Esma'il Pur-Mohammadi, Asadollah Panjehshahi, Hamid Taj ol-Dini, 'Alireza Tashayod, Dr Javidpur, Saifollah Javidfar, Hoseyn Jalali, Hoseyn Judat, Ahmad Hatami, Hedayat Hatami, 'Abbas Hejri, Mohammad-Hassan Pak, Hamid Haqi Mani, Shafi Hoseynpur, Rahim Hoseynpur, 'Ali Naqi Hamidian, Karim Heydarnezhad, Zafar Heydari, Abolhassan Khatib, 'Ali-Akbar Khatib, A. Khatibi, Farzad Dadgar, Dr Ahmad Danesh, Assadollah Darikbandi, Mohammad Daryabari, Esma'il Zolqadr, Mohammad Rejali, Haqiqian Rudsari, Ja'far Riahi, Mohammad Riahi, Asef Razmdideh, Teymur Ravandi, Rowshanzadeh, Mohammad Reza Jamalifar, Seyyed Rowghani, 'Ezzatollah Zare', 'Ali Zemorodian, Hoseyn Siahqalam, Capt Shafi-pur, Majid Shamsabadi, Hoseyn Shahidi, Rahim Shams, Akbar Sadeqi Bonab, Fariborz Salehi, Abdol'azim Saburi, Hoseyn Sadra'y, Hassan Sedaqatpur, Hoseyn Sarafpur, Nasser 'Atta'y, Seyfollah GHiasvand, Mehrdad Farjad Azad, Sanayifar, Reza Fiazpur, Hoseyn Qassemnezhad, Hoseyn Qalambor, Davud Qoreyshi, Zohreh Qha'eni, Sasan Qandi, Siamak Qalambor, Bahman Qanbari, Sa'id Kazemi, Hushang Kamrani Mihani, Dr Gorgani, Sa'id Matin, Mojtaba Mohseni, Rafat Mohammadzadeh, Saber Mohammadzadeh, Mojtaba Matla' Sarabi, Hamid Montazeri, Mehrdad Motlaq,

Farajollah Mizani (Javanshir), Reza Moradian, Mirshekari, Mirzai, Hassan Nassari, Amir Hushang Nazemi (Nik-A'yeen), Bizhan Ne'manpur, Nasser Nowruzi, Ja'far Hushmand, Mahmud Hushi, Kazem Hamadani, and Daryush Yusefi.

It is rumored, as claimed by the Feda'iyane Khalq Organization, that Dr Kianuri and his wife have also been executed.

Meanwhile, a group of the Feda'iyane Khalq (Majority) has launched a hunger strike in the city of Göttingen to protest the recent executions.

Commentary Reflects on Recent Execution of Clerics

46400044a London KEYHAN in Persian 8 Dec 88 p 6

[Text] During the initial weeks of the revolution, one day Hadi Ghafari—after having condemned Gholamhoseyn Daneshi to death and having carried out the execution in his capacity as a canonic judge—visited the city of Qom and went to see Khomeyni in his house to hear a word of praise or encouragement from his lips. But Khomeyni, upon seeing him at the threshold, frowned, and without allowing him to sit down, said: "The killing of clerics should not be initiated in this country."

Hadi Ghafari retreated, put on his slippers, and went away to escape Khomeyni's glance. Since then no one with a turban on his head and a cloak over his shoulders was condemned to death by the tribunals of the Islamic Republic. Special tribunals for the clergy were established so that mullahs incompatible with Khomeyni would step into them as clerics and step out of them as pseudo-clerics. (Hojjat ol-Eslam Mahdavi, the prayer leader of Qolhak who was placed before the firing squad on charges of having collaborated with Sadeq Qotbzadeh, was considered to be an exception to the rule).

But presently the cloak and the turban no longer hold the same value in the eyes of the Ayatollah. If the words "diehard"—the invective "foolishly religious" that had been used by Khomeyni himself was censored by his son Ahmad—"idiot" and "ignorant" do not suffice to silence adversaries in clerical garb, there shall be no reservations in using lead bullets to that end. The killing of mullahs was not worthy of one like Hadi Qafari: Such an innovation is the exclusive right of Ayatollah Khomeyni. Some time ago Fathollah Omid Najafabadi, Hoseyn Arab, Sharafeddin Mashkur, Ja'far Qayur, and Mohsen Khavari Langarudi were executed by a firing squad—all were clerics from the circle of Ayatollah Montazeri.

The execution was carried out in Qom, near the home of Ayatollah Montazeri, so that the fiery message of Khomeyni—or any group acting in his name—would be heard by the successor chosen by the leader of the Islamic Revolution, in a manner that would leave no place for any misinterpretation. Was this the explicit

answer to Montazeri's implied threat apparently addressed to a visiting group but in fact directed at Khomeyni: "If you shut up mouths, then hands shall reach out for swords?"

Is the struggle for power in Tehran's regime heading towards a direction where—like the wild west—any one with the fastest draw could be the winner? Should the Imam's Charter of Brotherhood be translated into the scarring expression of bullets or the cutting language of daggers in order to be comprehensible for the pretenders of the legacy of the Islamic Revolution? Has the overture to great and bloody purges already been strummed irreversibly?

Inevitable Changes

Certain evaluations suggested that with the termination of the war, the Islamic government would lean towards moderation, both in its foreign policy and in the internal scene, before undergoing certain changes internally, changes that would render the trend towards moderation both credible and secure. This was not wishful thinking: Introducing the bill for the dissolution of the Revolutionary Guard to the Parliament, propounding the issue of combining the Committee into a single policing force, discussing the freedom—though conditional—of political parties on the part of the Minister of Information and Security, and lastly, the resignation of Mir Hoseyn Musavi—though it was not accepted—all of these portended that a powerful tendency within the regime (of course influenced by external forces) directed it towards moderation.

Talk of renewing ties with the United States, though propounded with caution but to the extent of being drawn into the media, forebode the existence of a tendency for breaking the taboos, a tendency that awaits a more favorable climate to make itself felt.

The Islamic Republic cannot help experiencing such changes. That what shall remain of the Islamic Republic after undergoing such changes is not of any immediacy—although the question deserves a serious discussion. What is of immediacy is that a sector of Tehran's regime is acutely horrified over the possibility of the situation getting out of hand in the process. It therefore struggles to hold the bridles so that the changes may not lead to its overthrow. Whereas another sector maintains that if the regime recklessly raises a curbing hand to suppress every opposing movement, it shall sooner or later fall into the quagmire it is so fearful of falling into today. The warps and woofs of power struggle are spun over such a groundwork.

Meanwhile, an indisputable fact should never be forgotten: The Ayatollah Khomeyni is concerned about the present, while all of the seekers of power are concerned about their future too. At this juncture the only individual who being blessed with authority, sees enough courage in himself to air his anxiety over the future, is

Ayatollah Montazeri. Since a long time ago he has withdrawn himself from beneath Khomeyni's shadow, and is propounding the type of government favored by himself. At this juncture deciding the share of practicality and popularity on the one hand and the share of conviction on the other, is beside the point. The government favored by him, as can be surmised from all of his words, is not the one which is holding the reigns in Iran today. Therefore if everything fails to change today, tomorrow will be very late.

Montazeri's difference with the other power seekers practically manifests itself in this same point. The standard-bearer of change and an about-face towards a credible moderation within the government is Montazeri. Rafsanjani does not measure up to him in this respect. Neither does Rafsanjani's place in the ranks of the Shiite clergy allow him that much, nor does this political foresight permit him to withdraw from beneath Khomeyni's shadow. Montazeri—correctly or incorrectly—believes himself to be somebody without Khomeyni, while Rafsanjani correctly believes that without Khomeyni he shall fail to keep aloft in the storm caused by the power struggle. That what would be the situation of the house speaker today, or in which quagmire would have landed, had he suffered only one of the blows inflicted upon Montazeri by the implied or explicit support of Khomeyni, is really worthy of consideration.

Nevertheless, there exists another major difference between Montazeri and Rafsanjani: Montazeri more or less views the government and its operations from without, while Rafsanjani is in the middle of the arena—in a sense, he is the game master—and his glance at the government's power is from within. Even if occasionally he wishes to create a gap between his views and those of Khomeyni, he shall never enter the arena face to face. He will stretch his head from behind Khomeyni and will show off cautiously, once more to hide himself behind Khomeyni with the utmost haste. Presently, that is the safest place for him.

For instance there exists a difference between the position lately retaken by Khomeyni vis-a-vis the United States and the position Rafsanjani has been forced to take in that respect. Let us take a closer look at this difference:

Khomeyni says: "As I have said time and again, the relationship between Iran and the United States is like the relationship between the lamb and the wolf: there can be no compromise between the two. The statement does not leave much for speculation. But Rafsanjani is by no means so explicit. Though he initially locks the door, but nevertheless returns to open it slightly. He says: "As the Imam declared, your—i.e., the United States—relations with us is like the relations of the wolf and the lamb." But he does not add that a reconciliation is impossible. On the contrary, he winks, "America wishes to set up relations with the Islamic Republic." And he adds: "If you are sincere in your intentions and wish to reestablish

relations with Iran, why have you frozen our assets? Why have you closed our accounts in America? Why don't you lift the sanctions on arms purchased at the time of the Shah?" The Irangate scandal commenced by these same innuendos and eyewinks. But today both sides have grown more cautious.

Between Pillar and Post There May Be Rescue

Rafsanjani knows well that the Islamic Republic—after a bloody 8-year war of no consequence, and in a sense, linked with defeat, a grounded economy, a wounded ideology and leadership due to efficiency and confidence crises—no longer is the regime that would temporarily manage to bewilder its opponent by the use of uncommon tactics, or the regime that could make its weight felt in international politics. Clocks should be wound and adjusted to the normal movement of world policies.

Rafsanjani knows well that until a central government, with powers inevitable to any central government deserving the name, takes over in Iran the situation will continue to persevere on the chaotic groundwork of the past, albeit foreign ministers, presidents of republics, and premiers of other countries keep on visiting Tehran and continue to make promises and pledges.

But at the same time Rafsanjani knows well that if there exists only one impossibility in the Islamic Republic, that impossibility is a 'planning effort'—even a short-termed one—on which one may be able to base a future. Therefore, he has no choice but to move forward step by step: "Between the pillar and the post there may be rescue." Rafsanjani's confidence in the future of the Islamic Republic is comparable to that of Montazeri, the opponents of Khomeyni's regime, and the opposition beyond the borders of the country.

PAKISTAN

Facing the Challenge of a Nuclear Option
46000061 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
18 Dec 88 p 4

[Article by Ikram Ullah]

[Text] Kahuta had surprisingly and unwittingly become a major election issue. It sparked off a campaign duel between the IJI and the PPP. The innocent voter totally ignorant about the factual position was pushed to a point by some publicity agencies that the security of the state of Pakistan was in danger. The Co-chairperson of the People's Party offered a public debate to remove the clouds. The dust settled down without such a debate as wiser counsels prevailed not to make a sensitive issue like Pakistan's nuclear study an instrument for vote catching. It is not an exclusive domestic issue. It has regional and global implications far more complex than the Afghanistan policy or our relationship with India.

Nuclear Club

Pakistan's pursuit for nuclear energy for peaceful purposes has plagued our relationship with the nuclear club countries over the past two decades. They are all determined that, Pakistan, at all costs, must be prevented from acquiring this technology. To date, the United States has been acting, for whatever reasons, as the leader and spokesman of this club. It has been chosen to perform this role for obvious reasons. It is the only country which has the ability to turn off the economic and military aid that has sustained Pakistan since our birth in 1947. Self-reliance is a mere slogan and as much a far cry as ever before. Without economic independence, political freedom is stripped of much of its true meaning. With the dawn of a new era in Pakistan, as we stand on the threshold of much coveted democracy, our financial bankruptcy speaks volumes. This is the yardstick by which the performance of the outgoing regime can be judged and measured. Zia said in July 1977 that Bhutto had left him an empty kitty. Bhutto's daughter does not seem to have inherited anything better in 1988.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was beset with many problems when he took over the task of governing Pakistan in December 1971. Seventeen years later in December 1988, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto faces a worse scenario, both domestic as well as global. And she has a long way to catch up with her father's stature, political acumen and perception of the virulent power games which consume the Third World all the time. The nuclear option is one such lethal issue.

The idea of developing nuclear energy was the brain child of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. In India it was Jawaharlal Nehru. In Israel, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion conceived the idea in 1957. Both India and Israel have long since joined the club, without any protest. On the contrary the Western response has been not only encouraging but gleeful. France and the U.S. actively helped Israel in acquiring the technology. There is ample evidence to justify this assertion. The motive was to equip Israel with a veto against the Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular. Denying a U.S. visa to Yasser Arafat to address the United Nations General Assembly in New York speaks louder than any other argument, on the subject of American love for Islam or freedom. Similarly, India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 was joyfully received by the West as a counter-balancing feat against China in Asia. It did not stop there. In September, 1979, there was a 'mystery flash' somewhere in the South Atlantic or Indian Ocean area. Initial announcements attributed the flash to a South African device. Later in February 1980, the CBS network of the United States attributed the explosion to Israel. In other words, at first the inference was that the blast was a South African bomb, probably aided by Israel. But the CBS report, five months later converted it into an Israeli bomb, probably aided by South Africa. Since then, there have been many alternative theories to wash out and eliminate the dust that was raised over this "mystery

flash." Those governments that are eager to minimise the chances of a nuclear arms race either in Africa, in the Middle East or South Asia, would in any case have been inevitably tempted to opt for a scenario which would not portray either South Africa or Israel as nuclear powers. This attitude of the club is certainly bad news for Pakistan, for the World of Islam and also for the African people, particularly the blacks in South Africa struggling for self-determination, freedom and democracy.

The Prime Minister, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto has inherited a paradoxical situation which in the current global backdrop is not easy to handle. The interests of Pakistan and those of the U.S. and its other allies like Israel not excluding India, clash violently over this issue. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto fought a gallant battle and risked his neck for what he believed to be a just cause. No one knows how much Pakistan has moved forward in this delicate area since 1979. For one thing the conflict in Afghanistan has been a blessing in disguise insofar as the softening of the U.S. attitude is concerned. But, once the Russians are out of Afghanistan, hopefully by February 1989, the Symington axe might again appear over the mushroom clouds of Kahuta.

One fact is quite evident. Except for their own trusted bedfellows, the great powers do not trust Third World countries with nuclear technology and least of all, any Muslim country like Pakistan. There is a theory that this distrust could become an asset if the threat of nuclearisation of the Third World creates enough consternation in the northern hemisphere to result in a massive international movement to declare nuclear weapons illegal for all, and to put an end to nuclear arsenals in every country that has them. According to Professor Ali A. Mazrui of the University of Michigan, who was recently in Lahore, what this theory means is that although greater risk of nuclear war comes from vertical proliferation in the northern hemisphere and only secondarily from horizontal proliferation in the Third World, the vertical variety in itself has not been enough to end this dangerous nuclear order. The "vaccination" of horizontal nuclear proliferation might be needed to cure the world of this nuclear malaise—a dose of the disease becomes part of the necessary cure.

Challenge

As far as Pakistan is concerned, its entire defence strategy has always been evolved in relation to the threat faced by it. Basically Pakistan's economy is ambivalent about militarism and rearmament. The rest of the Third World also shared this doctrine of non-alignment. So great was India's image in this respect that Uganda's Milton Obote described Nehru as "the founder of non-alignment." But how distantly related were the two doctrines of non-alignment and non-violence! Gandhi once said "Free India can have no enemy. For India to enter into the race for armaments is to court suicide. The world is looking for something new and unique from India. With the loss of India to non-violence, the last

hope of the world will be gone." But in spite of Gandhi's vision, independent India did not practice abstinence. Gandhi's non-violence was not fully translated either into foreign policy or defence procurement. Nor indeed into the domain of nuclear technology.

India's non-violence and non-alignment was destined to go nuclear. India was indeed the first non-aligned country to explode a nuclear device. India was also the first country without a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations, to go nuclear. The first five nuclear powers were precisely the warlords with the veto in the Security Council—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and the People's Republic of China. India at last had broken this neat equation and put the issue of nuclear proliferation on a new footing.

With Israel and South Africa having joined the club, the issue of nuclear non-alignment becomes a contradiction in itself. Pakistan finds itself in a difficult and dangerous position. After what happened to Baghdad, there has been talk of threats to Kahuta. It is strange and significant that when India tells the world that it will use its nuclear capability for peaceful purposes, everyone believes it. No one pays any heed to what Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and others, including Maldives have gone through. But strangely enough, when Pakistan assures the world, repeatedly, that it has no desire to put its nuclear technology to military use, everyone raises an eyebrow and threatens a veto.

The biggest challenge the Prime Minister of Pakistan faces today is the nuclear dilemma. Her father lost his life but did not give in on this issue. It is a political minefield through which she will have to tread with the utmost skill of diplomacy and statecraft.

Country's Reported 'Legacy of Economic Bondage'

46000057a Karachi DAWN in English 12, 13 Dec 88

[Article by Shahid Kardar]

[12 Dec 88 p 7]

[Text] As if it wasn't painful enough for the newly-elected democratic government to be greeted by an empty treasury, it now finds itself lumbered with the awesome and politically daunting task of having to implement the conditionalities of an IMF agreement signed by the department caretakers. By accepting such an agreement on the eve of the installation of a new regime, the outgoing team almost signed away the right of the coming set-up make its own decision in the matter. [as published]

Make no mistake about it, the outgoing regime has just negotiated for Pakistan the most comprehensive and harshest agreement yet signed with the IMF in this country's history. The new government certainly finds itself in a tough spot, cornered, and with its room for

manoeuvrability severely circumscribed. It finds itself caught between the devil and the deep sea. It can neither easily accept the agreement as it is, because there will be an unfavourable political fall-out of simply accepting and executing the suggested policies without amendments, nor can it afford to refuse the assistance, given the precarious state of the country's foreign exchange and the balance of payments position.

What are these measures? What will their impact on the economy and on our daily lives? How fair are these conditionalities in terms of the pace at which the adjustments will have to be made? And to what extent are the theoretical justifications underlying the proposals valid? These are some of the basic questions that need to be analysed because certificates of 'good behaviour' and sound economic policy issued by the IMF and the World Bank are critical determinants of a country's credit worthiness even in the private commercial lending market. Hence, the implications that will flow from the adoption of the IMF's proposed policy measures need to be examined carefully.

The agreement requires that the following measures to be undertaken to reduce the budgetary deficit.

i. Broadcasting of the tax base by subjecting to sales tax and excise duty commodities and services previously exempt and augmenting revenues by raising the sales tax and excise duty rates on the existing set of excisable products.

ii. Drastic upward revisions in the tariffs of utilities and services provided by the public sector. For instance, in the case of electricity, it is rumoured that in a separate agreement with the World Bank, WAPDA is committed to increase its charges at 14 percent per annum for the next 5 years, having already upped its charges earlier this year under the agreement.

iii. Substantial pruning of the development expenditure programme so as to achieve a 10 percent cut in the present level of activity. It should be noted, however, that over the last few years this, in fact, has already been taking place. Development expenditure, in the face of escalating non-development expenditure and declining revenues, has been slashed from 8.7 percent of GDP in 1977-78 to 7 percent of GDP in 1987-88.

iv. Reduction in subsidies.

v. A tighter monetary policy.

The need to tackle the imbalance between government revenues and expenditure is certainly crucial and thus a laudable objective, but the implications of the above policy measures are not likely to be lost on anyone. The ideological sympathy that such a set of measures that rely on raising of revenues more through indirect taxes than direct income and wealth related taxes like agricultural income tax, capital gains tax, etc., has with the interests

of the rich will, of course, find favour with powerful economic groups who will come out less bruised from the reformatory and corrective measures. Hence, the above mentioned conditionalities need not be discussed at length.

A tightening of belts will be required all round by the inflation that will be fuelled by higher indirect taxation. This will be extremely painful for the poverty-stricken segments of the population, 40 percent of which already lives below the poverty line. Not only will they have to suffer a further deterioration in their purchasing power; the depreciation that inflation will make inevitable in the value of the rupee (so that we can maintain the competitiveness of our exports in international markets) will, at least in the short term squeeze the poor even more, as imports of important products like edible oils and fuel become expensive on account of the depreciated value of the rupee.

Similarly, a cut in development expenditure will render it difficult to pursue policies aimed at increasing employment opportunities in the more backward regions, in sharp contrast to the currently high level of expectations and aspirations in Sind and Baluchistan. As for the demand for a stricter monetary policy, it should be noted that it is likely to lead to a rise in interest rates. This factor, by increasing the cost of investment, will have an adverse impact on industrial growth, thereby further limiting alternatives for generating employment opportunities.

There are, however, two conditionalities that need to be examined in depth:

a. The linking of the procurement price of the main agricultural commodities—wheat, rice, cotton, and sugarcane—to international prices.

b. Continued liberalisation of imports by a lowering of tariff walls, by reducing tariff levels and by extending permission to import around 150 items currently on the restricted list.

Another proposed policy measure (not being dealt with in detail here) is deregulation and the gradual dismantling of various controlling mechanism. It should be noted, however, the import liberalisation conditionality is inextricably linked to the policy of general liberalisation and deregulation of the economy and the withdrawal of various controlling and regulatory procedures. An important stipulation of this while liberalisation package is a docile and quiescent labour force. This implies that workers have to be disciplined so that the market can operate freely and without shackles. The proposed liberalisation, thus, requires an authoritarian political set-up, which this government, obviously, cannot be expected to adopt. But without this tight rein on the labour front, and in the absence of a lax attitude on working conditions for labour, entrepreneurs may not find decontrols a sufficiently attractive incentive to stimulate investment activity.

Let us now proceed to examine the theoretical foundations of conditionalities (a) and (b) separately. The new IMF agreement in line with what the World Bank has been demanding in recent years, is asking the government to set its support/procurement prices of our major crops, such as cotton, rice, wheat, and sugar cane at levels prevailing in international markets. This policy measure is being recommended on the plea that it would provide the necessary incentive to farmers to increase production, i.e., as the best tool for stimulating a supply response.

The maintenance of prices close to, and in line with, the world prices is a key instrument in the IMF policy package however, the feasibility of such a policy instrument is doubtful or questionable:

i. In view of fluctuating exchange rates.

ii. Considering that foreign trade in agricultural commodities plays a limited role; it constitutes a relatively small proportion of total domestic production.

iii. On the grounds that there may be situation in which procurement prices are low compared to world prices but prices to the consumer may be high because of middlemen and as such, remedial measures would be required in the field of marketing rather than in pricing.

iv. That it is obligatory on the government to balance the claim of the farmers with surpluses against the interests of the consuming sections of society, especially the disadvantaged sections, and the need to maintain better control over the price level; and

v. In view (i) and (iii) there is also the difficulty of identifying an international price. The problem of defining 'an international price' cannot be viewed lightly. This is because high production subsidies in the developed countries, in the United States in particular, stimulate high-cost production a part of which is then off loaded in international markets with the aid of export subsidies. For instance, the international price of wheat is high because of the huge production subsidies paid by the American Government to its farmers.

Government policies influence prices but then prices are also influenced by market and, other, non-market forces. Higher prices cannot by themselves increase production. Non-price factors like credit availability, fertiliser, assured supply of water, transportation, institutional arrangements, and access to cost-reducing technology and communication network also influence agricultural production considerably. Without these measures pricing policies will be largely ineffective in satisfying the objectives underlying the upward adjustment in procurement prices.

The grower's decision to grow one crop rather than another is not determined by the price but the net return from the cultivation of a particular crop. Included in the determination of the returns and costs are his estimates

on the real price he will have to pay to get the inputs, his ability to get credit from financial institutions, and the ease with which he can reap and sell his produce in the market.

Supporters of higher procurement prices argue that although higher prices of agricultural produce favour the large farmers, i.e. those with the disposable surpluses, the policy is desirable for pushing up the rate of growth of agriculture. But this policy has an adverse impact on the cost of living of the poor, specially the rural poor, considering that a large proportion of the agricultural population constitutes those who are net buyers of food.

Moreover, a uniform purchase price for the country on the basis of an average cost of production favours the higher productivity regions (for instance Sind in Pakistan) and the large farmers. The distributive and social costs rise further under the existing method of determining production costs, in which other than the actual paid-out costs of the farmer, an estimated valuer for family and hired labour, imputed market rents for land, etc., are also applied by the Agricultural Prices Commission in determining production costs for fixation of support prices. The repeated demands of the farming lobby for remunerative prices in whose determination costs such as the rental value of land are also included favour the bigger landlords, who do not cultivate their own farms but merely supervise the farming operation.

Therefore, as the gains of higher prices are primarily private, and concentrated in a few hands, as against the social costs, what is required is a package that includes technology and infrastructure. These are better tools for promoting growth as they are most cost-effective and result in a better distribution of incomes.

Import liberalisation is being proposed on the plea that a substantial increase in imports of industrial raw material inputs and plant and machinery is necessary if the process of industrial growth has to be accelerated, if the efficiency and the productivity of the industrial sector have to be raised, and if exports have to be stepped up significantly. The argument concedes that in the short terms this liberalisation of imports may worsen the balance. However, the above mentioned benefits will eventually accrue to the economy in the long run, i.e., after a lag.

The balance of payments can, of course, be improved by either curtailing imports or by raising exports. But the programme in operation under the guidance of the IMF proposes a set of measures which oppose a cut-down on imports on the grounds that import liberalisation will encourage modernisation and raise efficiency (primarily through exposure to greater competition) and productivity and thereby domestic growth. However, the adopted course reflects a conspicuous deviation from the objectives of self-reliant development. What is conveniently forgotten, when such remedies are suggested, is that practically none of the so-called developed countries

industrialised themselves in a liberal environment in respect of trade. Nor does the IMF explain its silence on the restrictions placed on our exports in the markets of developed countries and its inability to convince them to lower these barriers while it forces us to lower ours.

[13 Dec 88, p 7]

[Text] The question, therefore, we must ask is why the IMF is proposing policies that might result in worsening the trade deficit and the balance of payments position. By getting us to lower trade barriers not only do the advanced countries manage to sell their products; the inevitable currency depreciation which accompanies this liberalization also keeps low the price of their raw-material goods which we export. And the IMF is fully aware that any major expansion which could reduce the high levels of domestic unemployment in developed countries (its mentors), without high rates of inflation, requires cheap and abundant supplies of energy and primary commodities (exported by developing countries) used as raw materials by the industrial structure in the West.

Having indicted above the important reasons for remedies suggested by the IMF, it would be pertinent to recognise there that the difficulties being encountered our foreign trade are not merely the outcome of the policy of import liberalization. This situation is the natural outcome of the framework within which the economy is operating and the direction of the overall policy package that the previous government had employed to promote investment and production for stimulating growth. Under this framework import-intensive production structures were being encouraged. Hence, to this extent IMF is right when it argues that import controls will slow down the growth process.

It should be evident to most that without a liberal import policy the assembly plants for motor cars, motor-cycles, colour televisions, air-conditioners and the like would face acute operational problems.

In fact, if the imports of components were obstructed or checked in any way, these units would close overnight.

With the economy developing within such a framework, it would be extremely fanciful and unrealistic to either assume or expect that the government has any options or alternatives to the prevailing import policy. This policy can hardly be inverted or turned around without seriously affecting industrial production and growth.

To finance these imports and purchases of defence equipment exports, in the face of declining remittances, will have to be stepped up. And, pray, how do you bring about a perceptible increase in exports in an increasingly protectionist international market for the whole range of other products in which Pakistan could, under some esoteric theory, develop a potential? to this the IMF would reply: by the technological upgradation of the

production processes and the modernisation and replacement of the generally obsolete plants and equipment in the exporting sector, i.e., by increasing imports of high-quality industrial inputs. The argument has thus come full circle. It is so delightfully simple and obvious, and of course, logically consistent, if the existing economic institutional structures are assumed to be the unchangeable fixed parameters of the economic model.

To support the argument for export-led growth, the example of South Korea is frequently held out. Let us, therefore, see what lessons the South Korean example furnishes.

South Korea has been run by a repressive dictatorial regime. Labour unions are prohibited under the law while there are no minimum wage laws. Although dictatorial in tenor, the government machinery has operated efficiently and to a considerable free of extent corruption. Its industrialisation could proceed and could be sustained by a fairly high degree of income-and-asset-ownership equality which controlled rural unemployment, and thereby rural-urban migration.

Not only did it achieve a very high rate of literacy and a strongly motivated population, the State played a very active and interventionary rule in guiding allocation of resources by identifying the direction and extent of economic activity. The State did not permit markets to play the determining role in shaping the production structure of the economy, contrary to what is widely believed. It controlled the banking system and the financial agencies and the inflows and outflows of foreign exchange.

Finally, what could be achieved by South Korea cannot be achieved by Pakistan and other countries of similar size if, given, the international market structure, all were to simultaneously pursue a similar set of policies.

The World Bank's argument throughout the 1980s was that the so-called NICs would graduate from textiles, leather products and unsophisticated consumer goods into products like motor cars, computers and VCRs. The exploitation of export opportunities and more basic industries, the argument went, would be left to newcomers. This did not happen. These NICs have done no such thing; they are still very much entrenched in, for example, textiles. Moreover, the rules on non-tariff barriers in terms of quantitative restrictions and quotas on textile products and footwear have become more stringent over the years. The greater the success of a particular country in a specific export category the more restrictive became the quotas.

There have been radical changes in the international economy. Not only are there synthetic substitutes and high, almost unsustainable levels of external debt; the world economy faces surpluses and gluts, hardly an encouraging scenario for new entrants. However, despite these far-reaching changes, the World Bank and the IMF continue to prescribe export-led growth as the panacea for

heavily indebted countries. It is surprising that despite the proven bankruptcy of this advice throughout the recessionary period of the 1980s, it is still being touted.

Article Calls for New Media Policy

46000057c Karachi DAWN in English 15 Dec 88 p 7

[Article by M. B. Naqvi]

[Text] Pronouncements on Press freedom and professional autonomy of Radio and TV by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Mr Javed Jabbar, the minister of state for information, are happy auguries for the new democratic phase in national life. On this subject it is necessary to separate the vital issues from the peripheral.

A large number of specific problems are being placed before the new government by journalists, editors and newspapers owners. The PFUJ [Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists] and other professional bodies have long been agitating on hard details of the issues the journalists face from day to day like the demand for new Wage Board, reinstatement of sacked workers, improvement in working conditions, terms of employment, etc. The editors are asking for improving the new Press law. The owners have their long and familiar list of desires about advertisement rates, newsprint quotas, import licences, etc. Now, none of these is irrelevant or unimportant. But what is of vital concern is what do the media communicate and whether they are able to do so in a professionally honest and free way.

Essence of democracy is not so much the shape and character of institutions that govern society but the spirit of tolerance and accommodation that informs them. Whatever else it may or may not be, a democratic dispensation is marked by pluralism and acceptance of the right of all schools of thought to express themselves without let or hindrance. It is not the intention here to underplay the importance of representative institutions of government and the majority's right to govern; no Pakistani can underrate their importance after such long spells of despotism, both military and civil.

But it is necessary to put the problem in perspective: only the majority has the right to govern a society but this has to be in a manner that preserves society's pluralism—all flowers should bloom. Representative institutions are the means through which human freedoms are to be preserved through checks and limitations on the possible tendency of a majority to suppress minorities. This is effected mainly by freedom of all to express themselves, especially through the press and other media.

Being a working journalist, I cannot but sympathise with journalists' specific grievances of bad terms and conditions of service, low wages and other inequities. But two points need to be made: first, the journalistic fraternity has no special rights and should demand no extraordinary privileges from any government, no matter how

democratic; special privileges can be a corrupting influence. We journalists are ordinary citizens and ought to be satisfied with the rights and obligations of ordinary citizens. Secondly, the specific issues the PFUJ and CPNE are wont to bring up with the government are day-to-day problems of a profession that ought not to obscure the importance of basic problems of the media and how they should operate.

The first item on the agenda, no doubt, should be Government-Press relations. Replacement of PPO [Press & Publications Ordinance] by RPPO [Revised Press & Publications Ordinance?] was certainly an improvement. But RPPO, too, is restrictive. There is no need for a special Press law. If journalists and editors are ordinary citizens with ordinary privileges and obligations of a citizen, as they in fact are, ordinary statutes should suffice. If the government wishes to keep itself informed of what is being published, District Magistrates can certainly sent it returns of declarations given (chiefly for statistical purposes) for periodicals or books published in their ares of competence.

A few detailed observations in respect of the print media are necessary. Too much government ought to be taken off the back of all media of communication. Specifically, the overly big and terribly expensive Ministry of Information is totally an unnecessary white elephant. A competent PID [Press Information Department] is all that a democratic government needs to keep the Press and populace informed of what it plans to do and what it is doing. A dictator's requirements are different. But a truly representative party government can do without an elaborate propaganda apparatus.

Specific mention needs to be made of two levers of control that dictators have effectively used in the past: concentration of public sector advertisements and newsprint quotas. A previous Information Minister, Kazi Abid if memory serves, is on record having said that ads are not a right of a newspaper (by virtue of circulation) but a privilege that the government may bestow on anyone it likes. This is a pernicious policy. To start with, there ought to be no centralisation of advertisements. Secondly, the government, as such, should have nothing to do with their distribution. Let each advertiser select the particular paper or medium it thinks best for promoting its business. The same applies to newsprint quota: it should be available to all citizens in quantities they need; newspapers need have no monopoly or near-monopoly.

The prime minister has accorded a high priority to disbanding the National Press Trust (NPT). But it is a hornet's nest of difficult problems. It is necessary for the government to make up its mind whether it really wants to break up this less-than-honest government monopoly (in practice, if not in theory). Let it do so despite the losses the nationalised banks are sure to suffer and an increase in the numbers of unemployed journalists is also likely—the two bugbears that will have to be faced

anyhow. No private entrepreneur, not even Ch. Shujaat Hussain, will buy PPL [Pakistan Press Ltd.?] with its present liabilities; Adamjis might not touch MORNING NEWS with a barge pole, given its huge debt obligations to banks. Employees' cooperatives owning newspapers has not worked out in the UK and elsewhere—except perhaps France. And banking system's accumulated loans are a disincentive in all cases. Some newspapers would, in any case run the risk of closure and the resultant unemployment of workers. There is no real escape from these consequences; let the government wash its hands of this whole business by withdrawing its pressure on banks to go on giving loans to this unviable institution.

None of this should, however, be taken to mean that since both prospects—of a large number of unemployed journalists and writing off of accumulated bank loans—would be hard to countenance by the Benazir government, the NPT would remain intact or should be reserved in its present form. Far from it. Nothing will destroy the credibility of the new government more quickly than its reneging on the pledge to disband the NPT and implement other measures for insuring Press freedom. All it simply means is that the operation will be an extremely difficult undertaking and shall involve a cost, besides a whole lot of complex problems not easy to solve. After all, who can make an omelette without breaking eggs?

Possible suggestions about how to do it can include, apart from the (only) seemingly hard idea of handing over these papers to possible private owners, without too many financial liabilities, creation of new, smaller non-profit making trusts for each paper to be run by Boards of Governors comprising eminent personalities like retired judges of Supreme and High Courts, senior bureaucrats and journalists, a representative each of the CPNE and PFUJ this must be reinforced by a foolproof statute guaranteeing independence of policy and non-interference by government in the functioning and powers of the trusts' Board of Governors who should have full powers of hiring and firing of papers' MDs and editors. A second suggestion, in the case of one or two papers—again minus past financial liabilities—would be employees' cooperative ownership, to be guided by truly independent Boards of governors comprising similar prominent individuals and with same statutory safeguards of non-interference.

None of these suggestions is either too utopian or too easy. But both can be tried. The latter fits in ideally with APP's [Associated Press of Pakistan] possible reorganisation with minor modifications: all newspapers can jointly own it together with the TV and Radio news organisations. Needless to say, if 'professional autonomy' of Radio and TV news and comments means anything at all, it means its guidance by similar councils and committees made up of persons of high moral integrity and with a reputation for independence. The

world at large will watch with much interest this Pakistani experiment and would applaud even its approximate success. That would redound to the credit of the new government in a manner that nothing else will or can.

Secret funds and subsidies to other so-called private newspapers should also end. Indeed, discretionary funds are a source of corruption in all cases and circumstances. Other specific issues concern news agencies: APP needs to be disinvested at whatever cost to all concerned. Paper syndicates, and agencies ought to go or stand on their own feet. What is the rationale of wasting Rs 624.4 million on the Information set-up, excluding the cost on PBC [Pakistan Bar Council], PTV [Pakistan Television] and other agencies during fiscal 1988-89? In the case of the previous regime, it was to drum up support for it by projecting its ideas and viewpoints. But this is not needed by a party government; it is the party that popularises and promotes its policies and programmes and not paid pipers. The latter's performance is there for all to see: which dictator could save his power through them when people revolted or fate struck?

It is radio and TV that pose equally perplexing problems. But if a democratic government has the courage of its

conviction, it needs to rack its brains for long. What kills professional competence and freedom of these media government ownership and control. (Making them corporations does not change the hard reality of official control; not much reliance can be placed on legal fictions). Professional autonomy—the declared goal of the PPP government—can make sense only when two conditions are met: government stops underwriting these institutions and hands over their control to truly high-powered autonomous bodies with powers of hiring and firing senior personnel and of framing policies that they think fit, with, may be, broad guidelines from the government.

Let these media live on their own earnings alone. It may also be desirable to break their monopoly by allowing private radio and TV stations. Each will have to survive on its professional competence and responsiveness to public needs and desires. These are not easy choices to make in, a situation of over-contradiction. There are also risks and imponderables involved in a process of reform and liberalisation. But the choices must be made and risks taken in the confident belief that eventually the political and democratic dividend would far outweigh the short-term advantages of a policy of total control and insistence on conformity.

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